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ABSTRACT
Saleema A. Karim:  The Magnet Recognition Program:   
What are the Effects on Financial Performance? 
(Under the direction of George H. Pink) 
 
Information asymmetry is defined as an imbalance of information between two parties 
where one party has more information than another party.  In health care, information asymmetry 
impairs the ability of hospitals to compete effectively because customers are unable to evaluate 
the quality of health care, which then influences customer selection of hospitals.  In order to 
reduce information asymmetry, some hospitals attain quality designations from external parties 
as signals of their commitment to health care quality and quality management to patients, 
providers, and payers.  One particular quality designation in health care is the Magnet 
Recognition Program. 
 Magnet Recognition has been promoted as a signal for nursing excellence and quality 
patient care over the past two decades.  Despite the financial investment required to attain the 
designation, there has been limited research investigating Magnet Recognition as an effective 
signal of quality.  The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the Magnet 
Recognition signal by examining its effect on various dimensions of hospital financial 
performance:  reimbursement, market share, cost inefficiency and ultimately profitability. 
 A pre-post research design, using control hospitals, was used to measure the effect of the 
signal.  Secondary data from the Medicare Cost Reports, Area Resource File, American Hospital 
Association and American Nurses Credentialing Center were used.  The sample consisted of a 
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longitudinal, unbalanced panel of hospitals located in urban areas between 2000 to 2010.  The 
empirical analysis consists of two phases:  (1) propensity score analysis and (2) difference-in 
difference analysis using fixed effects and a stochastic frontier panel model with random effects. 
 The Magnet Recognition signal was found to have no effect on either hospital 
reimbursement or market share.  The lack of signal effectiveness on reimbursement and market 
share may be attributed to either the signal strength, interpretability of the signal or 
responsiveness to the signal.  However, the signal was associated with a significant reduction of 
cost inefficiency.  Overall, the signal resulted in a significant increase in profitability.  In 
addition to affecting the appeal and demand for the designation, these results present hospital 
managers and policy makers with the pathway by which the signal may impact hospital 
profitability.  
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
Problem Statement 
Information asymmetry is defined as an imbalance of information between two parties, 
where one party has more information than another party.  This imbalance can result in 
misinformation and an imbalance of power in transactions.  One way to mitigate this imbalance 
is via signaling theory.  Various types of signals are utilized to reduce information asymmetry.  
Examples of signals commonly used by organizations include branding1-3, advertising3, 
reputation4, research and development5, profit status6 and quality designations.7-9   
In health care, information asymmetry impairs the ability of hospitals to compete 
effectively in health care markets10 because customers are unable to evaluate the quality of health 
care services.  This incomplete information influences consumer selection of hospitals.8  In order 
to reduce information asymmetry, hospitals sometimes attain quality designations from external 
parties as signals of their commitment to health care quality and quality management to patients, 
providers and payers.9  One particular quality designation in health care is the Magnet 
Recognition (MR) Program®.   
This MR designation is an example of a signal employed by hospitals to communicate to 
patients, providers and payers, the hospital’s commitment to health care quality and quality 
management via nursing service excellence.9  MR can be considered a symbol of distinction11; 
indeed, Karkos et al. viewed MR as a signal of nursing excellence and quality patient care.12  MR 
signals to consumers and to health care providers about the quality of care, and in particular 
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nursing care, which they can expect to receive in a MR hospital13-15, which in today’s 
competitive market place is an important hospital characteristic.16, 17 
The American Nurses Credentialing Center (ANCC) confers the MR designation to 
hospitals and long term care facilities.18, 19  The MR process is an external professional peer 
review of a hospital’s environment20, with a focus on nursing, that requires the commitment of 
time and the investment of substantial human and financial resources.21, 22  Hospitals seeking MR 
are required to meet stringent criteria related to excellence in patient satisfaction, nurse 
satisfaction and nurse sensitive clinical outcomes.23   
MR designation has gained widespread attention in both research24, 25 and practice26 over 
the past two decades.  A MR hospital is acknowledged as a gold standard for quality nursing 
care27 and is the highest level of recognition a health care organization can receive for excellence 
in nursing services.14  The program has also been promoted and recommended by popular media 
as a signal for nursing excellence.  For example, in 2005, the U.S. News & World Report added 
MR hospital designation to its set of criteria used in the selection of the best hospitals in the 
U.S.20, 28  In 2010, nine of the 14 hospitals listed on the U.S. News & World Report’s Best 
Hospitals Honor Roll were MR hospitals.29 
Despite the financial investment required to attain the MR designation, there has been 
limited research investigating MR as an effective signal of unobserved quality.  The ANCC has 
promoted MR as a mechanism to improve hospital financial performance30 and rationalized the 
improvement through signaling to patients and clinicians that the hospital is a center for nursing 
excellence and the provider of quality patient care12 leading to increased volume of patients and 
corresponding increases in hospital market share15, 18, 31 and revenue.32  Unfortunately the 
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evidence in the literature about the impact of MR on hospital financial performance is largely 
anecdotal in nature and lacks scientific rigor.33   
Given the endorsements and increasing interest in the MR program, despite the lack of 
evidence on its effectiveness, there is a notable gap in knowledge that is highly relevant in the 
hospital marketplace.  The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of the MR signal 
by examining its effect on the various dimensions of hospital financial performance.   
 
What We Know about MR as a Quality Signal 
Much has been published on MR and its impact on hospital, nursing and patient 
outcomes.24, 25  MR hospitals are noted for their success in recruiting and retaining nurses by 
creating environments that foster empowerment, autonomy, responsibility, control over 
environment and positive collaborative nurse-physician relationships.34, 35  Overwhelming 
research evidence demonstrates positive outcomes of MR for hospitals36, specifically related to 
job satisfaction, retention of nurses, hospital marketability and patient outcomes.37  However, 
there is minimal research on the association between MR and indicators of financial 
performance.   
The hypothesized financial benefits associated with MR have been rationalized through 
the potential for cost savings38, increased volume of patients leading to increased hospital market 
share15, 18, 31 and better reimbursement rates.32  However, MR requires substantial investment of 
both time and resources39 thus, it is an expensive proposition for organizations interested in the 
designation.40  Moreover, a recent study by Jayawardhana et al. (2014) found that inpatient costs 
are higher for MR hospitals than non-MR hospitals, although MR hospitals were also found to 
have higher net inpatient revenues.41  Because the costs of pursing and maintaining MR are high, 
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more research is needed to understand the effectiveness of the MR signal as it relates to hospital 
financial performance.   
 
How this Study Fills the Gap in Knowledge 
Previous studies assessing the effect of signaling on firm performance have utilized small 
sample sizes, cross-sectional study designs, single-site evaluations, and convenience samples of 
firms, therefore limiting external validity of the results.  To overcome some of these limitations, 
this dissertation uses a longitudinal panel data set (addressing issues of sample size, selection 
bias and omitted variable bias), and externally reported administrative and financial information, 
applies a robust methodological approach, and employs innovative analytical techniques to 
investigate the effectiveness of the MR signal as measured by changes in various aspects of 
hospital financial performance.  Importantly, the approaches used in this study control for the 
fact that MR hospitals differ from non-MR hospitals.  This more rigorous methodological 
approach provides stronger empirical evidence of the effectiveness of the MR signal on hospital 
financial performance.  
The central hypothesis of this dissertation is that the MR signal will increase hospital 
financial performance through increasing hospital reimbursement, market share and efficiency of 
designated hospitals.  The three specific aims are as follows: 
• Aim 1: Determine the effect of the MR on hospital reimbursement and market share (Chapter 
4). 
• Aim 2:  Determine the effect of the MR on hospital cost inefficiency (Chapter 5). 
• Aim 3: Determine the effect of the MR on hospital financial performance (Chapter 6). 
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Relevance of the Question for Policy and/or Practice 
Although the primary purpose of the MR is not to improve financial performance of 
hospitals, with the current economic climate, fiscal constraints, healthcare workforce shortages, 
and reduced payer reimbursements for healthcare services, hospitals may pursue this strategy to 
increase competitiveness in the health care market and to improve financial performance and 
viability.  The pursuit of the MR is an important organizational decision that requires substantial 
modifications to the structure and culture of organizations and considerable investment of time 
and resources, initially and ongoing as the process continues. 
The results of this dissertation have important implications for the various stakeholders 
involved with MR, including the MR program, hospital managers, the nursing profession and 
policy makers.  The empirical evidence of the effect of the MR signal on hospital financial 
performance may affect the appeal, demand and marketability of the MR program to currently 
designated MR hospitals and potentially interested hospitals.  Hospital managers and decision 
makers may use the results as a deciding factor for undertaking the MR endeavour.  The value 
and contribution of the nursing profession to hospital financial performance may be recognized 
as an essential component to the financial viability of hospitals.  Finally, policy makers may be 
interested in the cost-quality trade-offs and financial effects related to MR as other signals of 
quality (e.g. Hospital Compare) are incentivized through payment policy.  
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
The sections of the dissertation are organized as follows:  Chapter 2 provides background 
on the MR program, a conceptual model on information asymmetry and signaling theory, and 
discusses current literature on the effect of signaling on performance of corporate firms and 
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health care organizations in particular.  Chapter 2 concludes by presenting the limitations of 
existing studies and justification for this dissertation research.  Chapter 3 describes the methods 
used in the dissertation, including study design and rationale, sample, data sources, hypotheses, 
and analytical approaches.  Chapters 4 to 6 are manuscripts corresponding to Aims 1 to 3, 
respectively, and are intended for submission to peer-reviewed journals.  Chapter 7 synthesizes 
the multiple findings of the dissertation, discusses its policy implications, and proposes future 
potential research opportunities.
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CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Overview 
This literature review serves two main purposes.  First, it reviews the literature on 
signaling theory and its role in reducing information asymmetry in corporate and health care 
settings and presents evidence on the effectiveness of signaling unobserved quality in health care 
settings.  Second, it introduces MR as a signal utilized by hospitals to distinguish themselves 
from competitors.  Background information on MR is provided to support the application of 
signaling theory to this dissertation.  This includes the impetus for hospitals pursuing MR and the 
journey to achieving MR.  In addition, research evidence on nursing, patient and organizational 
outcomes for MR hospitals is discussed, and the gaps in the MR literature are identified.  The 
principles of signaling theory are applied to explain the role of MR as a signal of unobserved 
quality.  
 
Theoretical Background 
The Role of Signals in Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry arises when there is imperfect information between two parties.42  
For instance, information asymmetry exists when firms know more than consumers about the 
services and products they sell and due to imperfect information, consumers are unable to 
evaluate the product or service quality.2  If consumers are unable to distinguish high quality 
firms from low quality firms, they may shift their demand to substitute products and/or services 
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or else pay a non-discriminatory price to all firms.7  Signaling is used to reduce the imbalance of 
information between two parties.  The quality information conveyed by signals leads consumers 
to update their perceptions2, 43 about product and service quality within the context of market 
conditions.44   
As described by Connelly et al. (2011), the signaling process consists of four elements: 
(1) the signaler, (2) the signal, (3) the receiver and (4) feedback (Figure 1).  The signalers are 
insiders or firms who have access to information about the product, service, or the organization 
that is not available to outsiders.43  
 
Figure 1.  Signaling Timeline (Adapted from Connelly et al., 2011) 
 
The signaler undertakes a decision or action (the signal) that communicates information 
regarding some type of unobservable quality to outsiders or consumers, to express positive 
organizational characteristics.43  There are two characteristics of effective signals: (1) signal 
observability, or the extent to which outsiders are able to notice the signal, and (2) signal cost.  
The credibility of a signal is linked with signal cost45; the costlier the signal, the less likely 
imposters will imitate quality signals and the more meaningful the signal.2  Signals become 
ineffective if they can be imitated by firms that do not have valid information to communicate.46 
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The receivers are outsiders or consumers who have limited information, but would like to 
receive this information to make informed decisions.  When signaling is effective, the signaler 
benefits from an action taken by the receiver that the receiver would not have otherwise 
performed.  This usually involves selection of the signaler over other alternatives.  In turn, 
receivers gain by making more informed decisions.  Lastly, feedback is the information sent back 
to signalers regarding the effectiveness of their signals.43  
 
Signaling Unobservable Firm Quality  
There are a number of studies that have examined the use of specific signals to 
communicate information about unobservable firm characteristics or firm quality to consumers. 
These signals can take on many forms, including corporate name changes46, quality 
designations7, management quality47, 48, product branding1-3, advertising expenditures3, pricing 
strategies49, and warranties.3  Firms use these and other signaling strategies to communicate 
unobservable quality to other firms and consumers.  The effectiveness of signals depends on 
various factors49 and is usually determined by examining the corresponding changes in firm 
performance.  According to the research literature the impact of signals on firm performance is 
varied.  
For instance corporate names have been known to signal a firm’s quality and reputation49 
and are linked directly to its’ successes and failures.  Firms considering corporate name changes 
usually make large financial investments to ensure the name is consistent with the firm’s image 
and strategic priorities.  Corporate name changes usually result from mergers and acquisitions or 
firms’ decisions to enter a new line of business.  Firms may also take on a new name to signal to 
customers, competitors and investors of a new approach to doing business.  In order to be an 
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effective signal, the name change must be a positive signal.  Previous research on corporate 
name changes has demonstrated either no significant market reactions or positive but statistically 
weak effects on firm performance.46  However, a study by Koku (1997), which investigated the 
effects of name change in the service industry, found that corporate name change signaling, on 
average, was an effective marketing strategy for firms in the service industry as measured 
through increases in the firm’s mean price per earnings ratio.46  
Firms may also pursue quality designations such as Total Quality Management, Business 
Process Reengineering, the Malcolm Baldrige Award Criteria, Six Sigma and more recently ISO 
9000, to signal unobservable attributes to stakeholders.50  For example, one study showed that 
implementing the ISO 9000 Quality Management Standard, created by the International 
Organization for Standardization, may act like a market signal of superior quality – such as in 
supply chains where buyers are so far removed from suppliers, it is difficult for buyers to 
identify high quality suppliers.  Since ISO 9000 requires compliance with a wide range of quality 
system standards and participation in an external audit and review, firms that complete the 
management steps needed to certify with this designation signal desirable organizational 
attributes, such as management commitment to ongoing improvements, lean production practices 
and consistent product quality.  These signals have been shown to communicate guaranteed 
product quality and service from the supplier to the buyer.  Research evidence indicates that ISO 
9000 designated firms’ grow faster after designation and that operational improvements from 
ISO 9000 do not account for the increased growth.7 
Research literature also indicates that quality and reputation of a firm’s management team 
is a signal of firm quality and a predictor of its future financial performance.  The quality of the 
management team has been theorized to improve the ability of the firm to obtain lower cost of 
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capital, to increase investor interest, and signal future expected performance.47  However, the 
relationship between management quality and future financial performance has received minimal 
attention in the literature.47, 48  In a research study by Chemmanur et al. (2009), reputable 
managers were shown to credibly signal firm value to outsiders, therefore reducing information 
asymmetry facing the firm in the equity market.  This in turn resulted in improved access to the 
equity markets and impacted firm financial policies.  The findings also indicated that quality 
management teams are more likely to select higher net present value projects and implement 
them more successfully, thereby affecting the firm’s investment policy.48 
Advertising expenditures and brand names are also examples of signals used by firms to 
convey unobserved quality to consumers.  Both these types of signals require an initial financial 
investment, with the belief that the returns on investment will be recouped at a later time.  Firms 
that incur large advertising expenditures signal to consumers that the unobservable quality must 
be valid else the firm would not be able to recover this expenditure.  Similarly brand names are 
supposed to communicate unobservable quality since large investments are made to build brand 
equity, such as advertising, product design, and packaging modifications.3  These signals are 
considered to be credible since they are associated with a commitment to high quality, thereby 
increasing the consumer’s perceived quality.2  If low quality sellers were to imitate these 
signaling strategies, their subsequent low quality would be revealed resulting in a loss of 
investment because future sales will decrease.  Therefore there is no incentive for low quality 
sellers to invest in either of these signaling strategies.3  There have been various research studies 
examining the relationship between unobserved quality and advertising51-53 and brand names, 
and their findings regarding the effectiveness of signaling are mixed.2, 54, 55 
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Signaling Unobserved Quality in Health Care 
Information asymmetry has also been shown to be a challenge for health care providers 
who often struggle to effectively communicate the quality of their services to prospective 
patients and/or employees.9  In order to communicate unobserved quality to both patients and 
providers, hospitals use various signaling strategies.  For instance, hospitals are known to use 
both advertising and their status as centers of excellence as a signal to distinguish themselves and 
attract patients and providers.56  In addition, health care providers also use public reporting of 
quality of care information to inform patients about the large variation between providers in 
quality of care and to motivate patient participation by enabling patients to make informed 
choices about their health care providers.10   
Not-for-profit status has also been theorized to be a signal of quality.  Unlike for-profit 
status, not-for-profit status is not associated with profit maximization; therefore not-for-profits 
are unlikely to shirk on quality in order to reduce costs.  As a result, the not-for-profit status may 
be a signal that a firm will provide the quality products or services.  On the contrary, Malani and 
David (2008) investigated the not-for-profit signal in hospital, nursing home and child care 
industries and concluded that not-for-profit status may not be an effective signal of quality.57 
Hospital report cards have also been utilized as a strategy to address information 
asymmetry in health care markets.  Public reporting of quality information has been utilized by 
policy makers to improve health care quality.  Public report cards provide patients with 
information to help them differentiate between quality providers and give providers incentives to 
improve their quality so they can increase demand for their services.  A recent study by Werner 
et al. (2012) investigated the relationship between report card scores and patient choice for 
nursing homes.  They discovered a statistically significant, yet weak positive relationship 
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indicating that public reporting may result in a small increase in consumer choice of high-scoring 
facilities.8  
As an alternative to reporting quality information directly, hospitals may make decisions 
that serve to indirectly communicate, or “signal”, unobservable information to consumers.  This 
would be accomplished by attaining a coveted quality designation which patients, providers and 
payers would interpret as the hospital’s commitment of resources to quality management.58  In 
the UK, the Patient’s Charter, introduced by government, defined a set of standards for public 
health service with regards to service quality.  If the targets identified by the Charter are met, the 
providers can apply for accreditation awarded by the government – the Charter Mark.  The 
Charter Mark can be used to signal service quality to users of services and/or to purchasers 
acting on their behalf.9  Research indicates that these types of signals affect patient’s perceptions 
of hospital quality and are hypothesized to have an impact on financial performance.59  Evidence 
indicates that the Charter Mark was shown to provide definite signals of service quality.9 
 
Magnet Recognition Signaling Unobserved Quality 
MR is considered to be a signal used by hospitals to communicate to consumers and 
health care providers about the quality of care which they can expect to receive in a MR 
hospital.13-15  MR is proposed to reduce the information asymmetry by signaling to various 
stakeholders, the hospitals’ commitment to nursing excellence and quality management 
strategies.  It is hypothesized to be an effective signal of quality because it meets the two 
conditions previously described.  First, MR is directly observable by consumers because 
hospitals have been shown to strongly promote receipt of the designation through marketing, 
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public display of banners, and other advertising.16, 60-62 Second, MR is costly63 and therefore 
difficult to imitate for providers that do not have meaningful quality information to convey.64  
The following sections present information on the MR program.  It is intended to explain 
and support the claim that MR is considered to be a signal used by hospitals to communicate 
their commitment to quality and nursing excellence.  The different interpretations of the MR 
signal by patients, providers and payers and the expected responses to the signal are discussed.  
The principles of signaling theory are applied to evaluate the effect of the MR signal on the 
various dimensions of hospital financial performance. 
 
Background of the Magnet Recognition Program 
 Over the past twenty years, there has been a growing body of evidence on the MR 
program and on MR hospitals, ranging from understanding how a hospital is designated, to 
evaluating the outcomes in MR hospitals.  MR is a symbol of distinction11 and the highest level 
of recognition that a health care organization can achieve that specifically recognizes excellence 
in nursing practice.17, 65, 66  MR has also been promoted and recommended by various advocates.  
In 2002, the Nurse Investment Act included provisions for grants to encourage facilities to 
implement the MR to improve nurse retention.  Also in 2002, the Joint Commission for the 
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations recommended the adoption of characteristics of MR.  
In 2005, the U.S. News & World Report added MR to its set of criteria used in the selection of 
the best hospitals in the U.S.20, 28  In 2010, nine of the 14 hospitals listed on the U.S. News & 
World Report’s Best Hospitals Honor Roll were MR hospitals.29 
The MR program began in 1993, with the first hospital receiving MR in 1994.  Since this 
time, the program has experienced substantial growth.39  Applications for MR have grown at an 
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average of 32% per year for the past five years.67  Although the number of MR hospitals has 
increased from 18 in 2000 to 391 in 201230, only eight percent of the 5,815 U.S. hospitals are 
designated as MR hospitals and only five hospitals internationally have earned the designation.68   
MR is a credential granted by the ANCC to health care organizations demonstrating a 
commitment to high standards in the delivery of nursing care and support for nursing practice 
throughout the organization.18, 19  The MR program is structured on quality indicators and 
standards of nursing practice as defined in the American Nurses Association’s Scope and 
Standards of Nurse Administrators.18  The goals of the MR program are to promote quality in a 
setting that supports professional practice, to identify excellence in the delivery of nursing 
services to patients and residents, and to provide a mechanism for the dissemination of ‘best’ 
practices in nursing services.17, 69, 70  These principles aim to foster excellence in nursing care 
services through the development of a professional nursing practice environment71, which in turn 
empowers staff, endorses evidence based care, and expands the role of the nurses in the delivery 
of patient care.72, 73   
MR hospitals are characterized by their professional work environments, promotion of 
growth and development of nurses74 and environments conducive to innovation.24  MR 
organizations are considered unique because of their organizational characteristics75 and 
distinctive culture, which encompass values of empowerment, pride, mentoring, nurturing, 
respect, integrity, and team work.18, 66, 76  MR organizations demonstrate strong leadership and 
advocacy for nursing service administration and effective communication among nurses, 
physicians, and administrators.28, 77, 78  All these attributes combine to provide an environment 
that enhances nurse and patient satisfaction79 and interdisciplinary relationships that contribute to 
the achievement of quality clinical outcomes.79, 80   
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Impetus for Magnet Recognition 
 There are various reasons that motivate health care organizations to pursue MR.  These 
reasons include, but are not limited to, the need to attract and retain professional nurses, to 
reduce costs and improve financial outcomes64, to distinguish themselves in the market place81, 
to improve quality of care82 and to produce superior patient and organizational outcomes.83  A 
growing body of evidence confirms the positive organizational, nursing and patient benefits 
associated with MR.83, 84  As a result, health care organizations are becoming increasingly 
interested in the designation as a means of accomplishing these goals.82 
Instead of pursuing MR, some organizations have selectively used the MR criteria as a 
guide to achieve the benefits expected from becoming a MR-like organization.12, 64  Benefits of 
this approach are noted; however they do not appear to be as substantial as undergoing the 
scrutiny of the application process.64  The critical self-assessment of the organization along with 
the thorough review and evaluation by external appraisers provides an additional value that 
selective implementation of MR criteria alone would less likely achieve.64   
Although MR is focused on the achievement of excellence in nursing practice, the 
organization as a whole often experiences the benefits.25  Because of these benefits, many 
organizations are undertaking the challenging process of becoming recognized as a MR facility.  
This next section will discuss the reasons that motivate health care organizations to pursue MR.  
 
Recruitment and Retention of Nurses and Other Health Professionals 
 The shortage of nurses has impacted many health care organizations in the U.S.  The 
shortage has affected hospital operations, the level of services provided and driven wage costs up 
by 5-8% annually.85  Nurses deliver 95% of hospitalized patient care16, however hospitals are 
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unable to maintain a supply of qualified nurses because of high turnover rates and low 
retention.86  As one strategy to address these concerns, hospitals have pursued MR as a way to 
recruit and retain valuable nursing staff.17  Research also indicates that MR may be a solution to 
deal with the nursing shortage.  The designation has been shown to give hospitals an advantage 
in terms of recruiting and retaining nurses83 by creating professional practice environments 
where nursing is valued.  The designation is used as a recruiting tool to attract nurses seeking 
employment in the best clinical practice settings.87   In addition to nurses, MR hospitals are also 
acknowledged as good places to work for all employees.87  While the MR started as a way to 
attract and retain nurses, it is now also used to recruit other health professionals, such as 
physicians, pharmacists, and laboratory technicians.88 
 
Patient Outcomes 
As hospitals and health care systems seek strategies to improve patient safety, more are 
considering the MR program as a framework for transforming nursing practice and the quality of 
patient care.89  The underlying philosophy of MR is the existence of a work environment that 
appreciates nursing practice and values nurses, which in turn will result in positive patient 
outcomes.90  In fact, there is convincing evidence that MR organizations produce better 
outcomes and demonstrate improvements in patient satisfaction.87   
 
Marketability & Competition 
MR is an effective tool in marketing services to patients, nurses and the community.16 
Some organizations have placed ads in their local newspapers touting their MR designation.60  
The designation provides an opportunity to promote the institution’s success and it conveys to 
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the public that it is recognized as a place to receive high quality care16, 61, 62 and that nursing 
services make a positive contribution to patient outcomes.91  Organizations can also capitalize on 
the designation by promoting the facility as a center for excellence, which appeals to consumers 
and generates more revenue.25 
 In addition to marketability, MR has also been demonstrated to provide organizations 
with a competitive advantage.  The changing health care environment is promoting competition 
between health care organizations in their acquisition of insurance contracts, qualified physicians 
and the retention of qualified nurses.92  In order to survive in the competitive marketplace, 
hospitals are restructuring and redesigning healthcare delivery, specifically focusing on quality 
care and creating excellent nursing practice environments.  MR has been shown to have a distinct 
advantage in recruiting nurses and in strategic marketing to the community and may be the key 
for being recognized as the community’s center for nursing excellence, which is an important 
attribute in today’s competitive market place.16, 17 
 
Quality Validation & Quality Improvement 
 Health care organizations may also consider MR as a means to highlight their quality 
accomplishments, specifically quality care and quality of nursing department.17  The designation 
provides external validation of an organization’s quality achievements93 and is used to 
distinguish the organization in the health care market place.81  Health care organizations also 
consider engaging in MR as a mechanism to improve quality outcomes.94  The MR program 
provides a framework that helps organizations focus on establishing initiatives that improve 
quality outcomes in the organization.94, 95 
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Societal Demand 
Health care consumers have an expectation for quality patient care.  They are more 
educated due to the internet92, more involved in their own health16 and are eager to find the 
hospital with the best quality of service.18  MR provides consumers with a way to help them 
judge the quality of care in hospitals.96  The designation signals superior performance, and an 
obligation to sustain this performance so expectations of consumers are fulfilled.18 
 
Workplace Environment 
Organizations also consider pursuing MR because the designation has been associated 
with the creation of positive work environments.69, 74  MR organizations have reported the 
presence of a high level of collegiality between nurses and physicians, a strong presence of 
nurses in decision making about patient care, and a culture of collaboration and team work, 
where creativity and innovation is encouraged.16   
 
Financial Returns 
Many health care organizations are feeling the financial pressures associated with 
reduced reimbursements, nursing shortages, increased competitiveness and the changing health 
care environment.12  In response, hospitals are implementing widespread innovations, such as 
MR to redesign work organization, roles, processes, and practices to conserve financial 
resources.33  MR is an expensive endeavour and most organizations consider the required 
financial commitment a barrier to pursuing the designation.  However despite the costs, some 
organizations make the choice to pursue the designation as a means to improve financial health 
and sustainability of their facility.  These organizations state that they could not afford not to 
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pursue MR.97  The designation has been linked with higher measureable financial returns98, 
improved bond ratings99 and cost savings.38   
 
The Costs of Achieving Magnet Recognition 
The achievement of MR is often referred to as a continuing journey, not a destination.100  
This journey is a rigorous and lengthy process101 that requires continued investment and 
commitment.20  The process requires a thorough examination and revamping of an organization’s 
structure, process and delivery methods93 and involves the integration of research and evidence-
based practice into the delivery of care at every level.102  While MR is focused on nursing 
practice and the pursuit of nursing excellence, it is an organization’s journey, therefore 
commitment and support from the entire organization is needed in order to succeed.103   
MR is also an expensive endeavour, with those desiring to achieve MR spending 
thousands of dollars on the process.  While there has been no consensus regarding the amount of 
financial investment required, it has been reported that an organization can spend from about 
$50,000 to $120,000 just in preparing for MR39 and up to a maximum of $600,000 annually for 
maintaining the designation.40  Many organizations hesitate to pursue MR because they are 
concerned about the financial investment, which is sometimes a barrier for health care 
organizations contemplating the decision to pursue MR, despite the positive benefits associated 
with the designation.63 
The costs associated with the MR can be divided into three categories:  (1) Costs of the 
MR Application, (2) Costs of the MR Journey, and (3) Financial Investment in the Nursing and 
Organizational Infrastructure.  These costs vary from facility to facility, and are dependent upon 
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the organization’s existing infrastructure, culture, readiness, size of the facility and support 
available to the institution.104  Each of these costs is described in detail below. 
 
Costs of the Magnet Recognition Application 
To achieve MR, a hospital is required to submit an application and comprehensive 
documentation that confirms the organization’s eligibility to become a MR facility.87  There are 
various costs specifically associated with the MR application and these costs vary depending on 
the applicant organization.  During the application process, a health care organization incurs the 
following expenses:  an application fee of $3,900, $100 per committee member for manuals, 
appraisal fees ranging from $14,000 to $58,000 depending on hospital size, documentation 
review and site visit fees of approximately $10,000, and $4,000 per year for two years’ 
membership in American Nursing Association’s National Database of Nursing Quality Indicators 
program.39, 104  These fees are paid directly to the ANCC.  These costs are incurred every four 
years when the organization re-applies for re-designation.39 
 
Costs of the Magnet Recognition Journey 
A large portion of the costs related to the MR journey can be attributed to the costs 
involved in the preparation of the application and relevant documentation and making 
modifications to meet the standards of MR.105  During the application process, organizations are 
required to either designate a staff member to manage the project or hire a MR Coordinator.87  
On average, the MR Coordinator salaries range from $60,000 to $70,000 per year.97  In addition 
to the MR Coordinator, the MR process also requires the involvement of nursing staff, 
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management and hospital personnel.76  In many organizations, part or full-time secretarial 
support has also been utilized to leverage time of the MR Coordinator.32 
Many hospitals also hire external consultants to oversee the process.  Their 
responsibilities include consultation about the MR application and implementation of the 
standards of the MR program.  Consultant time has been noted to be a large expense for those 
who used consultants.99  For a fee, the ANCC also makes available consultants who provide 
support for the self-assessment phase as well as the application and site visit preparation 
process.87 
Organizations also incur additional expenses related to the increased involvement of 
nurses in all aspects of hospital operations, especially during the application process.  While the 
salaries of nurses and advanced practice nurses are not usually recorded as MR expenses, nurses 
are valuable to the preparation of the organization and to the maintenance of the designation.  
These costs associated with nursing staff involvement in the MR journey are significant.  The 
expenses are related to paying nursing staff for participating on MR committees and 
consequently having to replace them on units, thereby also adding to the total salary expenses.99   
Costs are also incurred for conferences, luncheon events, site visits, and committee 
time.32  Events such as a 24-hour Magnet fair to raise awareness for an organization costs $3,000 
to $4,000 per event for food and entertainment.32  One organization estimated spending $100,000 
in non-salary expenses, which included conference fees, educational and celebratory events, 
promotional items and awards, and graphic design supports for their communications 
campaign.32  Once hospitals have been awarded MR, publicizing success is another major 
expense, which consists of a full page newspaper advertisement, billboards, and television 
spots.99 
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Finally, sustaining MR requires continued dedication and commitment by the nursing 
department.  In order to retain the designation, organizations are required to sustain the culture 
and continue to exceed the standards set by the MR Program.  Along with fulfilling these 
responsibilities, nurses are required to be innovative and implement evidence based practice in 
the hospital environment and provide new infrastructures for providing and improving nursing 
care.106  The focus on these activities requires the commitment of resources, such as time, 
expertise, knowledge and money.  Organizations cannot continue to maintain the designation 
without a continued commitment of human and financial resources.107   
 
Financial Investment in the Nursing and Organization Infrastructure 
In addition to the MR application costs and the costs associated with the MR journey, 
other organizational expenses must also be incurred to ensure compliance with the MR 
standards.32  The costs consist of establishing the organizational infrastructure to support the 
principles of MR, such as a revised governance structure, professional development programs, 
nursing research programs, and capital infrastructure, such as the implementation of information 
technology.   
Within most MR organizations, nurses play an influential role with extensive 
involvement in committees, governance and organizational-decision making.  Nurses are 
expected to be represented at the senior executive level and to be able to participate in 
organizational governance meetings.  Thus organizations must be willing to provide nurses with 
time out of clinical work and support nurse attendance at committee and council meetings.108  
This may be one of the most significant expenses for the process, given the cost of labour.68 
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 The MR program values education and nurse staff training.  Organizations must 
demonstrate support for professional development of nurses through the creation of educational 
infrastructure to promote and support learning and training opportunities.  In order to accomplish 
this endeavour, organizations are required to invest both human and financial resources to 
support both nurse-staff education and an environment that encourages continual learning.109  
Organizations also support continuing education through flexible scheduling to accommodate 
classroom hours.110  In addition to the management and delivery of professional development 
program, expenses incurred are related to continuing education opportunities, learning 
partnerships, tuition reimbursements, and professional development grants.109 
 The MR program also places a strong emphasis on nursing research, which requires a 
substantial financial investment.68  This includes expanding journal clubs to all nursing units, 
establishing a nursing research council and creating a nursing research center.111  The costs 
associated with establishing and maintaining a hospital based research center are related primary 
to personnel.  Other costs include the materials to support the work of the research center and the 
availability of the research internship, quarterly grand rounds and other educational programs.  
Computer, printer and software costs are also associated with the research infrastructure, 
including statistical analysis software to allow for more extensive data management and analysis 
procedures.112  Some organizations have established a Nursing Research Fellowship program to 
further advance nursing research in the clinical practice setting.111  Nurses are also encouraged 
and assisted with the submission of manuscripts, and publications and abstracts for conference 
presentations.  Registration, travel and hotel expenses are paid in full for nurses invited to 
present at national conferences.76 
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While the MR program does not require investment in capital infrastructure, such as 
medical equipment, buildings or other capital equipment, some MR organizations are investing 
in information technology support when pursuing the MR designation.  The MR program does 
not explicitly require that organizations use information technology; however, many of the 
organizations that have achieved MR are making use of information technology, especially 
electronic charting for nurses.90 
 
Outcomes of the Magnet Recognition Program 
MR has caught the interest of nurse administrators and hospital management in the U.S. 
and internationally for over 20 years.  While the MR was initially aimed at focusing efforts on 
nurse recruitment and retention and targeting strategies for improving nursing work 
environments113, it has also been associated with multiple, measureable benefits to the entire 
organization.103  Numerous research studies have found statistical evidence of significant 
differences between the MR and non-MR organizations.66  In addition to the research based 
evidence, anecdotal evidence also exists that confirms the benefits of the designation.   
 
Nursing Outcomes 
MR hospitals have been found to have characteristics that promote and sustain 
professional nursing practice.114  Nurses in MR hospitals describe their work environment as 
providing greater autonomy115, allowing more control over the practice setting81, increasing level 
of empowerment18 and having adequate support services to provide high-quality care.114-116  The 
work environment is perceived as collaborative, as evidenced by positive nurse-physician 
relationships19, 117, 118 and positive relationships among fellow nurses.28   
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 In addition to the effects on working environment, the MR designation has also been 
associated with a positive impact on nurse satisfaction.  Nurses in MR hospitals are more 
satisfied with their current jobs.18, 28  Research evidence shows that compared to non-MR 
hospitals, nurses in MR hospitals have statistically significant decreases in emotional 
exhaustion26 and lower rates of burnout.28  MR also appear to positively affect nurses’ health by 
way of low incidence of needle stick injuries, decreased staff turnover, decreased work related 
injuries, decreased fatigue and burnout, and increased career and employment satisfaction.28, 33  
Occupational health injuries, musculoskeletal injuries and blood and body fluid exposures are 
also lower in MR hospitals.38, 72   
 MR hospitals have significantly better nurse staffing, reflected in nurses caring for fewer 
patients each.34, 39  Nurses at MR hospitals reported caring for one fewer patient per shift than did 
the nurses in the original magnet hospitals (i.e. hospitals identified in the 1983 study119).96  Data 
from the 1997 Annual Hospital Survey of the American Hospital Association (AHA) showed 
that MR hospitals employed 190 full time equivalent registered nurses per 100 patients compare 
to 109 registered nurses per 100 patients in community hospitals.96   
MR has been associated with reduced overtime and flexible staffing schedules.  RNs 
employed in MR organizations reported that overtime was more often strictly voluntary, whereas 
nurses in non-MR hospitals reported higher levels of overtime and felt like it was required.28, 86, 
120
  Another study also examined satisfaction with scheduling, including hours and flexibility and 
found that MR nurses reported higher satisfaction, although comparison of hours worked and 
other schedule factors were not reported.86   
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Patient Outcomes 
Patient outcome is one of the most important indicators of quality care in health care 
institutions.18   Improvements in nursing, through MR, are being recognized as having a major 
contribution to quality and safety in patient care.38  MR has been associated with numerous 
positive patient outcomes121, which include lower patient mortality and morbidity rates, 
decreases in the  incidence of adverse patient outcomes122 and higher overall patient 
satisfaction.28, 105  A recent study showed that in MR hospitals, patients received care based on 
the best and most current evidence.108   
MR has demonstrated lower mortality rates and a positive influence on patient 
satisfaction, which has key implications for hospitals in the current fiscally driven environment.  
Patient satisfaction is considered a prime indicator of quality care123 and is of great importance 
for hospital leaders, because winning and keeping consumers is fundamental for survival in the 
current health care market.33  Consumers are able to use the MR designation as a reliable way to 
choose a good hospital that will provide quality care.105 
 
Organizational Outcomes 
 The success of MR hospitals can be attributed to the existence of an organizational 
framework that promotes and sustains nursing practice.  These hospitals are described as having 
flat organizational structures, unit-based decision making processes, evidence based practice, a 
culture of collaboration and team work, powerful nurse executives and highly qualified nurses.114  
In addition to influencing nursing and patient outcomes, these organizational features have been 
found to be associated with positive organizational outcomes including improved nurse 
recruitment and retention, increased productivity and distinction in the health care market. 
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One of the most promoted benefits of MR is the positive effect on nurse recruitment and 
retention.  According to research evidence, the structural components in MR hospitals result in 
high levels of nursing work satisfaction, which in turn leads to lower vacancy and turnover rates. 
One MR facility reported a reduction in nursing turnover from 30% in 2000 to 12% in 2008.124  
Another MR facility reported a decrease in nursing vacancy rates from 19% in 2000 to 5% in the 
first quarter of 2007.125  Nurses who work at MR hospital are also more likely to stay than those 
who do not work in non-MR hospitals.  According to the ANCC, the average length of 
employment of RNs on staff in a MR hospital is 8.35 years.126 
In addition to nurse recruitment, physician and administrative recruitment has been 
influenced by the MR designation.  New hires have noted that MR is associated with highly 
competent and coordinated staff.81  Furthermore, physician satisfaction scores are higher at MR 
hospitals compared to non-MR hospitals, which also influences physician recruitment.110 
MR hospitals have also been noted for recruiting highly educated nurses.  A research 
study conducted by Aiken et al. found that RNs working in MR have significantly higher 
educational preparation.  About 50% of nurses working in MR hospitals had a baccalaureate 
degree as their highest level of education, compared to 34% in non-MR hospitals.  Moreover, 
according to the ANCC, nurses at MR hospitals are more likely to be certified in specialty areas, 
maintain continuing education and participate in community programs.18 
 Compared to non-MR hospitals, MR hospitals have decreased utilization of agency 
nurses.  Most hospitals utilize agency nurses because there is both an insufficient supply of 
nurses currently employed at their respective facilities and a demand for nursing care by patients.  
Agency nurses are not as familiar with hospital specific policy, are not long-standing members of 
the nursing unit or team, and their practices may be different than those of nurses who have 
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worked in hospitals for an extended period of time.  The increased use of agency nurses is 
considered a risk factor that could potentially lead to negative patient outcomes.104 
 The MR designation provides an increased opportunity for hospitals to market 
themselves to the patients, physicians and potential nursing personnel.105, 127  Designated 
organizations have reported an increase in market share since receiving MR, attributed to 
increased physician referrals and consumer preference for quality patient care.110  
 Patients in MR hospitals were also found to have significantly shorter lengths of stay and 
lower utilization of intensive care days.22, 26, 126  One study found that length of stay declined 
from 4.86 days to 4.73 days in a MR hospital.128  The reduction in the average length of stay 
leads to use of fewer pharmaceuticals and fewer tests116, which results in cost savings.40 
 
Financial Outcomes 
Quantifying the costs and financial benefits of MR has been a difficult task for most 
organizations; one that requires further research.32  Although the ANCC website and Drenkard 
argue the long-term cost savings from MR, there is no consensus that MR is a cost saving 
innovation, and as discussed previously, the cost of application and sustaining MR is high.30, 38  
Although there is also no evidence that overall MR hospitals cost more than non-MR 
hospitals129, a recent study by Jayawardhana et al. (2014) found that inpatient costs for MR 
hospitals are higher than non-MR hospitals.41 
Aiken et al. states that despite the higher nurse-staffing ratios, MR hospitals will save 
money.  The shorter lengths of stay and fewer adverse events will lead to reduced use of high-
cost intensive care units, use of fewer pharmaceuticals, performing fewer tests – all of which are 
supposed to increase efficiency and contribute to cost effective care.127, 129  A study by McCue et 
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al. (2003) found that increasing nursing staff resulted in increased operating expenses, but no 
statistically significant effect on profitability.130 
Proponents of MR rationalize the potential financial benefits of MR by linking the 
positive organizational, nursing and patient outcomes to cost savings and improved financial 
performance.38  According to the research literature, needle stick injuries, morbidity, mortality, 
and turnover are lower in MR hospitals compared to non-MR hospitals; each of these variables 
has an associated cost savings.32  For instance, studies have reported up to a one-third decrease in 
needle stick injuries at a cost of $405 per event.38  In terms of savings from recruitment and 
retention, one MR hospital reported a reduction in labour costs of $4 million each year since 
2007.124  These cost savings have been attributed to a reduction in recruitment costs, reduction in 
orientation costs, productivity gains, and reduced usage of agency nurses.38   
According to anecdotal reports, MR may increase bond ratings for borrowing, and reduce 
insurance and legal fees.125  The designation is also believed to affect an organization’s ability to 
negotiate better reimbursement rates with managed care organizations, and increase 
endowments.32  A descriptive study by Tuazon (2007) found that on aggregate, the MR hospitals 
outperform the non-MR hospitals in terms of operating margin, total margin, and return on total 
assets.  However, the analysis of the data was descriptive with no statistical tests conducted when 
comparing mean scores of MR and non-MR hospitals.36 
 
Summary  
Signaling Research 
Although this is not a comprehensive review of the research on signalling, the preceding 
literature review provides valuable insight into some of the signaling strategies used in the 
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corporate and hospital setting to signal unobservable firm or product quality to consumers and 
other firms.  The effect of signaling on financial ratios, firm growth, product demand, consumer 
choice, and consumer perception has been assessed and shows mixed results.  The concept of 
signaling in hospitals has also been studied previously.  The focus has been specifically on 
patient response to hospital signals, such as the patient perceptions of quality and patient 
selection of provider, as measures of signal effectiveness.  This outcome measure provides an 
indication of the effectiveness of the signal as determined by the patient; however it does not 
provide the hospital with any indication of the effect of the signal on hospital performance.  
The limitations of the reviewed literature include focusing only on publicly traded firms, 
small sample sizes, case studies or single site evaluations, cross-sectional study design, data 
collected from surveys, and the application of simple statistics instead of empirical analysis 
controlling for relevant factors.  While the effect of signaling on firm performance in the 
corporate setting using various outcomes has been studied previously, there is minimal research 
focusing on the effect of signaling on hospital performance.  Specifically, there is an absence of 
research examining the relationship between a hospital’s signal of unobserved quality and the 
effect of the signal on the dimensions of financial performance, such as reimbursement, market 
share, efficiency and profitability.   
 
Signaling Magnet Recognition 
Previous research suggests that the MR designation may signal quality information 
important to multiple stakeholders including patients, payers and providers.  First, MR 
designation has been associated with better patient outcomes28, 105, increases in quality care27, 38, 
and increases in nurse to patient ratios.34, 39 Patients are expected to interpret the MR signal and 
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respond by seeking care at or referring family and friends to the designated hospital, or by 
remaining loyal to the designated facility through repeated visits.  Payers (i.e. government and 
insurers) are expected to interpret the MR signal and respond by steering patients to designated 
hospitals to receive quality patient care18 or increasing reimbursement for health services 
accordingly.32  In addition, the actions of patients and payers in response to the signal are 
expected to increase the volume of patients to MR designated hospitals.15, 18, 31  Therefore, the 
MR signal is believed to affect the hospital’s ability to negotiate better reimbursement rates and 
shift towards a more profitable payer mix32 and increase market share through increases in 
physician referrals and patient preference for quality patient care.110 
MR has also been associated with the promotion of excellence in nursing care86 and 
professional nursing practice131, emphasis on collaboration and team work34, 35, and creation of a 
positive culture and work environment.33  Nurses and providers are expected to interpret the MR 
signal and respond by seeking or maintaining employment in designated hospitals resulting in 
reduced nursing turnover, reduced recruitment118, 132 and orientation costs38, reduced usage of 
agency nurses38 and increased provider satisfaction.33, 60  These positive labour outcomes have 
been associated with cost savings and efficiency.15, 133 
The combined proposed effect of the MR signal on increasing revenue, through 
increasing reimbursement and market share, and decreasing expenses, through decreasing 
hospital cost inefficiency, may culminate to result in an expected improvement in financial 
performance for the hospital.  Signaling theory is used to develop a framework to explain the 
role of MR as a signal used by hospitals to indirectly communicate the underlying quality of a 
hospital’s products and services.4  MR hospitals have been theorized to signal to patients and 
clinicians that the hospital is a center for nursing excellence and the provider of quality patient 
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care.12  Unfortunately, there is no clear consensus on the effectiveness of the MR signal on the 
various dimensions of hospital financial performance.
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CHAPTER 3:  STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
Overview and Rationale 
 This study uses a pre-post research design using retrospective administrative panel data 
from 2000 to 2010.  MR hospitals are matched to never MR hospitals using market and hospital 
characteristics.  The matched hospital sample is then used to conduct the various statistical 
analyses to test each hypothesis.  The empirical analysis includes a difference-in-difference 
model using hospital fixed effects and a stochastic frontier analysis with random effects.  The 
dependent variables of interest are hospital reimbursement, hospital market share, hospital cost 
inefficiency and hospital financial performance.  The key explanatory variable is the MR signal.  
The analyses examine the impact of the MR signal on hospital reimbursement, market share, cost 
inefficiency and ultimately on financial performance, while controlling for hospital and market 
characteristics. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework used in this dissertation is shown in Figure 2.  The signaler is 
the MR hospital, the signal is the MR designation, the receivers are the patients, payers and 
providers, and the feedback is the changes in hospital outcomes that are attributed to the signal.  
The MR designation reduces the information asymmetry by signaling the hospitals’ commitment 
and dedication to health care quality and quality management strategies to the various 
stakeholders. 
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Figure 2. A conceptual framework illustrating the pathway of the Magnet Recognition 
signal from the signaler to the receiver and the resulting hospital outcomes. 
 
MR is hypothesized to be an effective signal of quality because it is: 1) directly 
observable by consumers through marketing, public display of banners, and other advertising by 
hospitals16, 60-62, and 2) costly63 and therefore difficult to imitate for providers that do not have 
meaningful quality information to convey.64 
 
Research Questions & Hypotheses 
Research Question 1:  Does the MR signal increase reimbursement and market share of 
designated hospitals compared to non-designated hospitals, controlling for known covariates? 
MR designation has been associated with better patient outcomes28, 105, higher overall 
patient satisfaction28, 105, increases in quality care27, 38, and increases in nurse to patient ratios.34, 
39
  As a result, patients are expected to interpret the MR signal and respond by seeking care at a 
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MR facility, referring family and friends to a MR designated hospital, or by remaining loyal to 
the designated facility through repeated visits.  Payers (i.e. government and insurers) are 
expected to interpret the MR signal and respond by steering patients to designated hospitals to 
receive quality patient care18 or by adjusting reimbursement for health services accordingly.32  
Therefore the actions of patients and payers in response to the signal are expected to increase 
both the health care reimbursement32 and the volume of patients to MR designated hospitals.18, 31, 
134
.  These findings lead to hypotheses 1a and 1b: 
Hypothesis 1a:  The MR signal will increase reimbursement of designated hospitals when 
compared to non-designated hospitals.  MR is believed to affect the hospital’s ability to negotiate 
better reimbursement rates with managed care organizations or result in a shift towards a more 
profitable payer mix.32 
Hypothesis 1b:  The MR signal will increase market share of designated hospitals 
compared to non-designated hospitals.  MR provides an opportunity for hospitals to market 
themselves105, 127 and MR is theorized to signal to patients and clinicians that the hospital is a 
center for nursing excellence and the provider of quality patient care.12  The MR signal is 
proposed to increase market share through increases in both physician referrals and patient 
preferences for receiving quality patient care.110 
Research Question 2:  Does the MR signal decrease hospital inefficiency in designated 
hospitals compared to non-designated hospitals, controlling for known covariates? 
In addition to positive patient-level outcomes121, MR has also been associated with the 
promotion of excellence in nursing care86 and professional nursing practice131, emphasis on 
collaboration and team work34, 35, and creation of a positive culture and work environment.33  
Providers are expected to interpret the MR signal and respond by seeking or maintaining 
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employment in designated hospitals resulting in reduced nursing turnover, reduced 
recruitment118, 135 and orientation costs38, reduced usage of agency nurses38 and increased 
provider satisfaction.33, 60  These positive labour outcomes have been proposed to be associated 
with cost savings and operating efficiency.15, 133  These findings lead to hypothesis 2: 
Hypothesis 2: The MR signal will decrease hospital cost inefficiency in designated 
hospitals.  MR proposes to reduce hospital cost inefficiency by increasing productivity38 and 
reducing costs through nurse autonomy33, promotion of innovation131 and discovery of quality 
improvements13, and the delivery of evidence based care.127, 129  The combination of all these 
outcomes will result in a decrease in hospital cost inefficiency. 
Research Question 3:  Does the MR signal improve financial performance of designated 
hospitals compared to non-designated hospitals, controlling for known covariates. 
Reimbursement and market share (Research Question 1) and inefficiency (Research 
Question 2) are conceptualized as pathways through which the MR signal will benefit designated 
hospitals.  Increasing reimbursement and market share may increase revenue generation and 
decreasing hospital cost inefficiency may reduce expenditures; therefore, if the MR signal is 
effective, a final outcome is expected to be an overall improvement in hospital financial 
performance.  This leads to hypothesis 3: 
Hypothesis 3:  The MR signal will improve the financial performance of designated 
hospitals.  This hypothesis represents the combined effects of hospital reimbursement, market 
share and inefficiency. These outcomes are interrelated and have also been theorized to affect 
hospital financial performance.38, 136, 137 
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Research Design 
This dissertation applies a pre-post research design, using MR and never MR hospitals, to 
measure the effect of the MR signal on hospital reimbursement, market share, cost inefficiency 
and financial performance (Figure 3).  This research design attempts to control for observable 
and unobservable factors that will potentially contribute to the difference between pre-test and 
post-test results and between the MR and never MR hospitals. 
 
Figure 3.  A pre-post research design using MR and never MR hospitals and three time 
periods (Pre-test, Intervention, and Post-test). 
  
There are two study groups: 
1. Treatment.  “Magnet Recognized Hospitals” are hospitals that achieved MR anytime during 
the study period. 
2. Control.  “Never Magnet Recognized Hospitals” are hospitals that never achieved MR prior 
to, during or after the study period.  This sub-sample excludes hospitals that have received 
MR prior to 2000 and after 2010.  The remaining never MR hospitals are used in the 
matching process, described below. 
There are three study periods: 
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1. Pre-test:  Two years prior to the implementation period, when the hospital is not pursuing 
MR. 
2. Implementation:  Two years prior to the initial MR designation, when the hospital is 
preparing for MR.  According to research literature, hospitals require approximately two 
years to transform into a MR hospital.138 
3. Post-test:  The year of initial MR designation and subsequent years of designation. Two years 
are required. 
 
Data 
This research study uses secondary data from four sources: 
1. Healthcare Cost Reports Information System (HCRIS), which includes data for hospitals that 
filed Medicare and Medicaid cost reports and includes hospital characteristics, utilization, 
cost and charge by cost center, and other financial variables and operational characteristics. 
2. Area Resource File (ARF) and other census data provide estimates of market population, area 
demographics, household income and socioeconomic characteristics to describe hospital 
demand and market characteristics. 
3. American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey, completed by most U.S. hospitals, 
includes information on hospital organization structure, service lines, staffing, expenses, 
physician organization structures, beds, utilization and facilities and services.139 
4. American Nurses Credentialing Center (ANCC) website provides information on MR 
hospitals.  A current listing of MR hospitals and the years of designation are listed on the 
Center’s website. The information for each MR hospital has been collected manually and 
entered into an Excel® spreadsheet.  This data is included in the final merged data set. 
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The four data sets are merged using both a year and a hospital identifier; however the 
definition of the year variable differs in the various data sets.  The HCRIS data set includes 
hospital year observations organized by fiscal year and the ARF, ANCC and AHA data sets 
include hospital-year observations organized by calendar year.  In order to merge HCRIS data 
set, a year-end variable is created using the following rule:  the fiscal year end date for each 
hospital-year observation (i.e. 6/30/2000) is designated as the year-end variable (i.e. 2000) and is 
matched with the calendar year variable.  
 
Study Sample 
Figure 4 provides a detailed breakdown of the hospital sample and the exclusion criteria 
used to obtain the final data set.  The study sample is a longitudinal, unbalanced panel of MR and 
never MR hospitals located in urban areas in the US from 2000 to 2010 (eleven years).  The 
hospital data set consists of 3,431 hospitals (31,163 hospital year observations).  Of the 370 
Magnet hospitals (4,070 hospital year observations) collected from the ANCC website, 315 
Magnet hospitals (3,403 hospital year observations) are identified in the hospital data set.  The 
remaining 55 Magnet hospitals, which are not found in the hospital data set, include 27 
children’s hospitals, 19 rural hospitals, five Veteran Affairs (VA) hospitals, three rehabilitation 
hospitals, and one psychiatric hospital. 
The study sample excludes duplicate hospital year observations (570) and hospital year 
observations if days in period are less than 330 days (1,134).  Also hospitals with less than eight 
hospital year observations, hospitals that do not have a hospital year observation at year 2000, 
and hospitals that receive MR before 2004 and after 2009 are excluded from the study sample 
(1,124 hospitals).  Each MR hospital must also have four consecutive years of data prior to MR 
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designation, and a maximum of two consecutive years of data following MR designation, for a 
maximum of six hospital-year observations.  MR hospitals with limited or missing financial data 
potentially introduce noise and bias the results; therefore, only MR hospitals that have complete 
data over of the required six consecutive years are included.  Although this requirement reduces 
the sample size, the reduction in the eligible hospital-year observations is trivial. 
The final study sample consists of 23,607 hospital year observations (2,199 hospitals) 
from 2000 to 2010.  There are 21,072 never MR hospital year observations (1,968 hospitals) and 
2,535 MR hospital year observations (231 hospitals).   
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Figure 4.  Consort diagram presenting the exclusion criteria used in determining the final 
hospital study sample. 
 
 
Variables and Measurements 
Table 1 is a comprehensive list of variables, measures, definitions and data sources that 
are utilized in the dissertation.  The variables are grouped into four categories. 
 
Magnet Recognition 
The Magnet Recognition Designation variable identifies hospitals as either MR or never 
MR.  The Hospital Magnet Recognition Status variable identifies the hospital’s status during the 
2000 to 2010 time period.  A hospital status can be defined as either pre-test period, 
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implementation / status quo period or post-test period.  Both MR and never MR hospital year 
observations are categorized as either pre-period, implementation / status-quo, or post period 
using a binary variable. 
 
Financial Performance Measures 
Net patient revenue per adjusted patient day is used to measure hospital reimbursement.  
To account for inflation, reimbursement has been adjusted to 2010 US dollars using the Medical 
Care Services Consumer Price Index.140  The total expenses, price of capital, and price of labour 
are included in the cost function model to estimate hospital inefficiency.   
Financial performance is measured using operating profitability, total profitability and 
return on equity.  Operating margin is a measure of profitability141 and frequently used to assess 
the financial health of an organization142 since it is directly affected by changes in either 
operating revenue or costs.  This ratio focuses on core business operations and therefore excludes 
investment income and other types of revenue and expenses unrelated to operating activities.143   
Total margin is a measure of total profitability and includes income from both operating 
and non-operating activities.144  Positive operating margin and positive total margin reflect 
positive financial performance.  Return on equity is a measure of organizational performance and 
it measures the rate of return for each dollar in equity (net assets).145  
 
Hospital Characteristics 
Hospital characteristics include hospital size (measured by total number of beds) which is 
associated with reputation, higher economies of scale and financial expertise, lower per unit 
costs, and more successful strategic activity.146, 147  System affiliation (determined using the 
Medicare Cost Report) indicates whether a hospital is owned by a larger system.  Such 
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affiliations have been found to result in increased efficiency, lower risk, better financial 
outcomes, seamless care, greater control over referrals, and greater economies of scale.146, 147   
Medicare payer mix and Medicaid payer mix are calculated as the percentage of total 
inpatient days attributed to Medicare and Medicaid, respectively.  These measures provide an 
indication of the hospital’s patient-mix 146 and the payer-mix.148  An increased dependence on 
government payers, such as Medicare and Medicaid, is likely to be associated with a higher 
probability of financial distress and operating losses, because these payers typically do not pay 
the full average cost of care.146 
Outpatient volume and inpatient volume are both common measures of hospital 
productivity.  Inpatient volume is measured using total inpatient days, a widely accepted measure 
of inpatient workload.  Outpatient volume is measured using total outpatient visits and is a 
widely accepted measure of outpatient workload, when combined with total inpatient days.149  
Both of these variables are included as outputs in the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) cost 
function.150 
Since resource consumption varies dramatically between patients classified in different 
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs), discharges have been adjusted by the Medicare Case Mix 
Index (MCMI), which reflects the costliness of DRGs into which the hospital’s patients have 
been classified. 150, 151  Since a measure of outpatient MCMI is not available, Percent Emergency 
Room Visits (emergency room visits as a percent of total outpatient visits) and Percent 
Outpatient Surgery (outpatient surgery as a percent of total outpatient visits) are added to control 
for the outpatient case mix.152  Research indicates that patients admitted through the emergency 
department and patients who require surgery tend to be more resource intensive groups of 
outpatients.151 
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Teaching affiliation indicates if a hospital is a teaching hospital and is used to control for 
differences in input quality.150  Teaching hospitals produce different outputs than non-teaching 
hospitals (i.e. medical education)153 and are more costly than non-teaching hospitals.154  
Teaching hospitals focus on training medical students and consume more inputs such as 
instructors, classroom space, diagnostic tests and state of the art technology.154  Teaching 
hospitals also attract sicker patients who require more resources because of the education value 
this provides to the students 152, 154, 155 and there is consensus that quality of patient care tends to 
be higher in teaching than in nonteaching hospitals.153  Teaching hospital status is included in the 
model as a binary variable.  
Ownership indicates for-profit, not-for-profit ownership or government ownership.  Due 
to their responsibilities to shareholders, for-profit firms are expected to more aggressively pursue 
cost reduction strategies than not-for-profit firms.  For-profit firms are also unlikely to be 
interested in the adoption of innovations that are unproven or may raise costs39, and as a result, 
may have higher operating margins than their not-for-profit counterparts.156  
 
Market Characteristics 
A hospital’s operating environment and the market demand for health care services can 
also influence hospital financial performance and market share.157  The hospital’s market area is 
defined as the county in which the hospital is located.   
The total population in the market, the market population density and the percent of the 
population age 65 and over describe the demand for hospital services in the market area. The 
average per capita income, unemployment rate and poverty rate (percentage of families or 
persons in poverty) measures a community’s financial ability to purchase health care services.158   
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The likelihood of a resident to bypass a hospital and seek services at another facility is 
proxied by the average distance from residence to hospital, calculated as the (discharge-
weighted) average straight-line distance from the residence ZIP centroid to the local hospital.159   
The hospital market share, a measure of the amount of hospital competition in the market 
area, is measured as the hospital’s discharges as a percentage of the total discharges in a 
hospital’s market area.159  The level of competition within a market may also influence the 
likelihood of MR and a hospital’s performance.  The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is a measure 
of market competition and it is calculated as the sum of the squared market shares (based on 
hospital discharges) of hospitals within the market area.  The Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
represents perfect competition when it registers a score of 0, while a score of 1 represents a 
monopolistic market.156   Hospital competition measures the number of hospitals physically 
located in the market area and is a measure of suppliers of health care services.   
There is a large variation in the location of MR hospitals.  Region, captured using U.S. 
census regions, is included to control for the effect of hospital location.160  Unmeasured factors 
affecting hospital financial performance and market share over time are accounted for using year 
dummies.  
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Table 1.  Listing of variables, measures, definitions and data sources. 
Variable Measure Type Aim Data Source 
Magnet Recognition 
Magnet Recognition 
Designation 
1, Magnet Recognition Hospital   
0, Never Magnet Recognition Hospital 
Binary Aim 1, 2, 3 ANCC 
Hospital Magnet Recognition 
Status 
0, Pre-Test   
1, Implementation 
1, Post-Test 
Binary Aim 1, 2, 3 ANCC 
Financial Characteristics 
Reimbursement* Net Patient Revenue per Adjusted Patient Day = 
Hospital Net Operating Revenue/Adjusted Patient 
Day 
Continuous Aim 1 HCRIS 
Total Expenses* Expenditures/Wage Rate, where wage rate is (payroll 
expenses+employee benefits)/FTE Personnel 
Continuous Aim 2 HCRIS 
Price of Capital (Depreciation+Interest Expense) / Number of Beds Continuous Aim 2 HCRIS 
Price of Labour (Payroll Expenses+Employee benefits) / FTE 
Personnel 
Continuous Aim 2 HCRIS 
Operating Profitability* Operating Margin (%) = [(Operating Revenues-
Operating Costs)/(Operating Revenues)]*100 
Continuous Aim 3 HCRIS 
Total Profitability* Total Margin (%) =  [(Total Revenues-Total 
Costs)/(Total Revenues)]*100 
Continuous Aim 3 HCRIS 
Return on Equity* Return on Equity (%) = [(Operating Revenues-
Operating Costs)/(Equity)]*100 
Continuous Aim 3 HCRIS 
Hospital Characteristics 
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Variable Measure Type Aim Data Source 
Hospital size Number of Staffed Beds Continuous Aim 1, 3 HCRIS 
System Affiliation 1, System Affiliation; 0, Free Standing Binary Aim 1, 2, 3 HCRIS 
Medicare Payer Mix Medicare Inpatient Days/Total Hospital Inpatient 
Days 
Continuous Aim 1, 2, 3 HCRIS 
Medicaid Payer Mix Medicaid Inpatient Days/Total Hospital Inpatient 
Days 
Continuous Aim 1, 2, 3 HCRIS 
Outpatient Volume Total Outpatient Visits Continuous Aim 2 HCRIS 
Inpatient Volume Total Inpatient Days Continuous Aim 2 HCRIS 
Medicare Case Mix Index Relative Resource Intensity of the Distribution of 
Diagnoses Related Groups 
Continuous Aim 2 AHA 
Percent Emergency Room 
Visits 
(Emergency Department Visits/Outpatient 
Visits)*100 
Continuous Aim 2 HCRIS 
Percent Outpatient Surgery (Outpatient Surgeries/Outpatient Visits)*100 Continuous Aim 2 HCRIS 
Teaching Affiliation 1, Teaching Affiliation   
0, No Teaching Affiliation 
Binary Aim 1, 2, 3 AHA 
Ownership 1, Not-for-Profit 
1, For-Profit 
0, Government 
Binary Aim 1, 2, 3 AHA 
Market Characteristics 
Population Total Population in the Market Area (1,000s) Continuous Aim 1, 3 ARF 
Population Density Market Population Density (1,000 population per 
square miles) 
Continuous Aim 1, 3 ARF 
Percent of the Population 65 
and Over 
[Total Population Age 65 and Older in Market 
Area/Total Population in Market Area[*100] 
Continuous Aim 1, 3 ARF 
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Variable Measure Type Aim Data Source 
Income Average per Capital Income in Market Area (1,000s) Continuous Aim 1, 3 ARF 
Unemployment Rate Average Unemployment Rate in Market Area Continuous Aim 1, 3 ARF 
Poverty Rate Average Rate of Families or Person in Poverty in 
Market Area 
Continuous Aim 1, 3 ARF 
Distance from Residence to 
Hospital 
Average Distance from  Place of Residence to 
Hospital (miles) 
Continuous Aim 1, 3 ARF 
Hospital Market Share* Hospital Discharges/Total Discharges in Market 
Area 
Continuous Aim 1, 3 ARF 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index The sum of squares of the market shares, expressed 
as a percentage, held by each firm in an industry.   
HHI=∑   
Continuous Aim 2 ARF 
Hospital competition The total number of hospitals in the hospital’s 
geographical market. 
Continuous Aim 1, 3 HCRIS 
Region 1, Midwest;  1, Northwest;  1, South;  0, West Binary Aim 1, 2, 3 ARF 
Year 2000=0 
2001=1 
… 
2010=1 
Continuous Aim 1, 2, 3 ARF 
*Measures of Hospital Outcomes used as dependent variables. 
ANCC (American Nurses Credentialing Center), HCRIS (Healthcare Cost Report Information System), AHA (American Hospital 
Association), ARF (Area Resource File) 
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Statistical Analysis 
The analysis is completed in two phases.  In Phase 1, the never MR hospitals are matched 
with the MR hospitals and a longitudinal data set is created.  In Phase 2, the matched never MR 
and MR hospital data set is used to conduct the empirical analysis and test each research 
hypothesis. 
 
Phase 1a – Matching the MR and never MR Hospitals 
In a pre-post research design, both control and treatment groups are required.  The current 
study sample of hospitals contains MR hospitals and never MR hospitals.  Since the 
counterfactual of the MR hospital is not observed in the data (i.e. it is a missing value), the 
objective is to use information from the never MR hospitals to impute a missing value for a 
hypothetical and not observed outcome.   
Since hospitals may have specific characteristics that make them more likely to become 
MR, corrective methods, such as propensity score analysis, are recommended to control for 
selection bias when analyzing data collected from an observational study design.161  Propensity 
score analysis is used to create ideal matched hospitals.  The propensity score analysis predicts 
the probability that a hospital will achieve MR based on both hospital and market characteristics 
for all hospitals during the year 2000 (i.e. the pre-test period).  A logit model is used to generate 
propensity scores:  
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The variables employed in the propensity score analysis include hospital characteristics:  
Hospital size, System affiliation, Medicare payer mix, Medicaid payer mix, Ownership, Teaching 
Affiliation and market characteristics:  Population, Percent of the population 65 and over, 
Income, Unemployment rate, Hospital competition and Region.   The log of the predicted 
probability is used as the propensity score, since it approximates a normal distribution, where p 
is the predicted probability of becoming a MR hospital.  
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A greedy matching algorithm is used to match MR hospitals to never MR hospitals in the 
year 2000.  A maximum of 1 to 4 nearest neighbour matching within a caliper with replacement 
is used.  The recommended caliper size is set at 0.25σp, (where 0.25σp denotes the standard 
deviation for the estimated propensity scores in the sample).162  Greedy matching requires a 
sizable common support region to work.  Hospitals that fall outside of the common support 
region are excluded since they have no matches.  If the common support region is small, the 
recommended procedure is to use different specifications (i.e. explanatory variables and/or 
functional forms) in the logit model to predict propensity scores and re-check the size of the 
common support region.163, 164 
In order to create the sample for analysis, MR hospitals are matched with never MR 
hospitals in the year 2000.  These matched hospitals remained matched throughout the study 
period.  The never MR hospitals identified in the year 2000 through matching, continue as 
control hospitals in the remaining years of the sample (i.e. 2001, 2002, … , 2010).  The resulting 
sample consist of matched MR (treatment) and never MR (control) hospitals, where Nmatch,MR 
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Hospitals = n(Nmatch,never MR Hospitals).  The Nmatch,MR Hospitals is the number of MR hospitals after 
matching, Nmatch,never MR Hospitals is the number of never MR hospitals after matching and n is the 
number of never MR hospital matches per MR hospital.  It has been suggested in the literature 
that n=4 is an ideal number of never MR hospitals for each MR hospital.163  Therefore, each 
matched MR hospital (1 hospital) and never MR hospitals (maximum of 4 hospitals) are 
combined to form a new unit, the hospital pentad. The hospital pentad will aim to simulate the 
MR hospital and its counterfactual for all three phases.  
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of propensity score in matching MR 
hospitals to never MR hospitals.  Specifically, no two hospitals are similar in all respects despite 
controlling for most characteristics.  Even though the analysis plan aims to control for the 
selection bias by using propensity scores and matching, it should be noted that propensity scores 
only control for observed variables and do not consider the effect of unobserved variables163 in 
the selection of MR.  This in turn can also result in biased parameter estimates of the likelihood 
of becoming MR.  One of the drawbacks of using observational data to determine causal 
inference is that despite controlling for potential endogeneity attributed to selection bias, there is 
a possibility that the parameter estimates will be biased.163  
Standardized differences are used to measure covariate balances between the MR 
hospitals and never MR hospitals.  The standardized difference is the absolute difference in 
sample means divided by an estimate of the pooled standard deviation of the variable, expressed 
as a percentage.165  The following equations are used to calculate standardized differences. 
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Balancing is considered successful if the standardized differences are less than 10%. 
Standardized differences greater than 10% in absolute value indicate serious imbalance.164  In 
this situation, the model predicting propensity scores is re-configured and re-run until the 
matching successfully removes all significant imbalances.  It is recommended using high-order 
polynomial terms and/or cross-product interaction terms in the logistic regression and rerunning 
the model may help to reduce imbalance between the two groups.  For instance, including a 
squared term of the covariate that shows significance after matching or a product of two 
covariates if the correlation between the two covariates is likely to differ between the two 
groups.162 
The sample used for the propensity score analysis consisted of 2,199 hospitals (231 MR 
hospitals and 1,968 never MR hospitals).  The 231 MR hospitals are matched with 584 never MR 
hospitals (some never MR hospitals were re-matched with MR hospitals).  A weakness in using 
the greedy matching model is the reduction in sample size attributed to a small region of 
common support, where specific MR hospitals and never MR hospitals cannot be matched (i.e. 
the observations fall outside the region of common support).  Since each MR is matched with a 
maximum of four never MR hospitals, in the year 2000 the sample consists of 231 hospital 
pentads for a total of 1,152 hospitals (231 MR hospitals and 921 never MR hospitals).  
Using the hospital year observations from the year 2000, standardized differences are 
estimated for pre and post matching to assess pre-match imbalance and post-match balance.  The 
post-match standardized differences are <10% for all the covariates.  This confirms that balance 
between the MR and the never MR hospitals have been successfully achieved.  Figure 5 displays 
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the absolute standardized differences in covariates between the MR and never MR hospitals 
before and after propensity score matching.   
 
Figure 5.  Absolute standardized differences in baseline covariates between MR hospitals 
and never MR hospitals, before and after propensity score matching (post-match 
standardized difference <10% indicates excellent covariate balance). 
 
 
Phase 1b – Creating the Final Data Set with Matched MR and Never MR Hospitals 
The never MR hospitals generated from the propensity score analysis are then identified 
in the remaining hospital year observations (from 2001 to 2010).  These never MR hospital year 
observations are designated as either pre-test, implementation or post-test for the years that 
correspond to the pre-test, implementation and post-test of the corresponding matching MR 
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hospitals.  This results in an unbalance panel data set of 12,480 hospital year observations (from 
2000 to 2010), consisting of 921 never MR hospitals and 231 MR hospitals.  Since each hospital 
should have a maximum of 6 hospital year observations (2 hospital year observations for pre-
test, 2 hospital year observations for implementation and 2 hospital year observations for post-
test), hospital year observations that are not designated in one of these time periods are excluded 
from the final data set.  The final data consists of 6,581 hospital year observations consisting of 
921 never MR hospitals and 231 MR hospitals.  This data set is used for the multivariate 
regression analysis described in Phase 2. 
 
Phase 2 – Empirical Analysis 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are used to summarize the data.  In order to mitigate the effect of 
outliers, dependent variables are censored at the 1st and 99th percentile.  Bivariate analysis is used 
to test for significant differences between the subgroup means for MR hospitals versus never MR 
hospitals.  The differences between the group means on each measure are analyzed for direction 
and statistical significance using t-tests for continuous variables and chi-square test for 
categorical variables.  Statistical significance is set at α=0.05 for all analyses.  Correlation 
analysis is completed to identify potential multicollinearity among the independent variables.  
The analysis is conducted using Stata 11.1 (College Station, Texas).166 
 
Multivariate Regression Analysis 
Two different multivariate regression analyses are utilized to test the hypotheses 
described in this dissertation.  For Research Questions 1 and 3, a difference-in-difference model 
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using hospital fixed effects is used, and for Research Question 2, a stochastic frontier analysis is 
used. 
 
Difference-in-Difference Model Using Hospital Fixed Effects 
A difference-in-difference model with hospital fixed effects is used for Aims 1 and 3 of 
the analysis.  The following standard regression model is used for the analysis of each aim:  
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where h indicates variables that vary by hospital and t indicates variables that vary by time.  The 
fY refers to the unobserved time-invariant variables, and the MYZ refers to the unobserved time-
variant variables.  Fixed effect component, fY, captures unobserved heterogeneity across 
hospitals that are fixed over time.167   This is a limitation of the study design and methodology. 
Table 2 lists the Hospital outcome variables and associated measures for each aim. 
Treatment is a binary indicator of MR for each hospital.  The never MR hospital is the referent 
variable.  The ImplementationPeriod and PostTestPeriod are both binary indicators of hospital 
MR status during the study period.  The referent variable is the pre-test period.  Time (=2000, 
2001, 2002, ….,2010) control for the year effects over the study period.  The regression analysis 
also controls for both Hospital Characteristics and Market Characteristics.  Standard errors are 
clustered at the hospital level to allow for correlation within hospitals over time.  
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Table 2.  Hospital outcomes and measures. 
Aim Hospital Outcome Variable Measure 
Aim 1 
 
Reimbursement  Net Patient Revenue per Adjusted Patient Day 
Hospital Market Share  Hospital Discharges as a Percent of Total 
Discharges in Hospital’s Market Area 
Aim 3 Profitability  Operating Margin 
 Total Margin 
 Return on Equity 
 
Table 3 decomposes the difference-in-difference equation (Equation 5) into individual 
components.  Each cell corresponds to the marginal effect of the MR signal on hospital outcomes 
for each phase of the study time period.  The coefficient ! is a measure of the difference in 
outcomes (i.e. reimbursement, market share and financial performance) between MR and never 
MR hospitals during the pre-test phase of the study.  This parameter estimate will determine if 
the MR and never MR hospitals are similar or different at the initiation of the study.  The 
coefficients ! # !^  are a measure of the difference in outcomes (i.e. reimbursement, market 
share and financial performance) between MR hospitals and never MR hospitals during the 
implementation phase of the study.  This parameter estimate will determine the effects of the MR 
signal prior to the commencement of the MR program.  The coefficients ! # !` are a measure 
of the difference in outcomes (i.e. reimbursement, market share and financial performance) 
between MR and never MR hospitals during the post-test phase of the study.  This parameter 
estimate will determine the effect of the MR signal after the commencement of the MR program. 
The coefficient !` is a measure of the overall effect of the MR signal on hospital outcomes (i.e. 
reimbursement, market share and financial performance).  This estimate is a measure of the 
difference in hospital outcomes between MR and never MR hospitals and between post-test and 
pre-test attributed to the MR signal.  For Aims 1 and 3, !` is the main parameter of interest since 
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it is the measure of the effectiveness of the MR signal on hospital outcomes.  The null hypothesis 
for these analyses is that MR does not have a causal effect on hospital outcomes, !`  0.  If !` is 
determined to be significant, than the hypotheses for Aims 1 and 3 cannot be rejected. 
 
Table 3.  Difference-in-difference estimators for the effect of Magnet Recognition 
 Pre-Test Implementation Post-Test Post-Test – 
Pre-Test 
Never MR Hospitals !" !" # ! !" # !+ !+ 
MR Hospitals !" # ! !" # ! # ! # !^  !" # ! # !+# !` 
!+ # !` 
MR Hospitals − 
Never MR Hospitals 
! ! # !^  ! # !` hi 
 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is used in Aim 2 to estimate the effect of the MR 
signal on hospital inefficiency.  This method focuses specifically on cost inefficiency, which 
arises when a firm does not maximize output given a set of inputs consumed and/or when the 
firm does not select the optimal input mix, given the prices of inputs and the technology 
available.150, 153  Estimated hospital level cost inefficiency is the percentage by which observed 
costs exceed minimum costs predicted for the best-practice frontier.168 
SFA is an econometric technique, which uses regression analysis to estimate a cost 
function, except the difference being that inefficiency of a hospital is measured using the 
residuals from the estimated equation.169  Maximum Likelihood estimation is used to estimate 
the parameters of the model.170  Once the parameters in the model are estimated, the inefficiency 
term is extracted from the composed error term.171 
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 SFA is based on the assumption that departures from the cost frontier can be decomposed 
into stochastic and deterministic factors.172  The former represents random error and the latter 
represents inefficiency.  The estimation of hospital cost inefficiency requires technical 
assumptions about the structure of costs and about the statistical distribution of the error term 
representing inefficiency.173, 174  The application of SFA to panel data has been suggested to less 
likely yield biased estimates of the βs due to omitted variables and because panel models require 
fewer distributional assumptions about deterministic error.152, 175 
A single-stage stochastic frontier panel model with random effects is used to analyze the 
determinants of cost inefficiency in MR hospitals.  In this model, all of the independent variables 
are included in one equation.154  This approach has the advantage of producing more efficient 
parameter estimates.176  The following empirical model is used for this analysis: 
 
[(YZ  :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Where TC is hospital h’s total costs at time t; Y is a vector of outputs (i.e. outpatient visits and 
number of inpatient days); W is a vector of input prices (i.e. price of capital and labour); CM is a 
vector of variables influencing quality of care and accounts for variation across a hospital’s 
outputs, such as teaching status, case mix complexity, etc., and eht is the error term.  The error 
term, eht, is composed of vht, which is the statistical noise (i.e. assumed to be distributed as 
N(0,σ2)) and independent of uh.177  The uh consists of positive departures from the cost frontier 
and represents cost inefficiency178 and is often assumed to be iid N|(0,σ2)|.169  The half normal 
assumption is based on the idea that larger values of cost inefficiency are less likely than smaller 
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values of cost inefficiency.177  The observations are indexed by a hospital index h = 1, 2, …, n 
and a time index t = 1, 2, …., T.152  
 SFA requires the specification of functional form for the cost equation.  Common 
functional forms used in the empirical research have been translog and Cobb-Douglas cost 
functions.  The translog form is preferred because of the increased flexibility; however this 
requires the inclusion of an increased number of parameters to estimate and may result in 
multicollinearity problems.179   
The general form of the translog cost model is used to estimate the stochastic frontier for 
hospitals, which is stated as the following: 
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Where TC is total expenses, Y is outputs, W is input prices, CM is variables influencing quality of 
care, Year is time-trend variable, vht is a two-sided randomly distributed error term, and uht is a 
non-negative term, indicating the proportion by which hospital h’s costs exceed their feasible 
minimum due to inefficiency.  
 A time-varying model proposed by Battese and Coelli is used to estimate hospital 
specific cost inefficiency.180  In this model the inefficiency-effects are defined by: 
LYZ  u~YZ # eYZ ,     LYZ  0.                                                                                                                             -. 8  
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where Zht is a vector of explanatory variables associated with the inefficiency-effects; δ is a 
vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; and wht are unobservable random variables, 
assumed to be independently distributed, obtained by truncation of the normal distribution with 
mean zero and unknown variance, σ2.150 
In addition to providing estimates of cost inefficiency, this model permits an estimation 
of the impact of both firm specific and environmental factors on cost inefficiency.181  By 
including time in the Z vector with other firm-specific variables, inefficiency can differ by firm 
and by time. 
The parameters of the cost frontier are simultaneously estimated by a maximum 
likelihood method using the FRONTIER 4.1 program, which uses a random effects regression 
technique.182  A limitation the random effects model is that the effects must be assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the regressors.174  Fixed effects is an alternative to this model; however this 
model cannot be used in a data set that has variables that are invariant over time.183   
This model estimates inefficiency and the parameters of the inefficiency-effects variables 
simultaneously (one-stage method).  Inefficiency-estimates can also be obtained using a two-
stage estimation procedure, where the inefficiency-estimates from the first stage are regressed 
against inefficiency-effects variables in a second stage.  The two-stage estimation procedure has 
been found to provide parameter estimates of the inefficiency-effect variables that are inefficient 
or more likely biased than those from the one-stage method.176, 182 
The cost inefficiency of the hth hospital in the tth year (where t ranges from 1 in 2000 to 
11 in 2010) is defined as the ratio of the stochastic frontier total costs to observed total costs.  
The stochastic total cost frontier is defined by the value total costs would be if uht (i.e., the cost 
inefficiency effect) was zero (i.e., full efficiency).  Therefore  
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where CEht = cost efficiency and uht was defined previously.   
This indicates that cost efficiency is no greater than 1 and the reciprocal of this quantity, 
exp(uht) is no less than one.  The amount by which exp(uht) exceeds one is a measure of cost 
inefficiency.152, 155 
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CHAPTER 4:  THE EFFECT OF THE MAGNET RECOGNITION SIGNAL ON 
HOSPITAL REIMBURSEMENT AND MARKET SHARE 
 
Overview 
In this Chapter, the focus is on examining the effect of the Magnet Recognition (MR) 
signal on both hospital patient reimbursement and market share.  If consumers and purchasers 
interpret the MR designation as a signal of high quality care, then demand for MR hospitals 
should increase and lead to an increase in market share and revenue.  Data from the American 
Hospital Association Annual Survey, Medicare Hospital Cost Reports, Area Resource File and 
American Nurses Credential Center is used for the analysis.  Propensity score matching is used 
to select comparable hospital matches from the panel data set.  The matched hospitals are used to 
construct the final study sample.  Then a difference-in-difference model with hospital fixed 
effects is applied to the matched hospital sample to test the effect of the MR signal, while 
controlling for both hospital and market characteristics.  Results indicate that the MR signal does 
not affect either patient reimbursement or market share of designated hospitals compared to non-
designated hospitals. 
 
Introduction 
Hospitals in the U.S. face ongoing financial challenges as they strive to achieve their 
missions.  These facilities are struggling to operate in a turbulent healthcare environment, 
consisting of a large population of uninsured and underinsured patients79, changing 
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reimbursement policies, broadening regulatory requirements, increasing emphasis on quality care 
outcomes, and declining economic conditions.11  In addition to these circumstances, hospitals are 
also coping with an aging workforce, a high percentage of elderly patients, high acuity patients 
and patients with multiple co-morbidities.79, 184  Despite rising costs and limited opportunities to 
increase revenue, hospitals are trying to survive and maintain the delivery of high quality 
healthcare services.  In order to mitigate these effects and ensure continued financial viability, 
many hospitals are employing strategies that will provide a distinct advantage and differentiate 
them from other hospital competitors, potentially providing opportunities to increase revenue 
through either market share and/or reimbursement.  One way a hospital can distinguish itself is 
by signaling the underlying quality of its products and services. 
Signals are used to reduce information asymmetry, which is defined as an imbalance of 
information between two parties, where one party has more information than another party.  
Signals are often used in healthcare to communicate the underlying quality of a hospital’s 
products and services.  The information contained in the signal permits consumers to make 
informed decisions and to distinguish between high quality and low quality products.  Healthcare 
providers attempt to communicate the quality of their services to prospective patients and/or 
employees in a variety of ways.9  Some communicate directly using public reporting of quality of 
care information.10  Others communicate indirectly, or signal, unobservable information to 
consumers by attaining a costly, coveted quality designation, which the consumer can interpret 
as the firm’s commitment of resources to quality management.58  The quality information 
conveyed by the signal then leads consumers to update their perceptions2, 43 about product and 
service quality within the context of market conditions.44   
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MR designation is an example of a signal employed by hospitals to communicate to 
patients, providers and payers, the hospital’s dedication and commitment to health care quality 
and quality management.9  MR is a quality designation given by the American Nurses 
Credentialing Center to hospitals and long term care facilities18, 19 to recognize organizations as 
centers of nursing excellence.86  Pursuing and sustaining MR requires the commitment of time 
and the investment of substantial human and financial resources by the hospital,21, 22 and the 
designation has gained widespread attention in both research24, 25 and practice26 over the past two 
decades.  MR is considered to be a symbol of distinction11 and has been theorized to signal to 
patients and to health care providers, the hospital’s dedication and commitment to quality patient 
care.13-15   
There is growing evidence (empirical and anecdotal) that MR hospitals are associated 
with positive nursing, patient and organizational outcomes.24, 25  These outcomes are interrelated 
and have also been theorized to affect both hospital reimbursement and market share through 
signaling delivery of quality care to payers, patients, and providers.  Under this theory, payers 
(i.e. government and insurers) interpret and respond to the MR signal by either 1) steering 
patients to designated hospitals to receive quality patient care18 and/or 2) increasing 
reimbursement for health services in high quality hospitals.32  Likewise, patients interpret the 
MR signal and respond by seeking care at or referring family and friends to the designated 
hospital, or by remaining loyal to the designated facility through repeated visits.  Lastly, 
providers interpret the MR signal by referring patients to designated hospitals where they will 
receive quality patient care.  Despite these theories, there have been no research studies that have 
empirically evaluated the effect of the MR signal on either hospital patient reimbursement or 
market share.   
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The purpose of this research study is twofold:  
(1) To investigate the effect of the MR signal on hospital reimbursement.  It is 
hypothesized that the MR signal will increase reimbursement of designated hospitals, and  
(2) To investigate the effect of the MR signal on hospital market share.  It is hypothesized 
that the MR signal will increase market share of designated hospitals.   
This study contributes to the evidence of signaling unobserved quality by hospitals in two 
ways.  First, although the more general effect of signaling on firm performance using various 
outcomes has been studied previously, there is minimal research investigating the effect of 
signaling in the hospital industry.  Second, although there is a large volume of studies conducted 
on MR hospitals, these research studies have been dominated by case studies, single-site 
evaluations33 and cross sectional survey studies with convenience samples of organizations and 
staff respondents.185  With the increased number of MR hospitals, it is now possible to design 
longitudinal research studies that address issues of modest sample size and omitted variable bias.  
This study uses externally reported administrative and financial information and employs a 
robust methodological approach and innovative analytical techniques to evaluating the effect of 
MR on hospital reimbursement and market share.   
The outcomes of this research will inform managers and policy makers about the 
effectiveness of the MR signal at changing hospital reimbursement and market share, and thus its 
utility as a potential strategy to improve the hospital’s marketability and financial health, 
especially in a highly competitive market area. 
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Research Design and Methods 
Research Design 
 This study applies a pre-post research design to measure the effect of the MR signal on 
hospital reimbursement and market share.  This research design attempts to control for 
observable and unobservable factors that will potentially contribute to the difference between the 
pre-test and post-test results.  The observations are divided into two groups.  The treatment 
group, hereafter referred to as “MR hospitals”, includes hospitals that have achieved MR 
anytime during the study period.  The control group includes hospitals that have never achieved 
MR prior to, during, or after the study period.  This sub-sample excludes hospitals that have 
received MR prior to 2000 and after 2010.  The control hospitals are referred to as “Never-MR 
hospitals”.  
 Three study periods are used.  The pre-test period is defined as a minimum of two years 
when the hospital is not pursuing MR.  The pre-test period is a baseline measure, before the 
hospital is actively pursuing MR.  The implementation period is defined as two years prior to the 
initial MR designation, when the hospital is preparing for MR.  According to the research 
literature, hospitals pursuing the MR designation require approximately two years to transform 
and become a MR hospital.138  The implementation period aims to control for any changes in 
hospital characteristics and outcomes that may occur during the transition to becoming a MR 
hospital.  The post-test period is defined as the year of initial MR designation and one 
subsequent years of designation.   
 
Data Sources 
 The hospital data for this analysis are obtained from Medicare’s Hospital Cost Report 
Information System (HCRIS), the American Hospital Association’s (AHA) Annual Survey of 
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Hospitals, the Area Resource File (ARF) and the American Nurses Credentialing Center 
(ANCC) website.   
The four data sets are merged using both a year and a hospital identifier; however the 
definition of the year variable differs in the various data sets.  The HCRIS data set includes 
hospital year observations organized by fiscal year and the ARF, ANCC and AHA data sets 
include hospital-year observations organized by calendar year.  In order to merge HCRIS data 
set, a year-end variable is created using the following rule:  the fiscal year end date for each 
hospital-year observation (i.e. 6/30/2000) will be designated as the year-end variable (i.e. 2000) 
and is matched with the calendar year variable.   
 
Study Sample 
The study sample is a longitudinal, unbalanced panel of MR and never MR hospitals 
located in urban areas in the US from 2000 to 2010 (eleven years).  The initial data set consists 
of 3,431 hospitals (31,163 hospital year observations).  Duplicate hospital year observations, 
hospital year observations with fewer than 330 days in the Medicare cost report period, hospitals 
with fewer than 8 hospital year observations, hospitals that do not have a hospital year 
observation at year 2000, and hospitals that received MR before 2004 and after 2009 are 
excluded from the data set. 
In addition, to remain in the final study sample, each MR hospital must have four 
consecutive years of data prior to MR designation, and two consecutive years of data following 
MR designation, for a total of six hospital-year observations.  MR hospitals with limited or 
missing financial data potentially introduce noise and bias the results; therefore, only MR 
hospitals that have complete data over the required six consecutive years are included.  Although 
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this requirement reduces the sample size, the reduction in the eligible hospital-year observations 
is trivial. 
The final sample consists of 23,607 hospital year observations (2,199 hospitals) from 
2000 to 2010.  This includes 21,072 never MR hospital year observations (1,968 hospitals) and 
2,535 MR hospital year observations (231 hospitals). 
Propensity score analysis is used to create a study sample of matched MR hospitals and 
never MR hospitals.  Using data from the year 2000, the propensity score analysis predicts the 
probability that a hospital will ever achieve MR as a function of hospital and market 
characteristics in 2000.  A greedy matching algorithm is used to match MR hospitals to never 
MR hospitals in the year 2000.  Following the recommendation by Guo, a 1 to 4 nearest 
neighbour matching within a caliper without replacement is used.163  As suggested by 
Rosenbaum, the caliper size is set at 0.25σp, (where 0.25σp denotes the standard deviation for the 
estimated propensity scores in the hospital sample).162  The matches from 2000 serve as the 
matches for the remainder of the study period. 
This results in an unbalanced panel data set of 12,480 hospital year observations (from 
2000 to 2010), consisting of 921 never MR hospitals and 231 MR hospitals.  Since each hospital 
should have a maximum of 6 hospital year observations (2 hospital year observations for pre-
test, 2 hospital year observations for implementation and 2 hospital year observations for post-
test), hospital year observations that are not designated in one of these time periods are excluded 
from the final data set.  The final study sample consists of 6,581 hospital year observations 
consisting of 921 never MR hospitals and 231 MR hospitals.   Standardized differences are used 
to measure covariate balances between the MR hospitals and the matched never MR hospitals.  
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The post-match standardized differences are <10% for all the covariates.  This confirms that 
balance between the MR and the never MR hospitals has been successfully achieved.   
 
Variables and Measurements 
Table 4 is a comprehensive list of variables, measures, definitions and data sources that 
are utilized in this analysis.   The variables are discussed in detail below. 
Dependent Variables 
Net patient revenue per adjusted patient day is used to measure hospital reimbursement.  
The adjusted patient day is defined as the sum of inpatient days and equivalent patient days 
attributed to outpatient services.  The MR signal is believed to affect the hospital’s ability to 
negotiate better reimbursement rates with managed care organizations or result in a shift towards 
a more profitable payer mix.32  To account for inflation, reimbursement has been adjusted to 
2010 US dollars using the Medical Care Services Consumer Price Index.140 
Hospital market share, a measure of the amount of hospital competition in the market 
area, is measured as the hospital’s discharges as a percentage of the total discharges in a 
hospital’s market area.159  The hospital’s market area is defined as the county in which the 
hospital is located.  MR provides an opportunity for hospitals to market themselves105, 127 and is 
theorized to signal to patients and clinicians that the hospital is a center for nursing excellence 
and a provider of quality patient care.12  The MR signal is hypothesized to increase market share 
through increases in either payers steering patients towards a MR hospital, physician referrals or 
patient preferences for quality patient care.110 
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Independent Variables – Main Explanatory Variable 
The Magnet Recognition Designation variable identifies hospitals as either MR or never 
MR.  The Hospital Magnet Recognition Status variable identifies the time period as either pre-
test, implementation, or post-test during the six year period over which each hospital is observed.   
 
Independent Variables – Control Variables 
Hospital Characteristics 
Hospital characteristics are noted to be associated with a hospital’s financial health.157  
These characteristics include a hospital’s structural factors and processes, which influence 
hospital operations, marketability and ability to earn revenue.  
Hospital characteristics include hospital size (measured by total number of beds) which is 
associated with higher economies of scale and financial expertise, lower per unit costs, and more 
successful strategic activity.146, 147  System affiliation (determined using the Medicare Cost 
Report) indicates whether a hospital is owned by a larger system.  Such affiliations have been 
found to result in increased efficiency, lower risk, better financial outcomes, seamless care, 
greater control over referrals, and greater economies of scale.146, 147   
Medicare payer mix and Medicaid payer mix are calculated as the percentage of total 
inpatient days attributed to Medicare and Medicaid, respectively.  These measures provide an 
indication of the hospital’s patient-mix 146 and the payer-mix.148  An increased dependence on 
government payers, such as Medicare and Medicaid, is likely to be associated with lower patient 
revenue, because these payers typically do not pay the full average cost of care.146 
Teaching affiliation indicates if a hospital is a teaching hospital or a non-teaching 
hospital.  Teaching hospitals are known to have higher costs than non-teaching hospitals.155  
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Teaching affiliation is included as a binary variable in this analysis.  Ownership indicates for-
profit, not-for-profit or government ownership.  These variables are included to control for 
internal pressure for cost reduction associated with ownership.186  Due to their responsibilities to 
shareholders, for-profit firms are expected to more aggressively pursue cost reduction strategies 
than not-for-profit firms.  For-profit firms are also unlikely to be interested in the adoption of 
innovations that are unproven or may raise costs39, and as a result, may have higher operating 
margins than their not-for-profit counterparts.156  
 
Market Characteristics 
A hospital’s operating environment and the market demand for health care services can 
also influence hospital financial performance and market share.157  The hospital’s market area is 
defined as the county in which the hospital is located.     
The total population in the market, the market population density and the percent of the 
population age 65 and over describe the demand for hospital services in the market area. The 
average per capita income, unemployment rate and poverty rate (percentage of families or 
persons in poverty) measures a community’s financial ability to purchase health care services.158  
The likelihood of a resident to bypass a hospital and seek services at another facility is proxied 
by the average distance from patient residence to hospital, calculated as the average distance 
between the residence ZIP centroid of each Medicare discharge and the hospital.159  Hospital 
competition measures the number of hospitals physically located in the market area and is a 
measure of suppliers of health care services.   
There is a large variation in the location of MR hospitals.  Region, captured using U.S. 
census regions, is included to control for the effect of hospital location.160  Annual unmeasured 
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factors affecting hospital financial performance and market share over time are accounted for 
using year dummies.   
  
7
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Table 4. Listing of variables, measures, definitions and data sources. 
Variable Measure Type Data Source 
Dependent Variable 
Reimbursement Net Patient Revenue per Adjusted Patient Day = Hospital Net 
Operating Revenue/Adjusted Patient Day 
Continuous HCRIS 
Hospital Market Share Hospital Discharges/Total Discharges in Market Area Continuous ARF 
Magnet Recognition 
Magnet Recognition Designation 1, Magnet Recognition Hospital;  Never Magnet Recognition 
Hospital (referent) 
Binary ANCC 
Hospital Magnet Recognition Status Pre-Test (referent);  Implementation;  Post-Test Binary ANCC 
Hospital Characteristics 
Hospital size Number of Staffed Beds Continuous HCRIS 
System Affiliation System Affiliation; Free Standing (referent) Binary HCRIS 
Medicare Payer Mix Medicare Inpatient Days/Total Hospital Inpatient Days Continuous HCRIS 
Medicaid Payer Mix Medicaid Inpatient Days/Total Hospital Inpatient Days Continuous HCRIS 
Teaching Affiliation Teaching Affiliation;  No Teaching Affiliation (referent) Binary AHA 
Ownership Not-for-Profit;  For-Profit;  Government (referent) Binary AHA 
Market Characteristics 
Population Total Population in the County (1,000s) Continuous ARF 
Population Density County Population Density (population per square miles) Continuous ARF 
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Variable Measure Type Data Source 
Percent of the Population 65 and Over [Total Population Age 65 and Older in Market Area/Total 
Population in County]*100 
Continuous ARF 
Income Per Capita Income in Market Area (1,000s) Continuous ARF 
Unemployment Rate Unemployment Rate in Market Area Continuous ARF 
Poverty Rate Percent/proportion of Families or Person in Poverty in Market 
Area 
Continuous ARF 
Distance from Residence to Hospital Average Distance from Place of Residence to Hospital (miles) Continuous ARF 
Hospital Competition The total number of hospitals in the hospital’s geographical 
market. 
Continuous HCRIS 
Region Midwest;  Northwest;  South;  West (referent) Binary ARF 
Year 2000 (referent);  2001…2010 Binary ARF 
ANCC:  American Nurses Credentialing Center, HCRIS:  Healthcare Cost Reports Information System, ARF:  Area Resource File, 
AHA:  American Hospital Association 
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Statistical Analysis 
Descriptive statistics are used to summarize the data.  In order to mitigate the effect of 
outliers, dependent variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.  Bivariate analysis is 
used to test for differences between the subgroup means for MR hospitals versus never MR 
hospitals.  The differences between the group means on each measure are analyzed for direction 
and statistical significance using t-tests for continuous variables and chi-square test for 
categorical variables.  Statistical significance is set at α=0.05 for all analyses.  Correlation 
analysis is completed to identify potential multicollinearity among the independent variables.  
The analysis is conducted using Stata 11.1 (College Station, Texas).166 
 
Empirical Analysis - Difference-in-Difference Estimation 
A difference-in-difference model with hospital fixed effects is used to estimate the effects 
of MR on both reimbursement and hospital market share.  The following standard regression 
models are used: 
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where h indicates variables that vary by hospital and t indicates variables that vary by time.  The 
fY refers to the unobserved time-invariant variables, and the MYZ refers to the unobserved time-
variant variables.   
The coefficient ! is a measure of the difference in reimbursement and hospital market 
share between MR and never MR hospitals during the pre-test phase of the study.  This estimate 
determines if the MR and never MR hospitals are similar or different at the initiation of the 
study.  However, since this variable is invariant over time, ! cannot be estimated using hospital 
fixed effects regression.  Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition (FEVD) is an econometric tool 
that has been recommended to estimate the coefficient of time-invariant variables.187  
Unfortunately, while the parameter estimates for the time-invariant variables are correct, the 
standard errors produced from the FEVD are biased downward, resulting in false conclusions 
about statistical significance.188   
The coefficient !+ is a measure of the difference in reimbursement and hospital market 
share from the pre-test period to the post-test period for never MR hospitals.  This estimate 
measures the change in the reimbursement and hospital market share that are attributed to market 
and hospital factors.  The summation !+ # !` is the difference in reimbursement and hospital 
market share from the pre-test period to the post-test period for the MR hospitals.  Thus, the 
difference, !`, is the net effect of the MR signal on reimbursement and hospital market share.  
This estimate is a measure of the difference in reimbursement and hospital market share between 
MR and never MR hospitals and between post-test and pre-test attributed to the MR signal.  In 
this study, !` is the main parameter of interest since it is a measure of the effectiveness of the 
MR signal on both reimbursement and hospital market share. 
 
 78 
Results 
 Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the study sample.  A comparison between 
MR hospitals and never MR hospitals reveals that MR hospitals receive higher reimbursement 
and have higher market share than never MR hospitals.  The net patient revenue per adjusted 
patient day for MR hospitals is $3,518 versus $3,118 for never MR hospitals (p=0.000) and the 
hospital market share for MR is 19.5% versus 18.0% for never MR hospitals (p=0.045).   
Table 6 presents the difference-in-difference estimates of the effect of the MR signal on 
hospital reimbursement and market share, controlling for hospital and market characteristics and 
including hospital fixed effects.  Since the Magnet Recognition Hospitals (MR hospitals and 
never MR hospitals), Hospital size (Total beds), and Regions (Northeast, Midwest, and South) 
variables are time-invariant, these variables do not remain in the regression model. 
The results of the difference-in-difference regression model indicate that the relationship 
between the MR signal and both reimbursement and hospital market share is modest – a 1.7 
percent increase in revenue and 0.31 percentage point increase in market share – but both are 
statistically non-significant.  The results also indicate that for-profit hospitals have an 11% 
greater reimbursement compared to government hospitals and hospitals affiliated with a teaching 
institution have 3.3% lower reimbursement compared to non-teaching affiliated hospitals.   
Table 6 also shows that Medicare payer mix, population density, percent of population 65 
and over, hospital competition and year variables are significantly associated with hospital 
market share.  A one percentage point increase in Medicare payer mix is associated with a 0.058 
percentage point increase in hospital market share.  Population density and percent of population 
65 and over are associated with 0.018 and 0.70 percentage point decreases in hospital market 
share, respectively.  An increase of one additional hospital in a hospital’s market area is 
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associated with a 0.13 percentage point decrease in hospital market share.  All the year variables 
(from 2001 to 2010) are associated with a significant increase in hospital market share compared 
to the year 2000, suggesting increasing market share over the eleven year time period.  This can 
be attributed to an increase in the number of total discharges per hospital per year potentially due 
to population growth in the hospital’s market area. 
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Table 5. Summary statistics of dependent and independent variables (N=6,581 hospital year observations) from 2000 to 2010 
 
All Hospitals 
(N=6,581 hospital year 
observations & 1,152 
hospitals) 
Never Magnet Recognition 
Hospitals 
(N=5,246 hospital year 
observations & 921 
hospitals) 
Magnet Recognition 
Hospitals 
(N=1,335 hospital year 
observations & 231 
hospitals) 
P 
Value 
 Mean Standard Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Dependent variable        
Reimbursement* 3,203.72 1,051.92 3,117.64 1,006.67 3,518.54 1,149.75 0.000 
Hospital market share (%) 18.30 24.30 18.00 24.40 19.50 23.90 0.045 
Magnet Hospital 
Recognition Status 
       
Pre-test (%) 33.10 - 33.10 - 33.00 - 0.895 
Implementation (%) 34.50 - 34.50 - 34.40 - 0.924 
Post-test (%) 32.40 - 32.30 - 32.70 - 0.818 
Hospital Characteristics         
Hospital size (Total beds) 445.00 333.00 439.00 340.00 466.00 302.00 0.080 
System affiliation (%) 29.70 - 29.70 - 29.60 - 0.948 
Medicare Payer Mix (%) 38.50 14.30 38.30 15.00 39.00 11.30 0.094 
Medicaid Payer Mix (%) 11.90 9.70 12.00 10.10 11.50 7.83 0.090 
Not-for-profit hospital (%) 86.10 - 86.00 - 86.20 - 0.844 
For-profit hospital (%) 4.30 - 4.40 - 4.00 - 0.505 
Government hospital (%) 9.60 - 9.60 - 9.80 - 0.820 
Teaching Affiliation (%) 66.60 - 66.50 - 67.20 - 0.662 
Market Characteristics        
Population (1,000s) 3,588.04 4,782.68 3,571.45 4,800.64 3,653.22 4,712.57 0.577 
Population density  726.00 737.00 722.00 742.00 742.00 718 0.376 
Percent of Population 65 
and over (%) 
12.00 2.45 12.00 2.48 12.10 2.35 0.422 
Income 37,192.05 7,137.81 37,139.18 7,104.58 37,399.79 7,265.89 0.234 
Unemployment Rate (%) 5.29 1.79 5.30 1.79 5.25 1.79 0.327 
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All Hospitals 
(N=6,581 hospital year 
observations & 1,152 
hospitals) 
Never Magnet Recognition 
Hospitals 
(N=5,246 hospital year 
observations & 921 
hospitals) 
Magnet Recognition 
Hospitals 
(N=1,335 hospital year 
observations & 231 
hospitals) 
P 
Value 
 Mean Standard Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Poverty Rate 11.50 2.52 11.50 2.55 11.60 2.43 0.075 
Distance from Residence to 
Hospital 
16.60 8.56 16.70 8.61 16.20 8.35 0.046 
Hospital competition 10.30 14.50 10.20 14.60 10.90 14.1 0.135 
Region        
West 14.70 - 15.10 - 13.30 - 0.105 
Midwest 31.50 - 31.10 - 33.40 - 0.098 
Northeast 19.40 - 19.00 - 21.00 - 0.089 
South 34.30 - 34.90 - 32.2 - 0.068 
Year        
2000 (%) 3.90 - 3.90 - 3.90 - 0.958 
2001 (%) 6.60 - 6.60 - 6.60 - 0.996 
2002 (%) 9.00 - 9.00 - 9.00 - 0.975 
2003 (%) 10.80 - 10.80 - 10.90 - 0.924 
2004 (%) 12.70 - 12.70 - 12.60 - 0.913 
2005 (%) 13.90 - 14.00 - 13.90 - 0.984 
2006 (%) 13.40 - 13.40 - 13.30 - 0.949 
2007 (%) 10.70 - 10.70 - 10.70 - 0.983 
2008 (%) 8.20 - 8.20 - 8.30 - 0.853 
2009 (%) 6.40 - 6.40 - 6.30 - 0.920 
2010 (%) 4.40 - 4.40 - 4.50 - 0.861 
*Adjusted for 2010 dollars according to the Consumer Price Index.  
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Table 6.  Difference-in-difference regression with hospital fixed effects 
Dependent Variable 
ln(Reimbursement) Hospital Market Share (%) 
Coefficient Robust SEs Coefficient Robust SEs 
Hospital Intervention     
Magnet Recognition Hospitala, f - - - - 
     
Magnet Recognition Hospital Status     
Implementationb −0.011 0.0059 −0.18* 0.083 
Post-testb −0.010 0.0088 −0.24 0.14 
Magnet Recognition*Implementation 0.0037 0.010 0.31 0.17 
Magnet Recognition*Post-test 0.017 0.011 0.21 0.22 
     
Hospital Characteristics     
Hospital Sizef - - - - 
System affiliation −0.0084 0.0074 −0.031 0.099 
Medicare Payer Mix 0.0020 0.0012 0.058** 0.016 
Medicaid Payer Mix −0.00018 0.00084 −0.0051 0.011 
Not-for-profit hospitale 0.046 0.038 −0.0042 0.22 
For-profit hospitale 0.11* 0.052 0.36 0.50 
Teaching Affiliation −0.033* 0.013 0.48 0.40 
     
Market Characteristics     
Population (1,000s) 0.000021 0.000075 0.00053 0.00079 
Population Density 0.00023 0.00044 −0.018** 0.0061 
Percent of Population 65 and over 0.0295 0.0168 −0.70* 0.29 
Income 0.0000012 0.0000023 −0.000053 0.000052 
Unemployment Rate 0.00020 0.0037 −0.11 0.077 
Poverty Rate 0.00017 0.0024 0.025 0.073 
Distance from  Residence to hospital −0.0025 0.0026 −0.099 0.056 
Hospital competition 0.0027 0.0025 −0.13** 0.032 
     
Region     
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Dependent Variable 
ln(Reimbursement) Hospital Market Share (%) 
Coefficient Robust SEs Coefficient Robust SEs 
Northeastd, f - - - - 
Midwestd, f - - - - 
Southd, f - - - - 
     
Time     
Year 2001c −0.0091 0.012 0.27* 0.13 
Year 2002 c 0.0039 0.015 0.55* 0.25 
Year 2003 c 0.021 0.017 0.71* 0.32 
Year 2004 c 0.026 0.020 1.03* 0.41 
Year 2005 c 0.025 0.022 1.13* 0.51 
Year 2006 c 0.028 0.027 1.41* 0.64 
Year 2007 c 0.027 0.031 1.84* 0.73 
Year 2008 c 0.0015 0.037 2.65** 0.87 
Year 2009 c 0.020 0.044 3.31** 0.97 
Year 2010 c 0.038 0.049 3.81** 1.08 
     
Constant 7.30** 0.34 39.48** 6.37 
     
Number of Hospital Year Observations 6,154  6,428  
Number of Hospitals 1,098  1,136  
     
F Statistic (28, 1,097) = 3.72 
p = 0.000 
 (28, 1,135)=2.38 
p = 0.000 
 
     
aReference is control hospitals;  bReference is the pre-test period;  cReference is year 2000;  dReference is west;  
eReference is government hospitals;  fTime invariant variables. 
*Statistically significant at the 5% level.  **Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Fixed effects are at the hospital level.    
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Discussion 
Hospitals are motivated to pursue MR for a variety of reasons.  These reasons include, 
but are not limited to, distinguishing themselves in the market place81, increasing market share15, 
18, 31
 and negotiating better reimbursement rates with payers32, such as managed care 
organizations32, all reasons which may result in potential increases in revenues.136  This 
relationship is rationalized through the reputation effect of MR, which is proposed to be a marker 
of distinction.  The designation provides an opportunity to promote the institution’s success and 
it signals to the public that it is recognized as a place to receive high quality care.16, 61, 62  In 
addition, the designation acknowledges that nursing services make a positive contribution to 
patient outcomes91 thus attracting patients and increasing reimbursement rates, correspondingly 
increasing hospital market share and hospital reimbursement. 
This study measured the effect of the MR signal on both hospital reimbursement and 
hospital market share.  In contrast to findings from previous descriptive studies, the empirical 
results from this analysis indicate that the MR signal does not have an effect on either hospital 
reimbursement or hospital market share.32  Increases in patient volume, which increases hospital 
market share, is influenced by various intermediate factors, such as employers, insurers, 
managed care organizations, and referring physicians.189 All of these factors may override the 
overall effect of the MR signal on hospital market share.  In terms of hospital reimbursement, the 
major payers include both the government and private health insurers.  Government payers 
reimburse hospitals using prospective payment systems and may be less responsive to adjusting 
reimbursement rates for MR hospitals; whereas private health insurers and managed care 
organizations may be more agreeable to negotiating reimbursement rates with these hospitals.  
Positive adjustments in reimbursement rates may encourage and reward the focus on quality 
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service delivery and reduction in redundancies of service provision.  Any potential increases in 
reimbursement rates by private health insurers may be diminished by limited increases or 
reductions in reimbursement by government payers. 
 In terms of hospital ownership, for-profit hospitals appear to receive higher 
reimbursement rates compared to government hospitals.  This may reflect a greater focus by for-
profit hospitals on well-insured patients or relatively profitable medical services.190  On the 
contrary, teaching affiliation was found to be negatively associated with reimbursement rates.  
This result is consistent with previous studies that showed teaching hospitals have patients with 
more complex health problems requiring both more intensive care and longer inpatient stays that 
results in a lower reimbursement per patient day compared to non-teaching hospitals.191 
 Medicare payer mix was determined to be positively associated with hospital market 
share.  An increase in Medicare inpatient days is likely attributed to an increase in the volume of 
Medicare patients, which may be attributed to population served by the hospital.  Population 
density, hospital market penetration and the percent of population 65 and over are all negatively 
associated with hospital market share.  The negative relationship with population density and 
hospital competition can be explained by the fact that an increase in the population of an area 
increases the number of firms (hospitals) in the area, leading to a reduction in the hospital market 
share.192  The negative relationship between the percent of the population 65 and over on market 
share is unexpected.   The negative effect of the percent of population 65 and over on market 
share may be attributed either to a reduction in accessing care from the hospital and accessing 
care from other sources such as home care.193   
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Implications 
Hospital Market Share 
 Market share is an indicator used by firms to measure their ability to attract customers 
and their success in the market area.  Hospitals publicize their MR designation to raise awareness 
and to market themselves to patients, nurses and the community.60  Hospitals promote their MR 
using full page newspaper advertisements, billboards, websites and television spots.99  The 
various forms of advertisement provide an opportunity to promote MR and communicate to the 
public that the hospital is recognized as a place to receive high quality care16, 61, 62 and that 
nursing services make positive contributions to patient outcomes.91  Hospitals incur enormous 
costs in the promotion of the MR.  One organization estimated spending $100,000 on educational 
and celebratory events, promotional items, and graphic design supports for their communications 
campaign.32   
Despite the use of costly advertisements and promotional materials, the study results 
indicate that the MR signal does not appear to have an effect on hospital market share.  This may 
have numerous implications for both the MR program and hospitals.  From the perspective of the 
MR program, both the validity and interpretability of the MR signal by may be debateable; 
specifically in-terms of the signal’s ability to attract patients and improve reimbursement.  The 
MR signal may either not be signalling “nursing excellence and the provider of quality patient 
care12” as previously considered or the MR signal may not be interpreted as “superior hospital 
performance and the delivery of quality health care services18” by payers, patients and providers.  
The ambiguity of the MR signal may have undesirable consequences for the MR program in-
terms of promoting the designation as a mechanism to increase hospital market share.   
These results may also prompt hospital CFOs and CEOs to re-evaluate the resources 
allocated to the promotion and advertising of MR.  Furthermore, the marketing strategy used 
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when promoting the MR signal may need to be reviewed and perhaps revised.  While MR has 
been associated with various positive benefits for patients, nurses and the organization, these 
benefits may not be carried in the MR signal.  There may be weaknesses in the MR signal that 
may explain the study results.  For instance, these benefits may not be in the message carried by 
the MR signal.  Although MR hospitals are acknowledged as centers of nursing excellence and 
the gold standard for nursing care, these accolades and honours may not be communicated by the 
MR signal.  The MR signal may also not be interpreted by the stakeholders.  Patients and 
providers may either not associate quality care or nursing excellence with the MR designation or 
understand the importance of nursing services to the delivery of quality patient care.   Lastly, the 
MR signal may not be eliciting the expected response to the signal.  While the MR signal may be 
recognized and interpreted, patients, payers and providers may not be responding for various 
reasons.  These reasons may include a lack of urgency to respond and limited control in decision 
making for a hospital visit.  Despite recognizing the MR signal, the individual may not respond 
immediately due to the lack of urgency, i.e. he or she does not need to go to the hospital at that 
moment.  However, in the case of an emergency, when a patient does need to visit a hospital, the 
patient will have limited decision making control; the decision will be determined either by the 
physician, the paramedics or the location of the nearest facility that meets the needs of the patient 
and the provider. 
 
Hospital Reimbursement 
Hospitals and payers try to negotiate reimbursement rates that are fair to both parties.  In 
order to gain leverage when negotiating reimbursement rates, hospitals often use quality metrics 
that demonstrate that the hospital is achieving high quality standards.  Quality metrics emphasize 
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the hospital’s commitment to quality management and may even give hospitals an added 
advantage in negotiations.194  MR hospitals are recognized for their commitment to nursing 
excellence and quality patient care 17 and a growing body of evidence confirms the positive 
organizational, nursing and patient benefits associated with Magnet Recognition.83, 84   
Regardless of the many positive outcomes for nurses, patients and organizations 
associated with MR28 and the emphasis on quality and safety in patient care38, this study 
indicates that the MR signal does not have an effect on hospital reimbursement.  From the 
perspective of hospitals, the CFOs and CEOS may not be leveraging the MR signal as a means to 
highlight their quality accomplishments to negotiate better reimbursement rates from the payers.   
However, from the payers’ perspective, payers may be unaware that MR signals hospitals 
that are classified as the gold standard because of their emphasis on quality and excellence in 
nursing care195 90, 196 and may not respond to the signal as predicted.  With an increase in the 
number of hospitals with MR or an increase in other signals used by hospitals, the MR signal 
may lose its distinctiveness and become weakened in the presence of other signals.  In this case 
hospitals are no longer able to differentiate themselves as centers of excellence in nursing care.  
On the contrary, payers may recognize and correctly interpret the MR signal, but may not 
consider the information communicated by the signal as important or as valued as other quality 
signals utilized by hospitals.   
 
Limitations 
There are a few limitations associated with this study.  Primarily, there are a number of 
variables of interest that were not included in the analysis due to inaccessibility of the data or 
inability to measure specific variables, potentially resulting in biased parameter estimates in the 
proposed empirical analysis.  For example, the scope of services provided has been found to be 
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strongly associated with likelihood of pursuing Magnet designation 197, but is not available in the 
existing data set.  In addition, the existence of other process management techniques, hospital’s 
management style, and measures of organizational culture are unobservable but could affect how 
a hospital is managed both financially and operationally.  However, the use of fixed effects 
regression was intended to control for variables such as these and all other unmeasured fixed 
hospital characteristics, which may be time invariant.   
Although the analysis attempted to match MR hospitals to never MR hospitals, no two 
hospitals are similar in all respects. Propensity scores only control for observed variables and do 
not consider the effect of unobserved variables163 in the decision of hospitals to seek MR. For 
example, a hospital may seek MR if other quality measures are decreasing. This non-random 
decision to seek MR can thus result in biased parameter estimates of the likelihood of MR.   
Although the ANCC website lists the current MR designated hospitals, it does not 
provide information on hospitals that applied for MR but were unsuccessful, hospitals that are 
currently undergoing the transformation to become MR recognized, or hospitals that had their 
MR status rescinded due to non-compliance with the program’s requirements. 
 
Conclusion 
 MR is not intended to improve hospital reimbursement or hospital market share.  
However, the MR signal is promoted as a means to inform payers, patients and providers about 
the hospital’s commitment to quality and patient care, consequently leading to increases in 
market share and increases in reimbursement.   However, the results from this study indicate that 
the MR signal has no effect on either of these outcomes.  Possible explanations may include the 
strength of the MR signal, the message carried by the MR signal, the interpretation of the 
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message in the MR signal, and the response or action after receiving the MR signal.  All of these 
intermediate components that determine a signal’s effectiveness may have contributed to the 
results found in this study. 
 The pursuit of MR is an important organizational decision resulting in substantial 
modifications to the structure of organizations and requires considerable investment of time and 
resources, initially and ongoing as the process continues.  Knowledge of the limited benefit of 
the MR signal on hospital reimbursement and hospital market share may cause CEOs and CFOs 
of MR hospitals to re-evaluate the advertising and marketing resources dedicated to promoting 
and signaling the designation to patients, providers and payers.  Resources may be re-allocated to 
other pathways that are positively impacted by the MR signal. 
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CHAPTER 5:  COST EFFICIENCY OF MAGNET RECOGNIZED HOSPITALS:  A 
STOCHASTIC FRONTIER APPROACH
 
Overview 
This study examines the impact of the Magnet Recognition (MR) signal on hospital cost 
inefficiency during the period 2000 to 2010.  The panel design includes 1,020 hospitals.  The 
primary sources of data are the American Hospital Association’s Annual Survey of Hospitals, 
Medicare Cost Reports, the Area Resource File, and the American Nurses Credentialing Center.  
Hospital cost inefficiency is estimated using a regression technique called stochastic frontier 
analysis.  The results indicate that overall mean estimated cost inefficiency is lower for MR 
hospitals (12.12%) when compared to never MR (15.46%) and cost inefficiency decreased over 
the study period.  A decrease in cost inefficiency is associated with system affiliation and an 
increase in cost inefficiency is associated with for-profit ownership and unemployment rate. 
 
Introduction 
 Efficiency can be defined as the relationship between inputs and outputs.150  In a 
perfectly competitive environment, firms operating inefficiently should go out of business in the 
long run, however this is not the case for hospitals.  Market imperfections permit inefficient 
hospitals to survive and continue operations.198  When resources are combined inefficiently, the 
firm incurs increased costs.199  However, applying the concept of efficiency to hospital care is 
not straightforward, because neither the outputs produced nor the quality of care is uniform 
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across hospitals.200  In other words, hospitals in the U.S. are described as inefficient because of 
the high costs and less-than average outcomes.152 
 It is assumed that hospitals select a set of inputs that will minimize costs of production 
given a certain level of output.  The production process, described by the production function, 
converts inputs, such as medical and non-medical personnel, buildings, and equipment, into a 
given level of output, such as the number of discharges and outpatient visits.  However, previous 
research has indicated that, on average, hospitals do not achieve minimum costs, which implies 
the presence of inefficiency in the production process.  Due to the highly decentralized nature of 
hospitals, with multiple specialized departments within each hospital, the presence of 
inefficiencies is not unexpected.198 
 Hospitals are being exposed to various approaches to increase the focus on improving 
efficiency.  Health plans are using provider efficiency ratings in network selection, pay-for-
performance programs, or steering patients toward efficient providers through lower copayments 
and/or public reporting.201  One of the major goals of Medicare’s Prospective Payment System 
(PPS), which pays hospitals a fixed rate per case, is to promote efficiency by rewarding hospitals 
that are able to keep their costs below the PPS rates, and penalizing those that are not.200  The 
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission has advocated using efficiency measurements to 
improve value in the Medicare program.202  In a time when resources are limited, improving 
efficiency is important as this allows more services to be produced from a constant level of 
resources without compromising quality.   
 The MR Program is an option proposed to improve efficiency in hospitals.  MR is a 
quality designation awarded to hospitals by the ANCC for demonstrating commitment to high 
standards in the delivery of nursing care and support for nursing practice throughout the 
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organization.18, 19  MR is proposed to be a marker of distinction and a signal of superior 
performance.18  Signals, such as MR, have been utilized by both healthcare and non-healthcare 
corporations to communicate unobservable information to stakeholders.  Hospitals use signals to 
distinguish themselves from other facilities and to attract patients and providers.56   
 The MR signal has been associated with the promotion of excellence in nursing care86 
and professional nursing practice131, a philosophy of evidence-based practice114, emphasis on 
collaboration and team work34, 35, and creation of a positive culture and work environment.33  
Designated hospitals are recognized as centers of nursing excellence86, which signals to 
consumers and to health care providers about the quality of care which they can expect to receive 
or provide in a MR hospital.13-15  Providers, such as nurses and physicians, are expected to 
interpret the MR signal and respond by seeking or maintaining employment in designated 
hospitals resulting in reduced nursing turnover, reduced recruitment118, 132 and orientation costs38, 
reduced usage of agency nurses38 and increased provider satisfaction.33, 60  These positive labour 
outcomes have been associated with cost savings and efficiency.15, 133 
A large amount of literature has been published on MR hospitals.  Research has identified 
that MR is related to positive outcomes, not only for nursing staff, but also for health care 
organizations and patients.24, 25  MR has also been postulated to improve efficiency by creating a 
hospital work environment that is professionally stimulating and rewarding for nurses131, which 
promotes nurse autonomy and gives nurses greater control over their work15, thereby also 
improving retention and decreasing turnover of nurses.118, 132  Improvements in hospital 
efficiency may be due to increasing productivity38 and reducing costs through nurse autonomy33, 
promotion of innovation131 and discovery of quality improvements13, and the delivery of 
evidence based care.127, 129  The combination of all these outcomes will result in an increase in 
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efficiency.  Despite these claims, there is no research literature on the influence of the MR signal 
on hospital cost inefficiency. 
 The popularity of the designation has motivated research on the effects of the MR signal 
on hospital financial performance and efficiency.  With respect to efficiency, a number of 
researchers have suggested that the MR signal reduces inefficiency in hospitals by promoting a 
culture of collaboration, innovation and evidence based practice114 resulting in the delivery of 
both cost effective care15, 133 and quality patient care.12    
 This study uses stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to investigate the effect of the MR 
signal on hospital inefficiency, controlling for various hospital and market factors.  Since the 
availability of financial resources is limited, there is an increased focus on reducing 
inefficiency.176  The results from this study will determine the relationship between the MR 
signal and hospital cost inefficiency, along with identifying the impact of internal factors and 
external pressures on cost inefficiency.   
 The effect of the MR signal on hospital cost inefficiency is important from a managerial, 
nursing profession and policy perspective.  Hospital managers are worried about reducing 
inefficiency and improving overall financial performance.  The results of this study can be used 
to decide whether or not pursuing MR is a potential option in light of the current fiscally 
constrained environment.  Hospital managers are also dealing with a nursing shortage, which 
affects both hospital operations and the quality of services provided.72  MR may be a potential 
solution to deal with the nursing shortage.  MR has been hypothesized to give hospitals an 
advantage in terms of recruiting and retaining nurses83 by signalling their dedication to a 
professional practice environment where nursing is valued and considered indispensable to the 
overall success of an organization.115  In turn, nurses may view the MR signal as an indicator of a 
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hospital that is dedicated to nursing excellence and values the contribution of the nursing 
profession to hospital operations and the delivery of patient care.  Nurses may consider MR a 
condition of future or continued employment with a hospital.   
 Policy makers and payers are interested in controlling the costs of health care without 
reducing access and compromising quality.  The current focus is on restructuring reimbursement 
methods to incentivize providers to focus on reducing costs and enhancing quality patient care.  
The results from this study may provide another opportunity by which cost inefficiency may be 
reduced.  MR may be considered as a potential solution for healthcare organizations to consider 
as they restructure and transition to a value based health care delivery system. 
 
Using Stochastic Frontier Analysis to Measure Hospital Cost Inefficiency 
 Earlier studies that focused on determining hospital inefficiency focused on costs as an 
indirect measure of cost inefficiency.  The assumption in these studies was efficiency must be 
increasing if costs are decreasing (or being contained).  Unfortunately this assumption may not 
hold true.  Cost containment can occur as a result from either decreases in inefficiency or 
decreases in the number of services and/or the quality of services or even perhaps from changing 
the product mix from more expensive to less expensive outputs.153  Due to this limitation, 
various other methods were employed to obtain a direct measure of hospital inefficiency, such as 
ratio analysis or ordinary lease squares regression.  These methods were also found to have a 
number of weaknesses.  For instance, ratio analysis relies on arbitrary inefficiency criteria and 
ordinary least squares regression results in biased parameter estimates.203  Frontier techniques 
were developed to overcome these weaknesses.  Frontier methods, which include both SFA and 
Data Envelop Analysis, determine the best practice frontier and measure inefficiency as the 
distance between actual firm performance and a best practice frontier.150, 153 
 96 
 SFA is a common method used to estimate cost inefficiency in hospitals.  In previous 
research, SFA has been applied to estimate cost inefficiency of Critical Access Hospitals173, 
teaching hospitals155, hospitals that are part of a network or members in a system151, 176 and 
hospitals that are associated with health maintenance organizations.152  SFA has also been 
applied to study cost inefficiency in non-healthcare industries such as the container port 
industry204, airport industry205, and banking industry.206 
 This is the first SFA-based study to examine the impact of the MR signal on hospital cost 
inefficiency.  SFA is parametric technique which can be used to estimate the cost inefficiency of 
an organization by comparing actual performance with an estimated or theoretical best practice 
frontier.  Intuitively, SFA creates a theoretical best practice frontier using actual hospital data 
and measures a hospital’s inefficiency as the distance from the hospital’s actual performance to 
the frontier.150  The cost inefficiency of a hospital is defined as the ratio of observed total costs to 
the best practice, stochastic frontier total costs.  The best practice frontier is defined by the value 
that total costs would be if full efficiency were attained.169, 203 
 SFA is based on the assumption that departures from the cost frontier can be decomposed 
into stochastic and deterministic factors.172  The former represents random error and the latter 
represents inefficiency.  The estimation of hospital cost inefficiency requires technical 
assumptions about the structure of costs and about the statistical distribution of the error term 
representing inefficiency.173, 174  The application of SFA to panel data has been suggested to less 
likely yield biased estimates of the coefficients due to omitted variables and because panel 
models require fewer distributional assumptions about deterministic error.152, 175 
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Methods 
Data Sources 
This study is based on panel data for urban hospitals for the period 2000 to 2010 (T = 
11).  The random effects frontier model used in this study can incorporate an unbalanced panel 
design.182  The individual hospital constitutes the level of analysis.  The market area is defined as 
the county, which is frequently used in hospital studies.152   
The hospital data for this analysis is obtained from Medicare’s Hospital Cost Report 
Information System (HCRIS), the American Hospital Association’s (AHA) Annual Survey of 
Hospitals, the Area Resource File (ARF) and the American Nurses Credentialing Center 
(ANCC) website.  The four data sets are merged using both a year and hospital identifier.  
Propensity score analysis was used on a larger sample of hospitals to match MR hospitals 
to never MR hospitals as a correction procedure for selection bias.  Matched hospitals in the base 
year (2000) remained matched during the remaining study period (2001 to 2010).  The resulting 
hospital sample contained MR hospitals (the treatment group) and never MR hospitals as the 
comparison group.  After eliminating hospitals with incomplete data and implausible values, the 
final sample contained 1,020 hospitals (5,491 hospital year observations) for the period 2000 to 
2010.   
 
Research Design 
 The analysis utilized in this research study assumes that costs are determined as follows: 
 
[(Z  :jZ , lZ # Z                                                                                                                                         -. 1  
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where TC represents total costs; Y is a vector of outputs;  W is a vector of input prices; and e is 
the error term, which can be decomposed as follows: 
 
Z  MZ # LZ                                                                                                                                                          -. 2  
 
where v is statistical noise (i.e. assumed to be distributed as N(0, σ2)) and u consists of positive 
departures from the cost frontier and represents cost inefficiency (i.e. the percentage by which 
observed costs exceed minimum costs predicted for a given level of output and input prices) for 
which a distribution must also be assumed.186  Frequently, u is assumed to follow a half-normal 
distribution and is always nonnegative (i.e. assumed to be distributed as N+(0, σ2))207; however 
there is no theoretical reason for the selection of this or other distributional forms.177  The use of 
a general distribution, such as a truncated normal distribution is recommended as an 
alternative.180  According to the literature, the various assumptions about the distribution of u 
appear to have little impact on estimated inefficiencies.152  The observations are indexed by a 
hospital index i=1,2,…n and a time index t=1, 2,…,T. 
 
Model Specifications 
 SFA requires the specification of functional form for the cost equation.  Common 
functional forms used in the empirical research have been translog and Cobb-Douglas cost 
functions.  The translog form is preferred because of the increased flexibility; however this 
requires the inclusion of an increased number of parameters to estimate and may result in 
multicollinearity problems.179   
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The general form of the translog cost model is used to estimate the stochastic frontier, 
which is stated as the following: 
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Where TC = Total expenses; Y = outputs; W = input prices; CM = outpatient case-mix adjusters 
influencing quality of care; Year is a time-trend variable; and vit and uit are variables previously 
described. 
 A time-varying model proposed by Battese and Coelli is used to estimate hospital 
specific inefficiency.180  In this model the inefficiency-effects are defined by: 
 
LZ  u~Z # eZ ,     LZ  0.                                                                                                                                -. 4 
 
where Zit is a vector of explanatory variables associated with the inefficiency-effects; δ is a 
vector of unknown parameters to be estimated; and Wit are unobservable random variables, 
assumed to be independently distributed, obtained by truncation of the normal distribution with 
mean zero and unknown variance, σ2.150 
In addition to providing estimates of cost inefficiency, this model permits an estimation 
of the impact of both firm specific and environmental factors on cost inefficiency.181  By 
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including time in the Z vector with other firm-specific variables, inefficiency can differ by firm 
and by time. 
The parameters of the cost frontier are simultaneously estimated by a maximum 
likelihood method using the FRONTIER 4.1 program, which uses a random effects regression 
technique.182  A limitation the random effects model is that the effects must be assumed to be 
uncorrelated with the regressors.174  Fixed effects is an alternative to this model; however this 
model cannot be used in a data set that has variables that are invariant over time.183  This model 
estimates inefficiency and the parameters of the inefficiency-effects variables simultaneously 
(one-stage method).  Inefficiency-estimates can also be obtained using a two-stage estimation 
procedure, where the inefficiency-estimates from the first stage are regressed against 
inefficiency-effects variables in a second stage.  The two-stage estimation procedure has been 
found to provide parameter estimates of the inefficiency-effect variables that are more inefficient 
or biased than those from the one-stage method.176, 182 
The cost inefficiency of the ith hospital in the tth year (where t ranges from 1 in 2000 to 
11 in 2010) is defined as the ratio of the stochastic frontier total costs to observed total costs.  
The stochastic total cost frontier is defined by the value total costs would be if uit (i.e., the cost 
inefficiency effect) was zero (i.e., full efficiency).  Therefore  
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where CEit = cost efficiency and uit was defined previously.   
This indicates that cost efficiency is no greater than 1 and the reciprocal of this quantity, 
exp(uit) is no less than one.  The amount by which exp(uit) exceeds one is a measure of cost 
inefficiency.152, 155 
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Cost Function Variables  
 For the specification of the stochastic frontier cost function, the approach by Rosko 
(2011) is followed.150  First, the assumption of linear homogeneity in input prices is imposed by 
normalizing the cost equation by the price of labour.  Therefore the dependent variable is the 
logarithm of (total expenses/the price of labour.)  The continuous output and input price 
variables are also in natural log form.  The output and input price variables are all entered 
directly and as squared and cross-product terms.  These variables are assumed to influence the 
cost of transforming resources into services.177  Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
study are presented in Table 7. 
 Two inputs, capital and labour, are included in the cost function model.  The use of 
financial inputs determine whether the total cost of labour, supplies and capital can be reduced 
through more efficient production or substitution of less costly inputs.201  The price of labour is 
calculated by the average annual salary per full-time-equivalent employee and the price of 
capital is calculated by the depreciation and interest expense per bed.   
Hospital outputs are considered to be exogenous, an assumption that is common to 
hospital cost studies.154  Outpatient visits and inpatient days are included as outputs in the cost 
function. 152   
Teaching hospital is a structural measure of quality.  These hospitals produce different 
outputs than non-teaching hospitals (i.e. medical education)153 and are more costly than non-
teaching hospitals.154  Teaching hospitals focus on training medical students and consume more 
inputs such as instructors, classroom space, diagnostic tests and state of the art technology.154  
Teaching hospitals also attract sicker patients who require more resources because of the 
education value this provides to the students. 152, 154, 155  According to Rosko (2007), the quality 
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of patient care tends to be higher in teaching than in nonteaching hospitals.153  Teaching hospital 
status is included in the model as a binary variable.  
 Since hospital outputs are heterogeneous, it is important to control for variations in case 
mix.  Consequently the ratio of outpatient surgeries to total outpatient visits and the ratio of 
Emergency Department Visits/Outpatient Visits are used to control for variations in outpatient 
case mix.  Research indicates that patients who require surgery and patients seen in the 
emergency department tend to be a more resource intensive group of outpatients.155  In order to 
control for heterogeneity in inpatient output, Medicare Case Mix Index is included in the 
analysis since patients with different diagnoses have different resource requirements.173   Time 
trend is also included, which is recommended as a proxy for improvements in medical and 
organizational technology.177  Therefore, this variable measures whether hospitals have been 
adopting a more expensive technology over time. 
 
Inefficiency Effects Variables  
Variables that are proposed to influence inefficiency are also included in the SFA model.  
These variables influence the cost inefficiency with which resources are transformed into 
services.177  The estimated coefficients provide an indication of the association between the 
internal hospital environment and the external pressures on cost inefficiency.   
To assess the impact of the MR signal on hospital efficiency, a vector of binary variables 
representing MR, the three phases of the study and interaction effects are included in the 
regression.  The Magnet Recognition Designation variable is a binary variable, which identifies 
hospitals as either MR or never MR.  The Hospital Magnet Recognition Status variable, also a 
binary variable, identifies the hospital status during the 2000 to 2010 time period.  A hospital’s 
status can be categorized as either pre-test period, implementation period or post-test period.  
 103 
The primary variable of interest is the interaction between MR and Post-test (Magnet 
Recognition*Post-test).  This variable measures the change in cost inefficiency for MR hospitals 
compared to the never-MR hospitals.   
Hospital reimbursement impacts profits and creates incentives for hospitals to become 
more efficient.  Two variables, Medicare share and Medicaid share of total inpatient days are 
used to represent a hospital’s payer mix and the regulatory pressures of public payers.  Medicare 
and Medicaid are federal and state payers, and both contribute to a large proportion of hospital 
revenues.  Hospitals face the prospect of providing predominantly unprofitable medical care to 
patients covered by Medicare or Medicaid.208  According to Cleverly and Harvey (1992) (as 
cited in Trussel, 2010), it is unlikely that Medicare reimbursements cover the full costs of 
treating patients.146  It is postulated that Medicare’s prospective payment system impairs the 
financial health of hospitals because the reimbursements fail to cover the hospital’s actual costs 
of patient care.146  Both Medicare and Medicaid increase the financial risk of the hospitals, 
leading hospitals to become more financially prudent and cost conscience; therefore both 
Medicare and Medicaid shares should be inversely related to cost inefficiency.  Since Medicaid 
reimbursement rates are lower than Medicare rates, it is expected that Medicaid share will have a 
larger effect on inefficiency than Medicare share.152 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a measure of industry concentration in a 
market area.  For hospitals, it is a measure of the distribution of discharges in a hospital’s market 
area.  The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the market shares of discharges for all of 
the hospitals in the county.  A value of 1 is indicative of a monopolistic market and measures 
close to 0 is indicative of a highly competitive environment.  As the number of hospitals increase 
in a market area, the competition among hospitals also increases.155  As a result, hospitals have 
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an incentive to increase efficiency.  Therefore it is expected that as HHI decreases, hospital 
efficiency should increase.152 
 System affiliation indicates whether a hospital is owned by a larger system.  Such 
affiliations have been found to result in increased efficiency, lower risk, better financial 
outcomes, seamless care, greater control over referrals, greater economies of scale146, 147, and the 
elimination of duplicative administrative functions.176  A hospital’s Ownership status influences 
the emphasis placed on earning profits.  Compared to not-for-profit hospitals, for-profit hospitals 
focus on earning profits, increasing shareholder wealth and reducing inefficiency.154, 209  To 
represent ownership form, a binary variable is used, 1 for for-profit hospitals and 0 otherwise.152   
Uncompensated care increases the financial risk of hospitals and leads hospitals to focus 
efforts to recoup costs and reduce inefficiency.  Since a measure of the amount of 
uncompensated care provided by hospitals is not available, unemployment rate is used as a proxy 
measure in the regression.  Unemployment rate has been found to be correlated with the 
percentage of population without insurance since most health insurance coverage is obtained 
from the place of employment.210  Shifts in the cost frontier are measured using a time trend 
variable equal to 1 in 2000, 2 in 2001 up to 11 in 2011, which measures the impact of the cost 
changes in technology over time.177  Table 7 presents the definitions and descriptive statistics of 
variables used in the stochastic frontier regression equation. 
 
Model Selection and Specification 
 In order to estimate a stochastic frontier cost model, a number of null hypotheses are 
tested to select the specification that best fits the model.  The final model is not directed by 
theory, but based on the results of various restriction tests.  Table 8 presents the results of 
hypotheses tests that examine a number of restrictions.   
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Hypothesis tests are performed using the likelihood-ratio test:  λ=−2[ln[L(H0)] – 
ln[L(H1)]].  Where ln[L(H0)] and ln[L(H1)] are obtained from the log-likelihood function under 
the null hypothesis (the restrictive model) and the alternative hypothesis (the unrestricted model) 
respectively and λ is the generalized likelihood statistic.  If the null hypothesis is true, λ has a 
Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the number of 
parameters estimated under null and alternative hypothesis.151  If the restriction has minimal 
impact on the parameter estimates, the value of the log likelihood function will not change much 
and the null hypothesis will not be rejected.  Chi square statistics (or mixed Chi-square) 211with 
critical values at the p < 0.05 level are used to test the hypotheses.  
 When attempting to select the preferred model for this analysis the following decisions 
need to be made:  (1) Should an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) or SFA be used in the 
estimation?  (2) Should a Cobb-Douglas or translog function be used?  (3) Should inefficiency-
effects variables be included in the model? and (4) What theoretical distribution should the 
composed error follow, a truncated normal distribution or a half-normal distribution?   
 First, in order to determine if SFA is a more appropriate estimation technique than OLS 
regression, the hypothesis, γ = 0, is tested.  Where γ = σu2/(σv2 + σu2), σu2 is the measure of 
inefficiency (i.e. one sided error) and σv2 is statistical noise (i.e. classical random error term).  
Larger values of γ imply that the variance of the inefficiency effects represents larger proportions 
of the total variance of the error terms u and v.152  Accepting the null hypothesis (H0: γ = 0) 
implies that σu2 is zero; therefore the parameters can be estimated using an OLS regression.  The 
results of the likelihood-ratio tests indicate that the OLS regression is rejected and the SFA is 
used. 
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 Second, likelihood-ratio tests are applied to determine whether the Cobb-Douglas or the 
translog function should be used for the analysis.  While the translog function is used frequently 
because of the flexibility it provides, this function requires many independent variables which is 
a concern for studies with small sample sizes.  Therefore, the Cobb-Douglas function may be 
considered as an alternative option.  In the Cobb-Douglas function the parameters of the higher 
order output and input price variables are restricted to zero.  The results of the likelihood-ratio 
tests indicate that the Cobb-Douglas frontier model is rejected and the translog model is used.176 
 Third, the inclusion of inefficiency effects variables to the model is tested.  The null 
hypothesis that δ1 = δ12 = 0 is tested.153, 176  The results support the rejection of the null 
hypothesis, which implies that the inefficiency variables have a significant impact on cost 
inefficiency and are therefore included in the model.176   
Fourth, the theoretical probability distribution of the inefficiency-effects, ui, must be 
made.  The half-normal distribution has been used frequently; however there is no a priori 
justification for the use of any specific distribution for the cost inefficiency-effects, ui.  The 
appropriateness of using the half-normal distribution is tested against the truncated-normal 
distribution.176  The results of the likelihood-ratio test indicated that the truncated normal 
distribution should be used in the analysis.  While the mean estimated inefficiency may vary 
under the different distributions, the relative inefficiency is minimally affected. 
The results of the restriction tests support the use of SFA using a translog function, with a 
composed error that assumes a truncated normal distribution, and the inclusion of inefficiency 
effects related to internal and external environmental factors.    
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Table 7.  Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Mean Standard Deviation 
Total Expenses* Total expenses / Price of Labour 11.67 0.90 
Outpatient Visits* Outpatient visits 12.09 0.97 
Inpatient Days* Inpatient days 11.01 1.09 
Price of Capital* Depreciation and interest expense per bed 10.59 1.03 
Price of Labour* Annual salary per full-time equivalent employee 7.44 0.31 
Emergency Room Visits (%) (Emergency department visits/outpatient visits)*100 25.94 16.97 
Outpatient Surgery (%) (Outpatient surgery/outpatient visits)*100 5.45 16.97 
Medicare Case Mix Index Medicare Case Mix Index 1.50 0.25 
Teaching Affiliation (%) Binary variable (1,0) for hospitals that are teaching hospitals 61.91 48.56 
   
Efficiency Effects Variables 
Magnet Recognition Hospital (%) Binary variable (1,0) for Magnet Recognition hospital 19.85 39.89 
Pre-test (%) Binary variable (1,0) for Magnet Recognition status during 
pre-test period 
33.29 47.13 
Implementation (%) Binary variable (1,0) for Magnet Recognition status during 
implementation period 
34.27 47.47 
Post-test (%) Binary variable (1,0) for Magnet Recognition status during 
post-test period 
32..43 46.82 
Unemployment Rate Average unemployment rate in hospital’s market area 5.27 1.79 
For Profit (%) Binary variable (1,0) for investor-owned hospitals 4.50 20.73 
System Affiliation (%) Binary variable (1,0) for system affiliation 28.72 45.25 
Medicare Share (%) (Medicare inpatient days/total inpatient days)*100 39.01 14.39 
Medicaid Share (%) (Medicaid inpatient days/total inpatient days)*100 11.02 8.98 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index Index for concentration of hospital discharges 0.17 0.24 
   
*Indicates transformed by natural logarithm 
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Table 8.  Generalized likelihood-ratio tests of null hypotheses for parameters of the translog stochastic cost frontier model. 
Null hypothesis Test statistic λ i  value Decision Implication 
H0:  γ = 01 2,509.07 17.672 Reject Use SFA instead of OLS. 
H0:  βij = 0 2,862.24 18.31 Reject Use the translog model instead of the Cobb-Douglas model. 
H0:  δ1 = δ12 = 03 1,699.27 22.36 Reject Include inefficiency variables in the model. 
H0:  u = 04 209.59 3.81 Reject Use truncated-normal distribution rather than half-normal 
distribution for residuals. 
1
  γ = σu
2/(σv2 + σu2), where v represents the classical random error and u the inefficiency residual, so larger values of γ indicate that a 
greater proportion of the regression residuals is due to inefficiency. 
2
  The critical value is taken from table 1 of Kodde and Palm211 because a mixed Chi-square distribution must be used. 
3
  δ1 = δ12 = 0 represents the coefficients estimated for the inefficiency effects variables. 
4
  The truncated-normal distribution has a placement parameter, u (estimated as δ0 in Table 9).  The half-normal distribution is a 
special case in which δ0 is restricted to 0. 
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Table 9.  Parameter estimates for the frontier cost function. 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant 4.944 8.874** 
Outpatient Visits 0.775 10.191** 
Outpatient Visits Squared 0.032 4.551** 
Inpatient Days −0.649 −11.076** 
Inpatient Days Squared 0.160 36.634** 
Outpatient Visits x Inpatient Days −0.130 −12.431** 
Price of Capital 1.300 3.347** 
Price of Capital Squared 1.197 18.164** 
Price of Capital x Outpatient Visits −0.184 −5.068** 
Price of Capital x Inpatient Days 0.255 7.321** 
Emergency Room Visits (%) 0.000 0.801 
Outpatient Surgery (%) 0.004 17.562** 
Medicare Case Mix Index 0.411 22.424** 
Teaching Affiliation  0.078 9.708** 
Year 0.019 15.434** 
   
Inefficiency effects   
     δ0 −7.576 −50.392** 
     δMagnet Recognition 0.097 1.534 
     δImplementation 0.389 4.324** 
     δPost-test 0.466 4.359** 
     δMagnet Recognition x Implementation −1.838 −16.144** 
     δMagnet Recognition x Post-test −1.841 −15.071** 
     δUnemployment Rate (%) 0.034 2.000* 
     δFor Profit 0.049 4.755** 
     δSystem Affiliation −0.078 −2.408* 
     δMedicare Share (%) −0.002 −1.053 
     δMedicaid Share (%) 0.014 7.052** 
     δHHI 0.492 5.910** 
     δYear −0.009 −3.965** 
   
σ
2
 
0.893 45.771** 
γ = σu
2/(σv2 + σu2) 0.952 618.056** 
Log-likelihood 49.36  
*p < 0.05 
**p < 0.01 
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Table 10.  Mean inefficiency estimates for all, MR and never-MR hospitals by time-period. 
 All Hospitals MR Hospitals Never MR Hospitals 
Time-period N Mean Standard Deviation N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Pre-period 1,828 0.1341 0.0861 358 0.1248 0.0712 1,470 0.1708 0.1225 
Implementation 1,882 0.1325 0.1050 372 0.1235 0.0997 1,510 0.1688 0.1173 
Post-period 1,781 0.1170 0.0878 360 0.1154 0.0923 1,421 0.1236 0.0653 
          
Total time-period 5,491 0.1278 0.0938 1,090 0.1212 0.0890 4,401 0.1546 0.1073 
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Results 
The parameters of the cost frontier were estimated using the simultaneous maximum 
likelihood method in the FRONTERI 4.1 program.182  Table 9 presents the results for parameters 
estimated by the frontier cost function.   
 
Cost Function Variables 
The estimated coefficients for Price of Capital and some of the output variables (or their 
square or interaction terms) have parameter estimates that were either insignificant or 
counterintuitive.  According to Rosko and Mutter (2010), this should not be unexpected due to 
the high correlations between the variables.173  While multicollinearity impacts the reliability of 
the parameter estimates for the output variables and the Price of Capital167, it does not introduce 
a bias in the inefficiency estimates.180  Since the purpose of this study is not to investigate the 
cost function parameters, the trans-log cost function is retained.   
Both Outpatient Surgery (%) and Medicare Case Mix Index have coefficients that are 
positive and significant, which is expected.  Increases in the proportion of outpatient surgery or 
increases in Medicare Case Mix Index increase resource utilization and therefore increase costs.  
As expected, hospitals that are affiliated with teaching institutions are 7.8% more expensive than 
non-teaching hospitals.   
 
Inefficiency Effects Variables 
The primary variable of interest is the interaction between Magnet Recognition and Post-
test, which indicates whether MR hospitals are more or less cost efficient than the comparison 
group of never MR hospitals.  The results in Table 9 indicate that the cost-inefficiency estimates 
are negatively associated with MR in the post-test period.  This suggests that compared to never 
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MR hospitals, MR hospitals are more efficient (p<0.01).  These results confirm the statements 
made in the research literature that MR hospitals are more efficient.15, 131 
The estimated results show a positive and significant coefficient of for-profit ownership, 
which indicates that for-profit hospitals in the sample are more cost inefficient than not-for profit 
hospitals (p<0.01).  The positive coefficient for the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (p<0.01) 
indicates that there is more cost inefficiency in markets where output is concentrated in fewer 
hospitals.  This result has also been found in a number of other studies.152, 176  According to 
Rosko (2001), profit maximizing firms with monopoly power are likely to increase profits by 
producing less output at higher prices or by changing the product mix to less expensive outputs 
thereby reducing costs.152 
A higher unemployment rate is associated with more cost inefficiency which is 
anticipated (p<0.05).  The coefficient on Medicaid Share is positive and significant.  This finding 
suggests that Medicaid payment is associated with increased cost inefficiency, which is an 
unexpected result.  System affiliation was associated with reduced cost inefficiency (p<0.05), 
which is consistent with results that this structural feature has operational benefits.  Hospitals 
that are part of a multihospital system may have the ability to provide services at lower costs and 
greater efficiency by collaborating on service delivery.151 
The positive coefficient of the time-trend variable in the cost function suggests that all 
hospitals (i.e. both MR and never MR hospitals) have been adopting more expensive technology.  
However, the time trend variable in the inefficiency effects variables is negative.  This means 
that inefficiency decreased during the study period.   
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Estimated Inefficiency 
Table 10 presents the mean estimated cost inefficiency by year for all hospitals, MR and 
never-MR hospitals.  The mean estimated cost inefficiency score for the entire sample was 
0.1278 or 12.78%, which lies in the ranges of inefficiency estimates found in other studies.151, 152, 
154, 155, 172, 173, 176
  The MR hospitals had lower overall cost inefficiency (12.12%) than the never 
MR hospitals (15.46%).  Over the three time periods, the mean cost inefficiency for both groups 
is declining.  The largest decrease in mean inefficiency score occurred from the implementation 
period to the post-period for both MR and never MR hospitals.   
 
Discussion 
 This study has provided some interesting results about the relationship between the MR 
signal and hospital cost inefficiency.  While the MR signal has been promoted to increase 
productivity and reduce hospital costs, this is the first national panel study to investigate the 
relationship between the MR signal and inefficiency using SFA.  The estimated results indicate 
that MR hospitals have lower cost inefficiency than the comparison group of never-MR 
hospitals.  These findings support the hypothesis of this study and confirm the claims stated in 
the literature that the MR designation increases efficiency and contributes to cost-effective 
care.127, 129   
The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of the MR signal on hospital cost 
inefficiency.  As discussed previously, MR is theorized to signal the promotion of excellence in 
nursing care86 and professional nursing practice131, emphasis on collaboration and team work34, 
35
, and creation of a positive culture and work environment.33  Research has confirmed that a 
professional practice environment supports nurses to function at the highest scope of clinical 
practice, to work effectively in an interdisciplinary team of caregivers, and to mobilize resources 
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quickly.75  In fact, the evidence suggests that hospitals with a poor working environment are 
associated with higher costs.116 
Providers are expected to interpret the MR signal and respond by seeking or maintaining 
employment in designated hospitals resulting in reduced nursing turnover, reduced 
recruitment118, 132 and orientation costs38, reduced usage of agency nurses38 and increased 
provider satisfaction.33, 60  According to research evidence, MR hospitals result in high levels of 
nursing work satisfaction, which in turn leads to lower vacancy and turnover rates.  One MR 
facility reported a reduction in nursing turnover from 30% in 2000 to 12% in 2008.124  Another 
MR facility reported a decrease in nursing vacancy rates from 19% in 2000 to 5% in the first 
quarter of 2007.125  Nurses who work at MR hospital are also more likely to stay than those who 
work in non-MR hospitals.  According to the ANCC, the average length of employment of RNs 
on staff in a MR hospital is 8.35 years.126   
This reduction in nursing turnover in MR hospitals is postulated to be linked to an 
associated savings of $64,000 per nurse.38  One MR hospital reported a reduction in labour costs 
of $4 million each year since 2007.124  These cost savings have been attributed to a reduction in 
recruitment costs, reduction in orientation costs, and productivity gains.38  MR has been 
hypothesized to give hospitals an advantage in terms of recruiting and retaining nurses83 by 
creating professional practice environments where nursing is valued.  The designation is used as 
a recruiting tool to attract nurses seeking employment in the best clinical practice settings.87  MR 
hospitals are acknowledged as good places to work for all employees, not just nurses.87   
MR is now also used to recruit other health professionals, such as physicians, 
pharmacists, and laboratory technicians.88  New hires have noted that MR is associated with 
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highly competent and coordinated staff.81  Furthermore, physician satisfaction scores are higher 
at MR hospitals compared to non-MR hospitals, which also influences physician recruitment.110 
It is important to note that in addition to the MR signal, this reduction in cost inefficiency 
may also be attributed to the operational changes that result due to the implementation of MR 
program.  For instance, cost savings associated with MR have also been rationalized through the 
delivery of cost effective patient care, such as lower average lengths of stay, use of fewer 
pharmaceuticals, and fewer tests resulting in a reduction in average patient costs.15, 133  A 
research study found that length of stay declined from 4.86 days to 4.73 days in a Magnet 
Recognized hospital.128  It has been postulated the improvement in the nurses’ work 
environment, attributed to MR, has been linked to reduction in medical errors and adverse patient 
outcomes.23, 116  A study by Lake et al. found that patients in MR hospitals had a 5% lower fall 
rate after controlling for multiple factors that influence fall risk.212  Another study in 2007, using 
National Database on Nursing Quality Indicators data reports fall rates in MR hospitals to be 
10.3% lower than the non-MR hospitals.  Pressure ulcer rates have also been reported to be lower 
in MR organizations.  A 2008 study reported that patients who had received care for a hip 
fracture were less likely to develop decubitus ulcer in MR versus non-MR hospitals.38  These 
fewer adverse events could lead to reduced use of high-cost intensive care units, which are 
supposed to increase efficiency and contribute towards cost effective care.127, 129 
Prior research evidence appears to support the contribution of both the MR signal and 
operational changes on hospital cost inefficiency.  Unfortunately, the results from this study 
cannot be used to determine between the reductions in cost inefficiency attributed to the MR 
signal and/or the operational changes from the MR program.  However, a recent study by 
Jayawardhana et al. (2014) found evidence that MR hospitals result in a significant increase in 
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inpatient costs, a 2.46% increase in inpatient costs on average.41  These findings indicate that 
there may be limited costs savings resulting from the delivery of inpatient health care services in 
MR hospitals.  Therefore, perhaps the operational and structural changes due to the 
implementation of MR and the provision of cost-effective patient care may not be fully 
responsible for the reduction in hospital cost inefficiency.  Instead, a plausible reason for the 
reduction in hospital cost inefficiency found in this study may be attributed to and associated 
with the MR signal. 
 
Policy Implications 
 The results from this study suggest that MR hospitals are more efficient than never-MR 
hospitals.  The reduction in inefficiency may be attributed to either or both the signaling effect of 
MR or the operational changes in hospitals due to MR.  While the MR program is not intended to 
improve efficiency of hospitals, the study results support the claims of additional benefits related 
to the designation.  This may have numerous implications.   
For instance, this may result in an increase in demand for MR by hospitals interested in 
recruiting and retaining providers, especially nurses.  Hospitals are now starting to realize that 
nursing shortages lead to increasing costs88, which is attributed to the increased use of agency 
nurses (who are reimbursed at higher rates), increased overtime of nurses, and many other 
factors.85  The financial health of a hospital is in jeopardy if they do not have a strong nursing 
department and cannot survive as a good health care facility.99  MR has been hypothesized to 
give hospitals an advantage in terms of recruiting and retaining nurses83 by creating professional 
practice environments where nursing is valued.  With the nursing shortage, hospitals may use 
MR as a potential recruiting strategy to attract highly qualified nurses and other health care 
providers seeking employment to their organization.17   
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The MR signal may communicate standards and expectations established by hospitals.  
Such that, when seeking employment, nurses may also be more discriminating when making 
their selections and may require or only consider MR hospitals as places of employment.  This 
may hinder the ability of non-MR hospitals to attract and retain nurses and other providers to 
their respective facilities. 
There may also be an increase in the demand and appeal for MR by hospitals due to the 
potential cost savings that may result because of the restructuring and operational changes that 
take place during the transition to becoming a MR hospital.213  With the reductions in provider 
payments that are occurring, government and advocacy agencies may consider promoting MR or 
components of MR as pathways to not only improve quality, but also to reduce costs and 
improve efficiency.  Thus potentially ensuring the financial viability of the hospital and 
maintaining access to services by the community. 
MR is a costly endeavour for hospitals.  In light of these results, CEOs and CFOs will 
need to carefully contemplate their decisions to pursue MR in terms of the costs and the future 
cost savings that will result.  Hospital managers of MR hospitals should be attentive to the 
specific changes and restructuring of health care delivery in their hospitals, since certain features 
may positively influence cost inefficiency.  
 The analysis of cost inefficiency in hospitals can make a major contribution to improving 
health services.  The current health care system in the U.S. is undergoing major changes to 
ensure the sustainability of the system.  The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act focuses 
on increasing access, improving quality and reducing costs.  The current payment systems are 
being restructured to incentivize providers to reduce costs, focus on the delivery of evidence 
based care, and encourage the delivery high quality care in an efficient manner.  Opportunities to 
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increase revenue generation through reimbursement for hospitals may be limited.  In order to 
continue operations and to be financially viable, hospitals will need to emphasize the delivery of 
cost effective care, while maintaining high quality.  
 
Limitations 
 It is important to note that the results presented in this study are estimates of relative cost 
inefficiency and may differ from true cost inefficiency.  SFA measures differences in 
inefficiency between hospitals in relation to a theoretical best practice frontier.   
Despite the inclusion of a number of cost variables, the results may be affected by 
omitted variable bias or measurement error.  While the distribution of the error term may have 
minimal impact on the estimates of relative cost inefficiency of the hospital sample, it may 
impact the magnitude of the point estimates.176  In other words, while the relative inefficiency 
estimates will remain true, the mean values may change if a different theoretical probability 
distribution is selected to represent the residual.177 
 A number of efficiency analysis studies using SFA with longitudinal panel data have 
been conducted using the random effects regression technique.182  This technique is known to 
have a few limitations.  First, in this model the cost inefficiency error components must be 
assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors.  A violation of this assumption may lead to 
inconsistent inefficiency estimates.152   
An alternative method is the application of a fixed effect regression approach.183  The 
fixed effects regression does not require making the assumption that inefficiency is uncorrelated 
with the regressors and does not require a distribution assumption about the error components.152  
However, this approach will capture the effects of all unobservable variables that vary across 
hospitals, but are time invariant for each hospital.  Furthermore, consistent estimation of 
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inefficiency requires a large number of observations per hospital.  This study used a panel of 6 or 
fewer observations per hospital which may result in inconsistent estimates.  In addition, the fixed 
effects approach assumes that hospital inefficiency is time invariant, i.e. the change in 
inefficiency is the same over time for each hospital.  This assumption may not hold true if a 
hospital responds to environmental pressures by increasing efficiency in different amounts.152, 176  
With the availability of a long panel, this assumption may be relaxed by using an approach that 
allows time-varying inefficiency.153  
 The inclusion of quality variables to the SFA, such as mortality or readmission rate, may 
be appropriate if quality requires additional resources.  For instance, reductions in quality might 
be falsely attributed to increases in cost inefficiency.  In fact, changes in quality might be 
affected by improvements in processes, as well as, by increases in the number and quality of 
inputs.  Rosko and Mutter (2007) recommend the inclusion of multiple quality outcome 
measures that capture the multifaceted nature of hospital quality153 such as patient outcomes and 
severity of illness.152 The inclusion of quality variables is constrained by the availability of valid 
quality measures for a national sample of hospitals.  However, several researchers have included 
quality measures in frontier analysis of health care organizations and have found that these 
variables had minimal impact on results.152, 209 
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CHAPTER 6:  THE EFFECT OF THE MAGNET RECOGNITION SIGNAL ON 
HOSPITAL FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE.
 
Overview 
This study examines the effect of the MR signal on hospital financial performance.  Data 
from the American Hospital Association Annual Survey, Medicare Hospital Cost Reports, Area 
Resource File and American Nurses Credential Center are used for the analysis.  To control for 
selection bias, propensity score analysis is applied to match MR hospitals to never MR hospitals.  
The final study sample includes the matched hospitals.  A difference-in-difference model with 
hospital fixed effects is applied to the matched hospital sample to test the effect of MR signal, 
while controlling for both hospital and market characteristics.  Results indicate that the MR 
signal improves the financial performance of designated hospitals compared to non-designated 
hospitals. 
 
Introduction 
Signals have an important role in reducing the existence of information asymmetry.  
Information asymmetry is defined as an imbalance of information between two parties, where 
one party has more information than another party.  This imbalance can result in misinformation 
and an imbalance of power in transactions.  In health care, information asymmetry impairs the 
ability of hospitals to compete effectively in health care markets10 because stakeholders are 
unable to evaluate the quality of health care.  This incomplete information influences selection of 
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hospitals by payers, patients and providers8, which may negatively influence a hospital’s 
financial viability. 
Signals are often used in healthcare to communicate the underlying quality of a hospital’s 
products and services.  The information contained in the signal permits stakeholders to make 
informed decisions and to distinguish between high quality and low quality products.  Healthcare 
providers attempt to communicate the quality of their services to prospective patients and/or 
employees in a variety of ways.9  Some communicate directly using public reporting of quality of 
care information to enable patients to make informed choices about their health care providers.10  
Others communicate indirectly, or signal, unobservable information to consumers by attaining a 
costly, coveted quality designation, which the consumer can interpret as the firm’s commitment 
of resources to quality management.58  The quality information conveyed by the signal then leads 
consumers to update their perceptions2, 43 about product and service quality.44   
MR designation is an example of a signal employed by hospitals to communicate their 
commitment towards health care quality and quality management to patients, providers and 
payers.9  MR is a quality designation given by the ANCC to hospitals and long term care 
facilities18, 19 to recognize organizations as centers of nursing excellence.86  Pursuing and 
sustaining MR requires the commitment of time and the investment of substantial human and 
financial resources21, 22 and the designation has gained widespread attention in both research24, 25 
and practice26 over the past two decades.  MR is considered to be a symbol of distinction11 and 
has been theorized to signal that the hospital is a center for nursing excellence and the provider 
of quality patient care12, which is an important attribute in today’s competitive market place.16, 17  
MR signals to patients and to health care providers about the hospital’s dedication and 
commitment to quality patient care.13-15 
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There is growing evidence (empirical and anecdotal) that MR hospitals are associated 
with positive nursing, patient and organizational outcomes.24, 25  These outcomes are interrelated 
and have also been theorized to affect hospital financial performance through signaling the 
delivery of quality care to consumers, thereby increasing cost savings, revenue, and market 
share.  Despite these claims, there have been no research studies that have empirically evaluated 
the effect of the MR signal on the financial performance of hospitals.  The purpose of this 
research study is to investigate the effect of the MR signal on hospital financial performance.   
This study builds on existing evidence on the effects of signaling unobserved quality in 
two ways.   First, although the effect of signaling on firm financial performance has been widely 
studied in the corporate setting, there is minimal research focusing on the effect of signaling in 
hospitals, many of which are not-for-profit. 
Second, although there are a large number of studies conducted on MR hospitals that 
have considered financial performance as an outcome, none has specifically examined the 
signaling effect of MR.  Existing studies are predominantly case studies, single-site evaluations33 
or cross sectional surveys using convenience samples of organizations and staff respondents.185   
With the increased number of MR hospitals in existence over an extended period of time, 
it is now possible to design longitudinal research studies that address issues of sample size and 
omitted variable bias, allowing robust evaluation of the effectiveness of the MR signal.  This 
study uses externally reported administrative and financial information, and employs a robust 
methodological approach and innovative analytical techniques to evaluate the effect of MR on 
hospital financial performance.   
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Research Design and Methods 
Research Design 
 This study applies a pre-post research design to measure the effect of the MR signal on 
hospital financial performance.  The design attempts to control for observable and unobservable 
factors that will potentially contribute to any difference between the pre-test and post test results 
by dividing hospitals into two groups.  The treatment group includes hospitals that have achieved 
MR anytime during the study period, and is referred to as MR hospitals.  The control hospitals 
are referred to as “Never-MR hospitals.” 
 Three study periods are used.  The pre-test period is defined as a minimum of two years 
when the hospital is not pursuing MR.  The pre-test period is a baseline before the hospital is 
considering pursuing MR.  The implementation period is defined as two years prior to the initial 
MR designation, when the hospital is preparing for MR.  According to the research literature, 
hospitals pursuing the MR designation require approximately two years to transform and become 
a MR hospital.138  The implementation period aims to control for any changes in hospital 
characteristics and outcomes that may occur during the transition to becoming a MR hospital.  
The post-test period is defined as the year of initial MR designation and subsequent years of 
designation.  A minimum of two years post-recognition are required. 
 
Data Sources 
 The hospital data for this analysis are obtained from Medicare’s Hospital Cost Report 
Information System (HCRIS), the American Hospital Association’s (AHA) Annual Survey of 
Hospitals, the Area Resource File (ARF) and the American Nurses Credentialing Center 
(ANCC) website.   
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The four data sets are merged using both a year and a hospital identifier; however the 
definition of the year variable differs in the various data sets.  The HCRIS data set includes 
hospital year observations organized by fiscal year and the ARF, ANCC and AHA data sets 
include hospital-year observations organized by calendar year.  In order to merge HCRIS data 
set, a year-end variable is created using the following rule:  the fiscal year end date for each 
hospital-year observation (i.e. 6/30/2000) will be designated as the year-end variable (i.e. 2000) 
and is matched with the calendar year variable.  This will permit the four data sets to be merged. 
The final merged data set will be used in this analysis. 
 
Study Sample 
The study sample is a longitudinal, unbalanced panel of MR and never MR hospitals 
located in urban areas in the US from 2000 to 2010 (eleven years).  The initial data set consists 
of 3,431 hospitals (31,163 hospitals year observations).  Duplicate hospital year observations, 
hospital year observations with fewer than 330 days in the Medicare cost report period, hospitals 
with fewer than 8 hospital year observations, hospitals that do not have a hospital year 
observation at year 2000, and hospitals that received MR before 2004 and after 2009 are 
excluded from the data set. 
In addition, to remain in the final study sample, each MR hospital must have four 
consecutive years of data prior to MR designation, and a minimum of two consecutive years of 
data following MR designation, for a maximum of six hospital-year observations.  MR hospitals 
with limited or missing financial data potentially introduce noise and bias the results; therefore, 
only MR hospitals that have complete data over a minimum of six consecutive years are 
included. Although this requirement reduces the sample size, the reduction in the eligible 
hospital-year observations is trivial. 
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The final sample consists of 23,607 hospital year observations (2,199 hospitals) from 
2000 to 2010.  This includes 21,072 never MR hospital year observations (1,968 hospitals) and 
2,535 MR hospital year observations (231 hospitals).   
Propensity score analysis is used to create a study sample of matched MR hospitals and 
never MR hospitals.  Using data from the year 2000, the propensity score analysis predicts the 
probability that a hospital will ever achieve MR as a function of hospital and market 
characteristics in 2000.  A greedy matching algorithm is used to match MR hospitals to never 
MR hospitals in the year 2000.  Following the recommendation by Guo, a 1 to 4 nearest 
neighbour matching within a caliper without replacement is used.163  As suggested by 
Rosenbaum, the caliper size is set at 0.25σp, (where 0.25σp denotes the standard deviation for the 
estimated propensity scores in the hospital sample).162  The matches from 2000 serve as the 
matches for the remainder of the study period. 
This results in an unbalanced panel data set of 12,480 hospital year observations (from 
2000 to 2010), consisting of 921 never MR hospitals and 231 MR hospitals.  Since each hospital 
should have a maximum of 6 hospital year observations (2 hospital year observations for pre-
test, 2 hospital year observations for implementation and 2 hospital year observations for post-
test), hospital year observations that are not designated in one of these time periods are excluded 
from the final data set.  The final study sample consists of 6,581 hospital year observations 
consisting of 921 never MR hospitals and 231 MR hospitals.   Standardized differences are used 
to measure covariate balances between the MR hospitals and the matched never MR hospitals.  
The post-match standardized differences are <10% for all the covariates.  This confirms that 
balance between the MR and the never MR hospitals has been successfully achieved.   
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Variables and Measurements 
Table 11 is a comprehensive list of variables, measures, definitions and data sources that 
are utilized in this paper. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 MR is proposed to improve a hospital’s financial performance either through increasing 
revenue38 or decreasing expenses.30  Together or individually, these changes may result in an 
increase in profitability and therefore have an impact on hospital financial performance.  
Financial performance is measured using operating profitability, total profitability and return on 
equity.  Operating margin is a measure of profitability141 and frequently used to assess the 
financial health of an organization142 since it is directly affected by changes in either operating 
revenue or costs.  This ratio focuses on core business operations and therefore excludes 
investment income and other types of revenue and expenses unrelated to operating activities.143  
Total margin is a measure of total profitability and includes income from both operating and 
non-operating activities.144  Operating margin and total margin greater than zero indicate 
profitability (revenues are greater than expenses) and margins less than zero indicate losses 
(revenues are less than expenses.).  Return on equity is another measure of financial performance 
and it measures the rate of return for each dollar in equity (net assets).145 
 
Independent Variables – Main Explanatory Variable 
The Magnet Recognition Designation variable identifies hospitals as either MR or never 
MR.  The Hospital Magnet Recognition Status variable identifies the time period as either pre-
test, implementation, or post-test during the six year period over which each hospital is observed.   
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Independent Variables – Control Variables 
Hospital Characteristics 
Hospital characteristics are noted to be associated with a hospital’s financial health.157  
These characteristics include a hospital’s structural factors and processes, which influence 
hospital operations, marketability and ability to earn revenue.  
Hospital characteristics include hospital size (measured by total number of beds) which is 
associated with higher economies of scale and financial expertise, lower per unit costs, and more 
successful strategic activity.146, 147  System affiliation (determined using the Medicare Cost 
Report) indicates whether a hospital is owned by a larger system.  Such affiliations have been 
found to result in increased efficiency, lower risk, better financial outcomes, seamless care, 
greater control over referrals, and greater economies of scale.146, 147   
Medicare payer mix and Medicaid payer mix are calculated as the percentage of total 
inpatient days attributed to Medicare and Medicaid, respectively.  These measures provide an 
indication of the hospital’s patient-mix 146 and the payer-mix.148  An increased dependence on 
government payers, such as Medicare and Medicaid, is likely to be associated with lower patient 
revenue, because these payers typically do not pay the full average cost of care.146 
Teaching affiliation indicates if a hospital is a teaching hospital or a non-teaching 
hospital.  Teaching hospitals are known to have higher costs than non-teaching hospitals.155  
Teaching affiliation is included as a binary variable in this analysis.  Ownership indicates for-
profit, not-for-profit ownership or government ownership.  These variables are included to 
control for internal pressure for cost reduction associated with ownership.186  Due to their 
responsibilities to shareholders, for-profit firms are expected to more aggressively pursue cost 
reduction strategies than not-for-profit firms.  For-profit firms are also unlikely to be interested 
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in the adoption of innovations that are unproven or may raise costs39, and as a result, may have 
higher operating margins than their not-for-profit counterparts.156  
 
Market Characteristics 
A hospital’s operating environment and the market demand for health care services can 
also influence hospital financial performance.157 The hospital’s market area is defined as the 
county in which the hospital is located.   
The total population in the market, the market population density and the percent of the 
population age 65 and over describe the demand for hospital services in the market area. The 
average per capita income, unemployment rate and poverty rate (percentage of families or 
persons in poverty) measures a community’s financial ability to purchase health care services.158  
The likelihood of a resident to bypass a hospital and seek services at another facility is proxied 
by the average distance from patient residence to hospital, calculated as the average distance 
between the residence ZIP centroid of each Medicare discharge and the hospital.159  The hospital 
market share, a measure of the amount of hospital competition in the market area, is measured as 
the hospital’s discharges as a percentage of the total discharges in a hospital’s market area.159  
Hospital competition is measures the number of hospitals physically located in the market area 
and is a measure of suppliers of health care services.   
There is a large variation in the location of MR hospitals.  Region, captured using U.S. 
census regions, is included to control for the effect of hospital location on both the likelihood of 
becoming a MR hospital and the existence of regional differences.160  Annual unmeasured 
factors affecting hospital financial performance and market share over time are accounted for 
using year dummies.   
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Table 11.  Listing of variables, measures, definitions and data sources. 
Variable Measure Type Data Source 
Dependent Variable 
Operating Profitability Operating Margin (%) = [(Operating Revenues-Operating 
Costs)/(Operating Revenues)]*100 
Continuous HCRIS 
Total Profitability Total Margin (%) =  [(Total Revenues-Total Costs)/(Total 
Revenues)]*100 
Continuous HCRIS 
Reinvestment Return on Equity (%) = [(Operating Revenues-Operating 
Costs)/(Equity)]*100 
Continuous HCRIS 
Magnet Recognition 
Magnet Recognition Designation 1, Magnet Recognition Hospital;  Never Magnet Recognition 
Hospital (referent) 
Binary ANCC 
Hospital Magnet Recognition Status Pre-Test (referent);  Implementation;  Post-Test Binary ANCC 
Hospital Characteristics 
Hospital size Number of Staffed Beds Continuous HCRIS 
System Affiliation System Affiliation; Free Standing (referent) Binary HCRIS 
Medicare Payer Mix Medicare Inpatient Days/Total Hospital Inpatient Days Continuous HCRIS 
Medicaid Payer Mix Medicaid Inpatient Days/Total Hospital Inpatient Days Continuous HCRIS 
Teaching Affiliation Teaching Affiliation;  No Teaching Affiliation (referent) Binary AHA 
Ownership Not-for-Profit;  For-Profit;  Government (referent) Binary AHA 
Market Characteristics 
Population Total Population in the County (1,000s) Continuous ARF 
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Variable Measure Type Data Source 
Population Density County Population Density (population per square miles) Continuous ARF 
Percent of the Population 65 and Over [Total Population Age 65 and Older in Market Area/Total 
Population in Market Area]*100 
Continuous ARF 
Income Per Capita Income in Market Area (1,000s) Continuous ARF 
Unemployment Rate Unemployment Rate in Market Area Continuous ARF 
Poverty Rate Percent/proportion of Families or Person in Poverty in Market 
Area 
Continuous ARF 
Distance from Residence to Hospital Average Distance from Place of Residence to Hospital (miles) Continuous ARF 
Hospital Market Share Hospital Discharges/Total Discharges in Market Area Continuous ARF 
Hospital Competition The total number of hospitals in the hospital’s geographical 
market. 
Continuous HCRIS 
Region Midwest;  Northwest;  South;  West (referent) Binary ARF 
Year 2000 (referent);  2001…2010 Binary ARF 
ANCC:  American Nurses Credentialing Center, HCRIS:  Healthcare Cost Reports Information System, ARF:  Area Resource File, 
AHA:  American Hospital Association 
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Statistical Analysis 
Descriptive statistics are used to summarize the data.  In order to mitigate the effect of 
outliers, dependent variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.  Bivariate analysis is 
used to test for differences between the subgroup means for MR hospitals versus never MR 
hospitals.  The differences between the group means on each measure are analyzed for direction 
and statistical significance using t-tests for continuous variables and chi-square test for 
categorical variables.  Statistical significance is set at α=0.05 for all analyses.  Correlation 
analysis is completed to identify potential multicollinearity among the independent variables.  
The analysis is conducted using Stata 11.1 (College Station, Texas).166 
 
Empirical Analysis - Difference-in-Difference Estimation 
A difference-in-difference model with hospital fixed effects is used to estimate the effects 
of MR on hospital performance: 
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where h indicates variables that vary by hospital and t indicates variables that vary by time.  The 
fY refers to the unobserved time-invariant variables, and the MYZ refers to the unobserved time-
variant variables.   
The coefficient ! is a measure of the difference in financial performance between MR 
and never MR hospitals during the pre-test phase of the study.  This estimate determines if the 
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MR and never MR hospitals are similar or different at the initiation of the study.  However, since 
this variable is invariant over time, ! cannot be estimated using hospital fixed effects 
regression.  Therefore this parameter will not be estimated in the regression.  Fixed Effects 
Vector Decomposition (FEVD) is an econometric tool that has been recommended to estimate 
the coefficient of time-invariant variables.187  Unfortunately, while the parameter estimates for 
the time-invariant variables are correct the standard errors produced from the FEVD are biased 
downward, resulting in false conclusions about statistical significance.188 
The coefficient !+ is a measure of the difference in financial performance from the pre-
test period to the post-test period for never MR hospitals.  This estimate measures the change in 
the financial performance share that is attributed to market and hospital factors.  The summation 
!+ # !` is the difference in financial performance from the pre-test period to the post-test period 
for the MR hospitals.  Thus, the difference, !`, is the net effect of the MR signal on financial 
performance.  This estimate is a measure of the difference in financial performance between MR 
and never MR hospitals and between post-test and pre-test attributed to the MR signal.  In this 
study, !` is the main parameter of interest since it is a measure of the effectiveness of the MR 
signal on financial performance. 
 
Results 
 Table 12 presents the descriptive statistics of the study sample.  A comparison between 
MR hospitals and never-MR hospitals reveals that MR hospitals are better financial performers.  
The operating profitability (5.6% versus 3.65%), total profitability (5.71% versus 2.89%) and 
return on equity (6.75% versus 4.49%) are significantly higher for MR hospitals than non-MR 
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hospitals.  Another notable difference between the MR and never-MR hospitals include that MR 
hospitals have a significantly higher market share (19.4% versus 17.9%).   
 Table 13 presents the results of the difference-in-difference regression model.  Since 
Magnet Recognition, Hospital size, and Region are time-invariant, these variables do not remain 
in the regression model.   
Results indicate that there is an overall positive and statistically significant relationship 
between the MR signal and both operating profitability and total profitability (p<0.05) between 
the pre-test and the post-test periods.  The MR signal is associated with a 1.21 percentage point 
increase in operating profitability and a 0.86 percentage point increase in total profitability.   
 Table 12 also shows that Medicaid payer mix, not-for-profit and for-profit ownership, 
and poverty rate are significantly associated with operating profitability.  Medicaid payer mix is 
associated with a 0.069 percentage point decrease in operating profitability.  In comparison to 
government hospitals, both not-for-profit and for-profit ownership are associated with a 4.41 and 
5.52 percentage point decrease in operating margin.  Lastly, a one percentage point increase in 
poverty rate is associated with a 0.30 percentage point increase in operating margin.   
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Table 12.  Summary statistics of dependent and independent variables (N=6,581 hospital year observations) from 2000 to 2010 
 
All Hospitals 
 
(N=6,581 hospital year 
observations & 1,192 
hospitals) 
Never Magnet Recognition 
Hospitals 
(N=5,246 hospital year 
observations & 921 
hospitals) 
Magnet Recognition 
Hospitals 
(N=1,335 hospital year 
observations & 231 
hospitals) 
P 
Value 
 Mean Standard Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Dependent variable        
Operating Profitability 4.06 8.46 3.65 8.81 5.60 6.78 0.000 
Total Profitability 3.48 11.70 2.89 12.60 5.71 7.04 0.000 
Reinvestment 4.98 9.60 4.49 10.00 6.75 7.94 0.000 
Magnet Hospital 
Recognition Status 
       
Pre-test (%) 33.10 - 33.10 - 33.00 - 0.895 
Implementation (%) 34.50 - 34.50 - 34.40 - 0.924 
Post-test (%) 32.40 - 32.30 - 32.70 - 0.818 
Hospital Characteristics         
Hospital size (Total beds) 445.00 333.00 439.00 340.00 466.00 302.00 0.080 
System affiliation (%) 29.70 - 29.70 - 29.60 - 0.948 
Medicare Payer Mix (%) 38.50 14.30 38.30 15.00 39.00 11.30 0.094 
Medicaid Payer Mix (%) 11.90 9.70 12.00 10.10 11.50 7.83 0.090 
Not-for-profit hospital (%) 86.10 - 86.00 - 86.20 - 0.844 
For-profit hospital (%) 4.30 - 4.40 - 4.00 - 0.505 
Government hospital (%) 9.60 - 9.60 - 9.80 - 0.820 
Teaching Affiliation (%) 66.60 - 66.50 - 67.20 - 0.662 
Market Characteristics        
Population (1,000s) 3,588.04 4,782.68 3,571.45 4,800.64 3,653.22 4,712.57 0.577 
Population density  726.00 737.00 722.00 742.00 742.00 718.00 0.376 
Percent of Population 65 
and over (%) 
12.00 2.45 12.00 2.48 12.10 2.35 0.422 
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All Hospitals 
 
(N=6,581 hospital year 
observations & 1,192 
hospitals) 
Never Magnet Recognition 
Hospitals 
(N=5,246 hospital year 
observations & 921 
hospitals) 
Magnet Recognition 
Hospitals 
(N=1,335 hospital year 
observations & 231 
hospitals) 
P 
Value 
 Mean Standard Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Income 37,192.05 7,137.81 37,139.18 7,104.58 37,399.79 7,265.89 0.234 
Unemployment Rate (%) 5.29 1.79 5.30 1.79 5.25 1.79 0.327 
Poverty Rate 11.50 2.52 11.50 2.55 11.60 2.43 0.075 
Distance from Residence to 
Hospital 
16.60 8.56 16.70 8.61 16.20 8.35 0.046 
Hospital competition 10.30 14.5 10.20 14.60 10.90 14.10 0.135 
Hospital market share (%) 18.20 24.3 17.90 24.40 19.40 23.90 0.045 
Region        
West 0.147 - 0.151 - 0.133 - 0.105 
Midwest 0.315 - 0.311 - 0.334 - 0.098 
Northeast 0.194 - 0.190 - 0.210 - 0.089 
South 0.343 - 0.349 - 0.322 - 0.068 
Year        
2000 (%) 0.039 - 0.039 - 0.039 - 0.958 
2001 (%) 0.066 - 0.066 - 0.066 - 0.996 
2002 (%) 0.090 - 0.090 - 0.090 - 0.975 
2003 (%) 0.108 - 0.108 - 0.109 - 0.924 
2004 (%) 0.127 - 0.127 - 0.126 - 0.913 
2005 (%) 0.139 - 0.139 - 0.139 - 0.984 
2006 (%) 0.134 - 0.134 - 0.133 - 0.949 
2007 (%) 0.107 - 0.107 - 0.107 - 0.983 
2008 (%) 0.082 - 0.082 - 0.083 - 0.853 
2009 (%) 0.064 - 0.064 - 0.063 - 0.861 
2010 (%) 0.044 - 0.044 - 0.045 - 0.920 
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Table 13. Difference-in-difference regression with hospital fixed effects 
Dependent Variable 
Operating Profitability Total Profitability Return on Equity 
Coefficient Robust SEs Coefficient 
Robust 
SEs Coefficient 
Robust 
SEs 
Hospital Intervention       
  Magnet Recognition Hospitala, f - - - - - - 
Magnet Recognition Hospital Status       
  Implementationb 0.12 0.28 −0.28 0.28 0.15 0.45 
  Post-testb −0.030 0.46 −0.51 0.47 0.20 0.77 
  Magnet Recognition*Implementation 0.36 0.38 0.36 0.35 −0.47 0.60 
  Magnet Recognition*Post-test 1.21* 0.49 0.86* 0.43 0.088 0.71 
Hospital Characteristics       
  Hospital Sizef - - - - - - 
  System affiliation 0.065 0.39 0.044 0.360 0.423 0.640 
  Medicare Payer Mix 0.034 0.048 0.029 0.040 0.110 0.070 
  Medicaid Payer Mix −0.069* 0.030 −0.048 0.030 −0.120* 0.050 
  Not-for-profit hospitale −4.41* 2.13 −1.46 1.33 4.55** 1.75 
  For-profit hospitale −5.52* 2.62 −2.76 2.02 2.31 3.10 
  Teaching Affiliation −1.19 0.75 0.12 0.65 −2.93 1.63 
Market Characteristics       
  Population (1,000s) −0.0039 0.0032 −0.0024 0.0027 −0.0038 0.0048 
  Population Density 0.013 0.019 0.008 0.017 0.014 0.028 
  Percent of Population 65 and over −1.18 0.84 −1.31 0.73 −0.16 1.08 
  Income 0.000050 0.00011 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  Unemployment Rate 0.043 0.18 0.00 0.17 0.010 0.26 
  Poverty Rate 0.30* 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.097 0.18 
  Distance from  Residence to hospital −0.0026 0.13 −0.016 0.09 0.086 0.19 
  Hospital Competition −0.043 0.15 −0.25 0.13 0.19 0.26 
  Hospital Market Share (%) 8.31 5.19 7.21 5.13 2.91 5.05 
Region       
  Northeastd, f - - - - - - 
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Dependent Variable 
Operating Profitability Total Profitability Return on Equity 
Coefficient Robust SEs Coefficient 
Robust 
SEs Coefficient 
Robust 
SEs 
  Midwestd, f - - - - - - 
  Southd, f - - - - - - 
Time       
  Year 2001c 0.14 0.70 −0.59 0.55 −0.96 0.99 
  Year 2002 c 0.73 0.84 −0.69 0.72 −1.13 1.15 
  Year 2003 c 0.66 0.94 −0.058 0.85 −0.51 1.30 
  Year 2004 c 0.92 1.07 0.69 0.96 0.37 1.53 
  Year 2005 c 1.32 1.19 1.21 1.09 0.086 1.72 
  Year 2006 c 0.93 1.38 1.36 1.30 −0.31 2.02 
  Year 2007 c 1.77 1.56 2.31 1.48 −0.20 2.32 
  Year 2008 c 0.29 1.91 −0.84 1.78 −3.97 2.79 
  Year 2009 c 1.25 2.20 0.74 2.05 −1.89 3.22 
  Year 2010 c 3.09 2.39 3.49 2.23 0.11 3.62 
       
Constant 18.96 14.64 21.26 12.68 −4.60 23.01 
       
Number of Hospital Year Observations 6,122  6,065  5,929  
Number of Hospitals 1,100  1,103  1,097  
      
F Statistic (29, 1099)=4.42 
p=0.000 
(29, 1102)=12.18 
p=0.000 
(29,1096)=8.15 
p=0.000 
aReference is control hospitals;  bReference is the pre-test period;  cReference is year 2000;  dReference is west;  eReference is 
government hospitals;  fTime invariant variables. 
*Statistically significant at the 5% level.  **Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Fixed effects are at the hospital level. 
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Discussion 
 The primary finding of this study is that the MR signal results in an increase in hospital 
profitability.  Specifically, the MR signal is associated with a 1.21 percentage point increase in 
operating margin and a 0.86 percentage point increase in total margin.  This translates to a $1.21 
million increase in operating margin and $0.86 million increase in total operating margin for 
every $100 million in revenue.  Based on the regression estimates, an average MR hospital has 
an operating margin of 5.61% and a total margin of 4.96% compared to an operating margin of 
3.71% and a total margin of 3.72% for an average never-MR hospital.   
These findings support the claims made in the various sources of literature that the non-
financial benefits resulting from MR will result in improved financial performance.  These non-
financial benefits, which include improved retention and decreased turnover of nurses118, 132, 
improved satisfaction for all clinical staff15, 86, improved patient quality and safety120, 214, and 
increased customer attraction for hospital selection96, all correspond to potential for cost savings 
and increased revenue opportunities38 that can improve financial performance.   
A recent study by Jayawardhana et al. (2014) found evidence that MR hospitals result in 
a significant increase in both inpatient costs and inpatient revenues.41  However, in order to 
achieve higher profitability (both operating and total profitability), the increase in inpatient costs 
would need to be offset by higher net inpatient revenue.  In a previous research study, the author 
investigated the effect of MR signal on market share and reimbursement.  In contrast to findings 
from previous descriptive studies, the empirical results from this analysis indicate that the MR 
signal does not have an effect on either hospital reimbursement or hospital market share.32   
These findings imply that the MR signal does not result in an increase a hospital’s revenue.   
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The author also investigated the effect of the MR signal on hospital cost inefficiency 
applying a SFA, using total hospital expenses in the analysis.  The results from this study 
indicate that the MR signal is associated with a significant (p<0.01) reduction in hospital cost 
inefficiency, which may be attributed to either the signaling effect of MR and/or operational and 
process changes that occur due to the transition to becoming a MR hospital.  Decreases in 
hospital cost inefficiency are related to a reduction in hospital expenditures and increased 
productivity.131  In the study by Jayawardhana et al. (2014) MR was found to increase inpatient 
costs by 2.46%41, which suggests that any potential cost savings due to the delivery of cost 
effective patient care may be trivial, since on average inpatient costs appear to increase instead of 
decrease.  This increase in inpatient costs in MR hospitals41 supports the hypothesis that the 
reduction in cost inefficiency may be due to the MR signal.  The increases in hospital 
profitability observed in this study may be attributed to a reduction in expenditures instead of 
increases in either market share or reimbursement.  
 Medicaid payer mix was found to have a negative effect on operating margin which is 
consistent with the findings in the literature.  It has been shown that hospitals that are dependent 
on Medicaid have a higher probability of closing, a higher probability of bond rating downgrades 
and a lower profitability.146  In terms of hospital ownership, both not-for-profit and for-profit 
hospitals have lower operating margins than government hospitals, which was unexpected.  
Property rights theory suggests that for-profit hospitals will be more focused on earning profits 
than not-for-profit hospitals.  These results can be explained by the internal pressures to reduce 
costs and increase efficiency that are associated with ownership.  Government hospitals likely 
have more pressure to reduce costs because of their accountability to the public, when compared 
to not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals. 
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Also of interest is that poverty rate is associated with an increase in operating margin.  
This was an unexpected finding.  Poverty rate is considered to be an indicator of a community’s 
financial ability to purchase health care services.  Hospitals located in areas with higher poverty 
rates may respond by reducing inefficiencies and focusing on cost saving strategies, which may 
lead to improvements in operating margin. 
 
Implications 
 The results of this study suggest that MR hospitals are more profitable than non-MR.  
This finding has implications for providers, policy makers, and the ANCC itself.  First and 
foremost, hospital CNOs may now be more encouraged to pursue MR designation.  In an era of 
scarce resources, some CNOs may have been reluctant to approach senior management and 
Boards with what could be considered costly proposals..  Removal or at least reduction of this 
barrier may empower nurse executives and lead to a new focus on nursing excellence in some 
hospitals. 
Fewer CEOs and CFOs may perceive MR as a costly endeavour and may consider the 
pursuit of the designation due to the potential positive financial benefits.  CEOs and CFOs have a 
fiduciary responsibility to invest scarce capital resources in ways that maximize benefit to the 
organization.  Senior managers now have evidence that pursuing MR recognition will not 
necessarily adversely affect the financial health of the organization and indeed may improve it.  
This study strengthens the argument for MR, which has been perceived as a costly pursuit with 
negligible returns on the requisite investment. 
Government, accreditation and industry organizations may support or require hospitals to 
attain MR.  With the emphasis on reduction in reimbursement and linking reimbursement to the 
delivery of quality care, hospitals are facing challenges that impact their future sustainability and 
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ability to continue operations.  MR may be a potential solution to help hospitals to continue to be 
financially viable while still improving quality of care by focusing on quality management, 
efficiency and cost containment.  Although MR is a costly endeavour, hospitals may be 
encouraged to pursue MR through either the provision of financial support, financial incentives, 
or changes in reimbursement. 
From the perspective of the ANCC itself, the study results may enhance the reputation 
and the perceived value of MR, may lead to more applications for MR, and increase the visibility 
and popularity of MR.  The ANCC now has evidence of the financial benefits of the Magnet 
designation.  However, as the demand for MR increases and more hospitals seek to become MR, 
the distinction and exclusivity attached to the MR signal may become weakened or diluted.  To 
prevent this from happening, the ANCC may become more selective in bestowing hospitals with 
the MR designation by utilizing more rigor in review criteria.   
 
Limitations 
There are a few limitations associated with this study.  Primarily, there are a number of 
variables of interest that were not included in the analysis due to inaccessibility of the data or 
inability to measure specific variables, potentially resulting in biased parameter estimates in the 
proposed empirical analysis.  For example, the scope of services provided has been found to be 
strongly associated with likelihood of pursuing Magnet designation 197, but is not available in the 
existing data set.  In addition, the existence of other process management techniques, hospital’s 
management style, and measures of organizational culture are unobservable but could affect how 
a hospital is managed both financially and operationally.  However, the use of fixed effects 
regression was intended to control for variables such as these and all other unmeasured fixed 
hospital characteristics, which may be time invariant.   
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Although the analysis attempted to match MR hospitals to never MR hospitals, no two 
hospitals are similar in all respects. Propensity scores only control for observed variables and do 
not consider the effect of unobserved variables163 in the decision of hospitals to seek MR. For 
example, a hospital may seek MR if other quality measures are decreasing. This non-random 
decision to seek MR can thus result in biased parameter estimates of the likelihood of MR.   
Although the ANCC website lists the current MR designated hospitals, it does not 
provide information on hospitals that applied for MR but were unsuccessful, hospitals that are 
currently undergoing the transformation to become MR recognized, or hospitals that had their 
MR status rescinded due to non-compliance with the program’s requirements. 
 
Conclusion 
Although the primary purpose of the MR is not to improve financial performance of 
hospitals, with the current economic climate, fiscal constraints, healthcare workforce shortages, 
and reduced reimbursements, hospitals might be contemplating pursuing this strategy to increase 
competitiveness in the health care market and to improve financial performance.  The pursuit of 
the MR is an important organizational decision resulting in substantial modifications to the 
structure and culture of organizations and requires considerable investment of time and 
resources, initially and ongoing as the process continues.  Knowledge of the pathway by which 
the MR signal effects hospital financial performance can be the deciding factor for hospital 
managers and decision-makers interested in undertaking this endeavour.
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CHAPTER 7:  CONCLUSION
 
What did the three studies investigate? 
 This dissertation research aims to address the existence of information asymmetry in 
health care organizations by applying signaling theory to investigate the effect of MR on the 
various dimensions of financial performance.  The three research studies in Chapters 3 to 6 
investigated whether the MR signal has an impact on a hospital’s financial performance.  MR is 
proposed to be a signal of unobserved quality utilized by hospitals.  According to signaling 
theory, hospitals signal their commitment to nursing excellence and quality care through the MR 
designation.  The signal is received by payers, patients, and providers.  Their responses and 
actions to the signal will influence three different intermediate outcomes:  increasing 
reimbursement, increasing market share, and/or reducing cost inefficiency.  An increase in 
reimbursement and/or market share will increase revenue and decreasing hospital cost 
inefficiency will reduce hospital expenditures.  The combined effect will be an increase in 
hospital profitability. 
 
What did the three studies find? 
Although MR signal has been hypothesized to improve reimbursement through 
negotiations with payers32 and increase market share by increasing patient volume through 
signaling to patients and providers the hospital’s commitment to patient quality15, 18, 31, the results 
in Chapter 4 do not support these hypotheses.  The effect of the MR signal on hospital market 
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share and hospital reimbursement, while controlling for hospital and market characteristics, 
indicate that the MR signal has no influence on either of these intermediate outcomes.   
MR has also been associated with the promotion of excellence in nursing care86 and 
professional nursing practice131, emphasis on collaboration and team work34, 35, and creation of a 
positive culture and work environment.33  Providers are expected to interpret the MR signal and 
respond by seeking or maintaining employment in designated hospitals resulting in reduced 
nursing turnover, reduced recruitment118, 132 and orientation costs38, reduced usage of agency 
nurses38 and increased provider satisfaction.33, 60  The combination of these outcomes is 
hypothesized to improve hospital efficiency by increasing productivity and reducing costs.  The 
results in Chapter 5 indicate that MR decreases hospital cost inefficiency of designated hospitals 
compared to control hospitals.  This finding supports the hypothesis of this study, and confirms 
the claims stated in the literature that MR increases hospital efficiency.127, 129  However, in 
addition to the MR signal, the improvement in efficiency may also be attributed to operational 
and structural changes in the hospital.  The requirements of attaining MR may result in changes 
in the hospital’s policies and procedures, leading to the delivery of cost effective patient care and 
therefore a reduction in cost inefficiency.  Unfortunately, the distinction between these two 
pathways cannot be determined. 
Finally, there is growing evidence (empirical and anecdotal) that MR hospitals are 
associated with positive nursing, patient and organizational outcomes.24, 25  These outcomes are 
interrelated and have been theorized to affect hospital financial performance through three 
pathways:  (1) cost savings, (2) increased revenue, and (3) market share, all through signaling 
delivery of quality care to payers, patients and providers.  The results in Chapter 6 show that the 
MR signal results in an increase in hospital profitability.  The results from Chapter 4 indicate that 
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the increases in profitability are not attributed to either hospital reimbursement or hospital 
market share, since the MR signal did not have a significant effect on either of these outcomes.  
However, the increases in profitability may be due to a reduction in costs, occurring though 
improvements in hospital efficiency, which is confirmed in Chapter 5.  The results in Chapter 5 
show that MR is associated with a decrease in hospital cost inefficiency.  However, this decrease 
may be due to either the signaling of MR to providers or the changes in the hospital’s structure, 
process and delivery methods93 that are required to become a MR.  Unfortunately, the 
contribution of each pathway to the reduction in cost inefficiency is unknown.  However, a 
recent study found an increase in average inpatient costs for MR hospitals41, which may question 
the ability of a MR hospital to reduce costs in the provision of cost effective care. 
 
Is Magnet Recognition an effective signal of unobserved quality? 
 The premise of this study was to determine the effectiveness of MR as a signal of 
unobserved quality.  MR is considered to be a signal used by hospitals to communicate to 
consumers and health care providers about the care which they can expect to receive in a MR 
hospital.13-15  MR is proposed to reduce the information asymmetry by signaling to various 
stakeholders, the hospitals’ commitment to nursing excellence and quality management 
strategies.  It is considered to be an effective signal of quality because it meets the two conditions 
previously described.  First, MR is directly observable by consumers because hospitals have 
been shown to strongly promote receipt of the designation through marketing, public display of 
banners, and other advertising.16, 60-62 Second, MR is costly63 and therefore difficult to imitate for 
providers that do not have meaningful quality information to convey.64 
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 The effectiveness of the MR signal is determined by its impact on the various dimensions 
of hospital financial performance:  reimbursement, market share, cost inefficiency and 
profitability.  Previous research suggests that the MR designation may signal quality information 
to multiple stakeholders including patients, payers and providers.  It is hypothesized that if the 
MR signal is effective, these stakeholders will respond accordingly and the signaling hospital 
will experience an increase in hospital reimbursement32, market share15, 18, 31, efficiency15, 133 and 
profitability.38, 136, 137   
 However, from the results of this study, it can be concluded that the effectiveness of the 
MR signal is limited.  The MR signal did not appear to elicit the expected outcome from the 
hospital.  In other words, it had no effect on either hospital reimbursement or market share.  This 
result may be explained by a number of factors.  The signaling environment may hamper or 
strengthen the signaling effect.  A noisy environment, such as the existence of multiple different 
signals may diminish the observability of the signal.  According to Connelly et al. (2011), signal 
effectiveness is also dependent upon the characteristics of the signal, such as signal strength, 
signal visibility, signal clarity, and signal frequency which are used to describe the detectability 
of a signal.  Even if the signal is strong, the effectiveness may be determined by the 
characteristics of the receiver of the signal.  The signal will not be recognized if the receiver is 
not looking for the signal or if the receiver is unable to interpret the signal.43   
 On the contrary to the findings listed above, MR was found to result in a decrease in 
hospital inefficiency, which supports the stated hypothesis.  The MR signal has been 
hypothesized to reduce hospital inefficiency through reduced nursing turnover, reduced 
recruitment118, 132 and orientation costs38, reduced usage of agency nurses38 and increased 
provider satisfaction.33, 60  However, structural and operational changes attributed to the MR 
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program may also be responsible for these findings.93  Unfortunately, the results of this study 
cannot determine the pathway by which hospital cost inefficiency is reduced.  A recent study 
found that inpatient costs increased in MR hospitals41, instead of decreased costs as proposed by 
Mason (2003).127, 129  The increased inpatient costs in MR hospitals may weaken the argument 
that cost efficiency is due to the delivery of cost-effective care, but instead may be due to the MR 
signal and its reduction in nursing personnel costs, as stated previously.  The effectiveness of the 
MR signal in this pathway may be due to the characteristics of the receiver, in this case the 
provider.  Since MR is a designation given to hospitals for their dedication and commitment to 
nursing excellence and quality patient care, providers such as nurses may seek out and interpret 
this signal when selecting future employment.   
 The combined effect of the MR signal was found to result in a significant increase in 
hospital profitability.  This increase in hospital profitability may be explained by the reduction in 
hospital inefficiency, which is associated with a decrease in hospital expenses.  Given the 
findings of these three studies, the effectiveness of the MR signal appears to vary depending on 
the receiver.  Overall, the MR signal can be described as weak and unrecognizable.  First, the 
signal does not appear to be readily detected by receivers.  Second, the signaling frequency is 
hindered due to the small number of MR hospitals currently in existence, thereby limiting the 
number of MR signals that are produced.  Third, the signal fit, which is the correlation between 
the MR signal and hospital’s unobservable quality (the focus on nursing excellence and quality 
patient care) is diminished.  The signal effectiveness is also determined by the characteristics of 
the receivers.  In order for a signal to be effective, the receiver needs to be actively scanning the 
environment for the signal.  In this study, specifically the payers and patients may not be actively 
seeking out the MR signal, so these parties may be unaware of the existence of the MR signal 
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and do not respond as expected.  Different receivers also interpret signals differently than others 
do.  Providers like nurses and physicians, may be more aware of the MR signal, since it is a 
hospital designation, and may have a different interpretation of this signal when compared to 
patients and payers, who may have a completely different interpretation.43 
 
What are the management and policy implications of the three studies? 
First, for a signal to be effective, it needs to valid, recognizable, interpretable and elicit 
the appropriate response.  No impact between MR and hospital reimbursement suggests that 
hospital CEOs and CFOs may not be leveraging MR as a means to highlight their quality 
accomplishments to negotiate better reimbursement rates from payers.  In turn, the payers may 
not recognize, not interpret, and/or not respond to the MR signal.  Payers may either be unaware 
or not value that MR hospitals are acknowledged as providers of excellence in nursing care.213  
Although previous research suggests that quality metrics emphasize the hospital’s commitment 
to quality management and may even give hospitals an added advantage in negotiations194, the 
MR signal does not appear to provide this benefit. 
Second, no impact between MR signal and hospital market share indicates that hospital 
executives and policy makers should carefully consider the financial resources dedicated to 
publicizing MR.  Hospitals incur enormous costs in the promotion of MR.  Full page newspaper 
advertisements, billboards, websites and television spots are used to promote MR in an attempt 
to raise awareness and to market themselves to patients, nurses and the community.60  While MR 
has been associated with various positive benefits for patients, nurses and the organization, these 
benefits may not be communicated by the MR signal to these various stakeholders, perhaps due 
to weaknesses in the signal. 
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Third, In light of the reduction in reimbursements payment methods and an increased 
focus on cost reduction and quality improvement, there may be an increased in demand by 
hospitals interested in pursuing the designation as a means to remain financially viable.  Policy 
makers may consider promoting MR or components of MR as pathways to not only improve 
quality, but also to reduce costs and improve efficiency. 
Fourth, from the perspective of the MR program, the study results may enhance the 
reputation and the perceived value of MR and may lead to more applications for MR and 
increase the visibility and popularity of MR.  For hospitals, fewer CEOs and CFOs may perceive 
MR as a costly endeavour and may consider the pursuit of the designation due to the potential 
positive financial benefits.  For government, accreditation and industry organizations may 
support or require hospitals attain MR as a means to improve quality and sustainability.   
Finally, these results present hospital managers and policy makers with the pathway by 
which the MR signal has an impact on hospital profitability and the need to review and 
comprehend the structure and processes that lead to the improvement in hospital profitability.  
The primary purpose of the MR is not to improve reimbursement, increase market share, or 
reduce cost inefficiency.  However, with the current economic climate, fiscal constraints, 
healthcare workforce shortages, and reduced reimbursements, hospitals might be contemplating 
pursuing this strategy to increase competitiveness in the health care market and to improve 
financial performance.  The pursuit of the MR is an important organizational decision resulting 
in substantial modifications to the structure and culture of organizations and requires 
considerable investment of time and resources, initially and ongoing as the process continues.  
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